stating that the Ex Post Facto Clause, which operates on statutes regardless of their effect on "vested rights,” supports the separation-of-powers principle by confining the Legislature to the enactment of prospective criminal sanctions, and the Judiciary to the application of existing criminal law
How later courts described this case
- stating that the Ex Post Facto Clause, which operates on statutes regardless of their effect on "vested rights,” supports the separation-of-powers principle by confining the Legislature to the enactment of prospective criminal sanctions, and the Judiciary to the application of existing criminal law
- stating that Ex Post Facto Clause forbids enactment of a law “which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at 8 the time it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed” (emphases added) (quoting Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 , 325–326 (1867))
- stating that ex post facto prohibition in United States constitution "forbids the Congress and the States to enact any law which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed”
- stating that “[t]he ex post facto prohibition forbids the Congress and the States to enact any law ‘which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed.’”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled on other grounds by California Department of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 (1995) — not on the Supreme Court's list
67 L Ed 2d 17 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds California Dep’t of Corrections v Morales, 514 US 499
Supreme Court of the United StatesApr 25, 19959 citing opinionsother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead itReported overruled on other grounds by Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990) — not on the Supreme Court's list
450 U.S. 24, 33, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990)
Declined to follow by Brown v. State, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 961 (1986)
We reject Jackson’s contention that Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 [101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17] (1981), should control in these circumstances.
Declined to follow by State v. Jackson, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 564 (1985)
We reject Jackson's contention that Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981), should control in these circumstances.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Gwong v. Singletary, 683 So. 2d 109 (1996)
The department argues that Waldrup and Weaver are distinguishable because they both deal with changes in the law, whereas here we are confronted with a change in an administrative rule.
Distinguished by Wilkerson v. State, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 45 (1985)
We reject Jackson's contention that Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 [101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17] (1981) should control in these circumstances.
Distinguished by In Re Ramirez, 39 Cal. 3d 931 (1985)
First, he argued that Weaver is distinguishable because the credits there were reduced regardless of the prisoner’s good conduct.
Distinguished by Love v. Black, 597 F. Supp. 1092 (1984)
But Weaver is clearly distinguishable.
The opinion
Justice Rehnquist,
concurring in the judgment.
I find this case a close one. As the Court recently noted: “It is axiomatic that for a law to be ex post facto it must be more onerous than the prior law.” Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U. S. 282, 294 (1977). Petitioner was clearly disadvantaged by the loss of the opportunity to accrue gain time through good conduct pursuant to the 5-10-15 formula when the legislature changed to a 3-6-9 formula. The new statute, however, also afforded petitioner opportunities not available *38 under prior law to earn additional gain time beyond the good-conduct formula. * The case is not resolved simply by comparing the 5-10-15 formula with the 3-6-9 formula. “We must compare the two statutory procedures in toto to determine if the new may be fairly characterized as more onerous.” Ibid.
I am persuaded in this case, albeit not without doubt, that the new statute is more onerous than the old, because the amount of gain time which is accrued automatically solely through good conduct is substantially reduced, and this reduction is not offset by the availability of discretionary awards of gain time for activities extending beyond simply “staying out of trouble.” This is not to say, however, that no reduction in automatic gain time, however slight, can ever be offset by increases in the availability of discretionary gain time, however great, or that reductions in the amount of credit for good conduct can never be offset by increases in the availability of credit which can be earned by more than merely good conduct.
Since the availability of new opportunities for discretionary gain time and the reduction in the amount of automatic gain time can be viewed as a total package, it must be empha *39 sized that nothing in today’s decision compels Florida to provide prisoners in petitioner’s position with the benefits of the new provisions when this Court has held that Florida may not require such prisoners to pay the price. It is not at all clear that the Florida Legislature would have intended to make available the new discretionary gain time to. prisoners earning automatic gain time under the old 5-10-15 formula, when the legislature in fact reduced the 5-10-15 formula when it enacted the new provisions. The question is, of course, one for Florida to resolve.
While the Court points out that gain time was available under the old scheme beyond the 5-10-15 formula, ante, at 35, n. 19,1 am not convinced that the new sources simply “reiterate [d]” opportunities previously available. There is, for example, no dispute that several of the new sources of gain time have no analogues in the previous statutory or administrative scheme. See, e. g., Fla. Stat. §944.275 (2) (e) (1979) (up to six days of gain time per month because of age, illness, infirmity, or confinement for reasons other than discipline); § 944.275 (3) (a) (up to six days per month for inmates who diligently participate in an approved course of academic or vocational study). Other new statutory provisions which had only administrative counterparts improved substantially on the availability of gain time. For example, under the old administrative system, an inmate could receive from 1 to 15 days of gain time per month for constructive labor, Fla. Admin. Code, Rule 10B-20.04 (1) (1975), while under the new statutory scheme, an inmate can receive up to 1 day of gain time for every day of constructive labor, Fla. Stat. § 944.275 (2) (b) (1979).