recognizing that misdemeanor convictions may be less reliable than felony convictions because they are obtained through "assembly-line justice" and because jurors may be less scrupulous in applying the reasonable-doubt standard to a minor offense
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that misdemeanor convictions may be less reliable than felony convictions because they are obtained through "assembly-line justice" and because jurors may be less scrupulous in applying the reasonable-doubt standard to a minor offense
- holding that prior un-counseled conviction could not increase imprisonment for current offense
- adhering to dissenting position in Scott that an uncounseled conviction is invalid not only where the defendant is sentenced to any actual incarceration but also where the defendant is convicted of an offense punishable by more than six months in prison
- holding that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction cannot be used under an enhanced penalty statute to convert a subsequent misdemeanor into a felony with a prison term
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled by Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994)
Listed in the Constitution Annotated's table of Supreme Court decisions overruled by subsequent decision (entry 207, expressly overruled).
Overruled — as noted by 2 later courts
The government also argues that Ant is no longer good law because it relied on Baldasar, which Nichols overruled.
2 citing opinionsDeclined to follow by Schindler v. Clerk of Circuit Court, 715 F.2d 341 (1983)
After careful consideration, we decline to extend the holding of Baldasar to the circumstances of the instant case.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Norman L. Haymer, 995 F.2d 550 (1993)
Needless to say, possession with the intent to distribute crack cocaine is a felony; therefore, Baldasar is inapplicable.
Distinguished by Sheffield v. City of Pass Christian, 556 So. 2d 1052 (1990)
The trial court had ruled that Baldasar was inapplicable because the enhancement was not from a misdemeanor to a felony.
Distinguished by Bilbrey v. State, 531 So. 2d 27 (1988)
" Since Orr was not imprisoned and his prior offense was not punishable by more than six months' imprisonment, Baldasar was inapplicable to that case.
Distinguished by State v. Caudle, 12 Fla. L. Weekly 505 (1987)
However, Baldasar is distinguishable from this case because there is no sworn allegation by the petitioner that his rights were in fact violated in the 1976 proceeding, and the uncounseled conviction was not used in the challenged proceeding to convert a misdemeanor to a felony punishable by a prison term.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Blackmun,
concurring.
In Scott v. Illinois, 440 U. S. 367 (1979), I stated in dissent:
“Accordingly, I would hold that an indigent defendant in a state criminal case must be afforded appointed counsel whenever the defendant is prosecuted for a non-petty criminal offense, that is, one punishable by more than six months’ imprisonment, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S. 66 (1970), or whenever the defendant is convicted of an offense and is actually subjected to a term of imprisonment, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972).
“This resolution, I feel, would provide the ‘bright line’ *230 that defendants, prosecutors, and trial and appellate courts all deserve and, at the same time, would reconcile on a principled basis the important considerations that led to the decisions in Duncan, Baldwin, and Argersinger.” Id., at 389-390.
I still am of the view that this “bright line” approach would best preserve constitutional values and do so with a measure of clarity for all concerned. Had the Court in Scott v. Illinois adopted that approach, the present litigation, in all probability, would not have reached us. Petitioner Baldasar was prosecuted for an offense punishable by more than six months’ imprisonment, and, under my test, was entitled to counsel at the prior misdemeanor proceeding. Since he was not represented by an attorney, that conviction, in my view, is invalid and may not be used to support enhancement.
I therefore join the Court’s per curiam opinion and its judgment.