stating that the Ex Post Facto Clause, which operates on statutes regardless of their effect on "vested rights,” supports the separation-of-powers principle by confining the Legislature to the enactment of prospective criminal sanctions, and the Judiciary to the application of existing criminal law
How later courts described this case
- stating that the Ex Post Facto Clause, which operates on statutes regardless of their effect on "vested rights,” supports the separation-of-powers principle by confining the Legislature to the enactment of prospective criminal sanctions, and the Judiciary to the application of existing criminal law
- stating that Ex Post Facto Clause forbids enactment of a law “which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at 8 the time it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed” (emphases added) (quoting Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 , 325–326 (1867))
- stating that ex post facto prohibition in United States constitution "forbids the Congress and the States to enact any law which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed”
- stating that “[t]he ex post facto prohibition forbids the Congress and the States to enact any law ‘which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed.’”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled on other grounds by California Department of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 (1995) — not on the Supreme Court's list
67 L Ed 2d 17 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds California Dep’t of Corrections v Morales, 514 US 499
Supreme Court of the United StatesApr 25, 19959 citing opinionsother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead itReported overruled on other grounds by Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990) — not on the Supreme Court's list
450 U.S. 24, 33, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990)
Declined to follow by Brown v. State, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 961 (1986)
We reject Jackson’s contention that Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 [101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17] (1981), should control in these circumstances.
Declined to follow by State v. Jackson, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 564 (1985)
We reject Jackson's contention that Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981), should control in these circumstances.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Gwong v. Singletary, 683 So. 2d 109 (1996)
The department argues that Waldrup and Weaver are distinguishable because they both deal with changes in the law, whereas here we are confronted with a change in an administrative rule.
Distinguished by Wilkerson v. State, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 45 (1985)
We reject Jackson's contention that Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 [101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17] (1981) should control in these circumstances.
Distinguished by In Re Ramirez, 39 Cal. 3d 931 (1985)
First, he argued that Weaver is distinguishable because the credits there were reduced regardless of the prisoner’s good conduct.
Distinguished by Love v. Black, 597 F. Supp. 1092 (1984)
But Weaver is clearly distinguishable.
The opinion
Justice Blackmun,
with whom The Chief Justice joins, concurring in the judgment.
Were the Court writing on a clean slate, I would vote to affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida. My *37 thesis would be: (a) the 1978 Florida statute operates only prospectively and does not affect petitioner’s credits earned and accumulated prior to the effective date of the statute; (b) “good time” or “gain time” is something to be earned and is not part of, or inherent in, the sentence imposed; (c) all the new statute did was to remove some of petitioner’s hope and a portion of his opportunity; and (d) his sentence therefore was not enhanced by the statute. In addition, as the Court’s 18th footnote reveals, ante, at 34-35, the statutory change by no means was entirely restrictive; in certain respects it was more lenient, as the Court’s careful preservation for this prisoner of the new statute’s other provisions clearly implies. Ante, at 36 and this page, n. 22.
The Court’s precedents, however, particularly Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U. S. 397 (1937), and the summary disposition of Greenfield v. Scafati, 277 F. Supp. 644 (Mass. 1967), aff’d, 390 U. S. 713 (1968), although not warmly persuasive for me, look the other way, and I thus must accede to the judgment of the Court.