holding that a court may impose attorney’s fee sanction against opposing counsel for “abusive litigation practices” only in “narrowly defined circumstances,” including where the court makes a finding that “counsel’s conduct ... constituted or was tantamount to bad faith”
How later courts described this case
- holding that a court may impose attorney’s fee sanction against opposing counsel for “abusive litigation practices” only in “narrowly defined circumstances,” including where the court makes a finding that “counsel’s conduct ... constituted or was tantamount to bad faith”
- stating that contempt powers are “the most prominent” of the court’s inherent powers “which a judge must have and exercise in protecting the due and orderly administration of justice and in maintaining the authority and dignity of the court”
- stating that contempt powers are “the most prominent” of court’s inherent powers “which a judge must have and exercise in protecting the due and orderly administration of justice and in maintaining the authority and dignity of the court”
- holding that bankruptcy courts have discretion in fashioning sanctions for failure to make § 329(a) and Rule 2016(b
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported superseded by statute, as recognized in In the Matter of Omni Video, Inc., Debtors. George Houston, Otr/california Stock Transfer and Daniel Lezak v. Floyd Holder, Trustee — not on the Supreme Court's list
447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980), superseded on other grounds by statute, The Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 3 , 94 Stat. 1154 , 1156 (Sept. 12, 1980)). 32 Roadway Exp., Inc., 447 U.S. at 767 . 33 In re Omni Video, Inc., 60 F.3d 230, 233
Court of Appeals for the Fifth CircuitSep 11, 19955 citing opinionsby statuteother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead it
The opinion
Mr. Chief Justice Burger,
dissenting.
I dissent from the Court’s holding that it was improper for the District Court to look to 42 U. S. C. §§ 1988 and 2000e-5 (k) to determine whether attorney’s fees were assessable as part of the excess costs which the respondent attorneys could be made to pay under 28 U. S. C. § 1927 .
Section 1927 does not itself attempt to define the costs which an attorney may be forced to pay because of vexatious, dilatory tactics and conduct, except to state that the attorney may be forced to pay only the excess costs generated by his misconduct. One must look elsewhere to determine the types of costs which are assessable. It may be correct that ordinarily a court would look to 28 U. S. C. § 1920 , which does not include attorney’s fees among its enumerated items. But whether or not attorney’s fees are recoverable as costs depends on the type of action involved. In Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 697 (1978), the Court noted that “there are a large number of statutory and common-law situations in which allowable costs include counsel fees.” In a footnote, the Court observed: “In 1975, we listed 29 statutes allowing federal courts to award attorney’s fees in certain suits. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S., at 260-261, n. 33. Some of these statutes define attorney’s fees as an element of costs, while others separate fees from other taxable costs. Compare 42 U. S. C. § 2000a-3 (b) with 29 U. S. C. § 216 (b) (1970 ed., Supp. V).” Id., at 697, n. 28 . *772 Title 42 U. S. C. § 2000a-3 (b), in pertinent part, states that the court in its discretion “may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs . . . whereas 29 U. S. C. § 216 (b) states that the court shall “allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.” Comparing the language of these sections to that of 42 U. S. C. §§ 1988 and 2000e-5 (k) at issue here, it seems plain to me that §§ 1988 and 2000e-5 (k) fall within the first category — statutes which define attorney’s fees as an element of costs. The Court said this in so many words in Hutto with regard to § 1988. 437 U. S., at 695 .
Thus, by statute, in Title VII actions, or in actions to enforce 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981 , 1983, 1985, and 1986, attorney’s fees are an element of costs. Sections 1988 and 2000e-5 (k) state that the awards may be made to the prevailing party, as was the instant award. They do not state who is to bear the costs. Normally, of course, the losing party will bear the costs. But if the court finds that the costs have been increased “unreasonably and vexatiously,” § 1927 empowers the court to make the errant attorneys themselves bear the excess costs occasioned by their misconduct. That is what happened here.
Respondents correctly point out that this Court has held in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412 (1978), that if the award is against the plaintiff, the suit must be found to have been frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. But that case does not determine the standard for an award of excess costs against an attorney. Section 1927 itself provides that standard; the attorney must have so multiplied the proceedings as to have increased costs unreasonably and vexatiously. Here, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals agreed that that standard had been met.
Given this disposition, I would not reach the other issues decided by the Court today.