holding that no special parole term was authorized for a conviction for conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, which mentioned only fine and imprisonment and not special parole, and emphazing the “in addition to” language of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)
How later courts described this case
- holding that no special parole term was authorized for a conviction for conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, which mentioned only fine and imprisonment and not special parole, and emphazing the “in addition to” language of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)
- stating that “policy of lenity means that the Court will not interpret a federal statute so as to increase the penalty it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be no more than a guess as to what Congress intended”
- holding that 21 U.S.C. § 846 does not authorize a sentencing court to impose a special parole term upon a defendant who is convicted of conspiracy to manufacture or distribute a controlled substance
- recognizing that the rule of lenity “applies not only to interpretations of the substantive ambit of criminal prohibitions, but also to the penalties they impose”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported superseded by statute, as recognized in United States v. Arthur James Wessels — not on the Supreme Court's list
447 U.S. 381, 387, 100 S.Ct. 2247, 2252, 65 L.Ed.2d 205, 211 (1980), superseded by statute as stated in United States v. Wessels, 12 F.3d 746 (8th Cir.1993), described the rule of lenity as "the Court will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an inteipretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what ... [the Legislature] intended.’ ”…
The opinion
Mr. Justice Stevens,
with whom Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Rehnquist join, dissenting.
Should the directors of a narcotics distribution business be punished less severely than their subordinates who merely peddle the poison? It is unlikely that Congress so intended. See Callanan v. United States, 364 U. S. 587, 593-594 .
Since an ordinary reading of § 406 1 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 implies that a conspirator may be punished just as severely as a substantive offender, I would so construe the statute. This construction is fortified by the total absence of any statement by any legislator suggesting any purpose to treat conspirators in the drug trade with any greater lenity than substantive offenders. 2 This is particularly important in view of the fact that prior to the 1970 Act, Congress had authorized *403 identical penalties for conspiracies and completed offenses. See ante, at 391.
Because the statutory language conveys quite a different meaning to me, and because the Court has not paused to consider the narrow issue presented by this case in the context of the larger objectives Congress was seeking, I respectfully dissent.
“Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this title is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.” 84 Stat. 1265 , 21 U. S. C. § 846 .
Surely the Court’s reference ante, at 399, to the offense of attempt cuts the other way, for it is common for legislation to authorize the same range of punishments for attempts as for substantive offenses. See, e. g., American Law Institute, Model Penal Code § 5.05 (1) (Prop. Off. Draft 1962), which provides in part: “Except as otherwise provided in this Section, attempt, solicitation and conspiracy are crimes of the same grade and degree as the most serious offense which is attempted or solicited or is an object of the conspiracy.”