vacating judgment removes any precedential effect and "[a]ll is effectually extinguished" (quoting Lebus v. Seafarer's Int'l Union, Etc. , 398 F.2d 281 , 283 (5th Cir. 1968)
How later courts described this case
- vacating judgment removes any precedential effect and "[a]ll is effectually extinguished" (quoting Lebus v. Seafarer's Int'l Union, Etc. , 398 F.2d 281 , 283 (5th Cir. 1968)
- “Because we have vacated the Court of Appeals judgments in this case, the doctrine of the law of the case does not constrain either the District Court or, should an appeal subsequently be taken, the Court of Appeals.”
- "The Board's articulated purpose for the [voluntary] adoption of the Plans was the alleviation of de facto segregation at Gage Park and Morgan Park High Schools. We find the state interest in promoting integration in these two high schools and communities, while at the same time affording all students residing in these attendance areas a viable opportunity to attend high school in an integrated setting, to be compelling.”
- a school board may "consider the probability of white flight in formulating a remedial plan to prevent de facto segregation in public schools"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Rehnquist,
with whom Justice Marshall joins, dissenting.
Title 28 U. S. C. §2106 provides that “[t]he Supreme Court. . . may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review . . . .” Our practice over many years indicates that implicit in this grant of authority is a requirement that we specify our reasons for acting as we do. Here the Court departs from that implicit requirement. The ultimate disposition of the case is the vacation of the judgment of the Court of Appeals and a remand so that this case may be consolidated with another proceeding in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. A reading of the Court’s per curiam suggests that the Court is vaguely dissatisfied with the opinion of the Court of Appeals which it purportedly reviews, but no substantive judgment is made as to whether that opinion was correct or incorrect in whole or in part. Nothing in the record before us suggests to me any reason why we should assume a function more properly exercised by the Court of Appeals or by the District Court, and order consolidation of this case with another pending action in the District Court. But even if I were disposed to agree as to the propriety of the disposition now made by the Court, I would hope that something in the nature of an opinion explaining the reasons for the action would accompany the disposition. Since the Court’s per curiam makes, no effort at such an explanation, I dissent.