recognizing that misdemeanor convictions may be less reliable than felony convictions because they are obtained through "assembly-line justice" and because jurors may be less scrupulous in applying the reasonable-doubt standard to a minor offense
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that misdemeanor convictions may be less reliable than felony convictions because they are obtained through "assembly-line justice" and because jurors may be less scrupulous in applying the reasonable-doubt standard to a minor offense
- holding that prior un-counseled conviction could not increase imprisonment for current offense
- adhering to dissenting position in Scott that an uncounseled conviction is invalid not only where the defendant is sentenced to any actual incarceration but also where the defendant is convicted of an offense punishable by more than six months in prison
- holding that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction cannot be used under an enhanced penalty statute to convert a subsequent misdemeanor into a felony with a prison term
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled by Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994)
Listed in the Constitution Annotated's table of Supreme Court decisions overruled by subsequent decision (entry 207, expressly overruled).
Overruled — as noted by 2 later courts
The government also argues that Ant is no longer good law because it relied on Baldasar, which Nichols overruled.
2 citing opinionsDeclined to follow by Schindler v. Clerk of Circuit Court, 715 F.2d 341 (1983)
After careful consideration, we decline to extend the holding of Baldasar to the circumstances of the instant case.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Norman L. Haymer, 995 F.2d 550 (1993)
Needless to say, possession with the intent to distribute crack cocaine is a felony; therefore, Baldasar is inapplicable.
Distinguished by Sheffield v. City of Pass Christian, 556 So. 2d 1052 (1990)
The trial court had ruled that Baldasar was inapplicable because the enhancement was not from a misdemeanor to a felony.
Distinguished by Bilbrey v. State, 531 So. 2d 27 (1988)
" Since Orr was not imprisoned and his prior offense was not punishable by more than six months' imprisonment, Baldasar was inapplicable to that case.
Distinguished by State v. Caudle, 12 Fla. L. Weekly 505 (1987)
However, Baldasar is distinguishable from this case because there is no sworn allegation by the petitioner that his rights were in fact violated in the 1976 proceeding, and the uncounseled conviction was not used in the challenged proceeding to convert a misdemeanor to a felony punishable by a prison term.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Stewart,
with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Stevens join,
concurring.
In Scott v. Illinois, 440 U. S. 367 , the Court held that “the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require . . . that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense.” Id., at 373-374 .
In this case the indigent petitioner, after his conviction of petit larceny, was sentenced to an increased term of imprisonment only because he had been convicted in a previous prosecution in which he had not had the assistance of appointed counsel in his defense.
It seems clear to me that this prison sentence violated the constitutional rule of Scott v. Illinois, supra, and I, therefore, join the opinion and judgment of the Court. *
It is noteworthy that the brief filed by the State of Illinois in Scott expressly anticipated the result in this case:
“When prosecuting an offense the prosecutor knows that by not requesting that counsel be appointed for defendant, he will he 'precluded, from *225 enhancing subsequent offenses. To the degree that the charging of offenses involves a great deal of prosecutorial discretion and selection, the decision to pursue conviction with only limited use comes within proper scope of that discretion.” Brief for Respondent in Scott v. Illinois , O. T. 1978, No. 77-1177, p. 20 (emphasis added).
Mr. Justice BreNNAN adheres to his dissent in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U. S. 367, 375 .