holding that a court may impose attorney’s fee sanction against opposing counsel for “abusive litigation practices” only in “narrowly defined circumstances,” including where the court makes a finding that “counsel’s conduct ... constituted or was tantamount to bad faith”
How later courts described this case
- holding that a court may impose attorney’s fee sanction against opposing counsel for “abusive litigation practices” only in “narrowly defined circumstances,” including where the court makes a finding that “counsel’s conduct ... constituted or was tantamount to bad faith”
- stating that contempt powers are “the most prominent” of the court’s inherent powers “which a judge must have and exercise in protecting the due and orderly administration of justice and in maintaining the authority and dignity of the court”
- stating that contempt powers are “the most prominent” of court’s inherent powers “which a judge must have and exercise in protecting the due and orderly administration of justice and in maintaining the authority and dignity of the court”
- holding that bankruptcy courts have discretion in fashioning sanctions for failure to make § 329(a) and Rule 2016(b
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported superseded by statute, as recognized in In the Matter of Omni Video, Inc., Debtors. George Houston, Otr/california Stock Transfer and Daniel Lezak v. Floyd Holder, Trustee — not on the Supreme Court's list
447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980), superseded on other grounds by statute, The Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 3 , 94 Stat. 1154 , 1156 (Sept. 12, 1980)). 32 Roadway Exp., Inc., 447 U.S. at 767 . 33 In re Omni Video, Inc., 60 F.3d 230, 233
Court of Appeals for the Fifth CircuitSep 11, 19955 citing opinionsby statuteother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead it
The opinion
Mr. Justice Stevens,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
By its terms, 28 U. S. C. § 1927 applies to “cases in any court of the United States” and allows the recovery of excess costs from “[a]ny attorney” who vexatiously multiplies the proceedings “in any case.” 1 This language is broad enough to encompass a civil rights class action alleging racial discrim *770 ination in employment. Two separate statutes specifically authorize the recovery of attorney’s fees “as part of the costs” in this kind of litigation. 2 Of course, such fees, like any other cost items, are normally recoverable only from the losing litigant rather than from the attorney personally. But it seems to me that § 1927 gives the court the power to assess against counsel any item of cost that could be assessed against a party when that attorney unreasonably and vexatiously multiplies the proceedings.
The Court seems concerned about the fact that the standards for allowing a party to recover fees differ for plaintiffs and defendants in civil rights litigation. Ante, at 762. I simply do not understand the relevance of that concern. As I read § 1927, the Sanction may be applied to an obstreperous lawyer regardless of whether his client prevails, so long as fees may be awarded as part of the costs in the litigation.
The Court also states that there “is no persuasive justification” for subjecting lawyers in different areas of practice to the risk of differing sanctions. Ante, at 763. But Congress has made a legislative decision to treat lawyers in civil rights litigation differently than they are treated in most types of litigation. Because of that congressional determination, lawyers in these cases are more likely to be well paid than other lawyers and, conversely, their misconduct may subject their clients to liability for the fees of opposing counsel. A conclusion that such special treatment also subjects these lawyers to an additional risk for failing to observe the normal proprieties that obtain in litigation does not strike me as anomalous.
Ironically, the Court rejects my rather straightforward approach to the statutory language because it “would constitute standardless judicial lawmaking,” ante, at 762, but then, in Part III of its opinion, embarks on a venture of its own that *771 surely fits that description neatly. Although a trial court has inherent contempt powers, I have the gravest doubts about its inherent power to order a lawyer to pay damages to an opposing litigant. Since it is not at all necessary to reach out to decide that issue, however, I would simply answer the statutory question presented by the certiorari petition.
Although I do not disagree with the Court’s discussion of Rule 37 in Part II-B of its opinion, I respectfully dissent from its construction of § 1927 and its inherent-power holding.
See ante, at 756, n. 3.
Title 42 U. S. C. § 1988 and § 2000e-5 (k) both authorize an award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party “as part of the costs” of the litigation.