holding that no special parole term was authorized for a conviction for conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, which mentioned only fine and imprisonment and not special parole, and emphazing the “in addition to” language of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)
How later courts described this case
- holding that no special parole term was authorized for a conviction for conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, which mentioned only fine and imprisonment and not special parole, and emphazing the “in addition to” language of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)
- stating that “policy of lenity means that the Court will not interpret a federal statute so as to increase the penalty it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be no more than a guess as to what Congress intended”
- holding that 21 U.S.C. § 846 does not authorize a sentencing court to impose a special parole term upon a defendant who is convicted of conspiracy to manufacture or distribute a controlled substance
- recognizing that the rule of lenity “applies not only to interpretations of the substantive ambit of criminal prohibitions, but also to the penalties they impose”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported superseded by statute, as recognized in United States v. Arthur James Wessels — not on the Supreme Court's list
447 U.S. 381, 387, 100 S.Ct. 2247, 2252, 65 L.Ed.2d 205, 211 (1980), superseded by statute as stated in United States v. Wessels, 12 F.3d 746 (8th Cir.1993), described the rule of lenity as "the Court will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an inteipretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what ... [the Legislature] intended.’ ”…
The opinion
Mr. Chief Justice Burger,
concurring.
If the question presented by this case were as simple and easy as the dissent formulates it — whether “the directors of a narcotics distribution business [should] be punished less severely than their subordinates who merely peddle the poison” — none of us would have any difficulty with the decision. But that is not really the issue. Rather, the question before the Court is substantially more limited: What do the words of the statute mean? Of course, we must try to discern the intent of Congress. But we perform that task by beginning with the ordinary meaning of the language of the statute. Our compass is not to read a statute to reach what we perceive — or even what we think a reasonable person should perceive — is a “sensible result”; Congress must be taken at its word unless we are to assume the role of statute revisers. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U. S. 680 (1980); TV A v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 173 (1978).
Particularly in the administration of criminal justice, a badly drawn statute places strains on judges. See, e. g., Busic v. United States, 446 U. S. 398 (1980); LaRocca v. United States (decided with Busic). The temptation to exceed our limited judicial role and do what we regard as the more sensible thing is great, but it takes us on a slippery *402 slope. Our duty, to paraphrase Mr. Justice Holmes in a conversation with Judge Learned Hand, is not to do justice but to apply the law and hope that justice is done. The Spirit of Liberty: Papers and Addresses of Learned Hand 306-307 (Dilliard ed. 1960).
Not without the same reluctance that in my view underlies the Court's opinion, I join the opinion.