holding that “the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s entry of judgment in favor of named plaintiffs over their objections did not moot their private case or controversy, and that respondents’ individual interest in the litigation . . . is sufficient to permit their appeal of the adverse certification ruling” (emphasis and footnote omitted)
How later courts described this case
- holding that “the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s entry of judgment in favor of named plaintiffs over their objections did not moot their private case or controversy, and that respondents’ individual interest in the litigation . . . is sufficient to permit their appeal of the adverse certification ruling” (emphasis and footnote omitted)
- explaining __________________ _____ that "appeal may be permitted from an adverse ruling collateral to the judgment on the merits at the behest of the party who has prevailed on the merits, so long as that party retains a stake in the appeal satisfying the requirements of Art. III"
- holding that plaintiffs can appeal denial of class certification despite a tender to named plaintiffs in a class action of the amounts claimed in their individual capacities, followed by the entry of judgment in their favor on the basis of that tender, over their objection
- recognizing that credit card holders’ “desire to shift part of the costs of litigation to those who will share in its benefits if the class is certified and ultimately prevails” constituted “a continuing individual interest” in the issue of class certification
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Lucas v. Dynegy Inc., 770 F.3d 1064 (2014)
Roper, however, is inapposite.
Distinguished by Yaakov v. Act, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 2d 124 (2013)
It is also worth noting that the Supreme Court explained in Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, - U.S. -, -, 133 S.Ct. 1523, 1532, 185 L.Ed.2d 636 (2013) that only "because Roper is distinguishable on the facts” did the Court "need not consider its continuing validity in light of our subsequent decision in Lewis.”
Distinguished by Potter v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc., 329 F.3d 608 (2003)
Roper is also distinguishable from this appeal because a policy consideration underlying the Court's decision-preventing defendants from "picking off" named plaintiffs to avoid appellate review of a denial of class certification-does not apply here.
Distinguished by Warner/elektra/atlantic Corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants/cross-Appellees v. County of Dupage, Defendant-Appellee/cross-Appellant, 991 F.2d 1280 (1993)
445 U.S. 326, 337, 100 S.Ct. 1166, 1173, 63 L.Ed.2d 427 (1980), is distinguishable because the Court believed that the finding that the winning party sought to appeal might have collateral estoppel effect.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Stevens,
concurring.
In his dissenting opinion Mr. Justice Powell states that, because the District Court erroneously refused to certify the class and because no member of the class attempted to intervene, the respondents “are the only plaintiffs arguably present in court.” Post, at 346. This position is apparently based on the notion that, unless class members are present for all purposes (and thus may be liable for costs, bound by the judgment, etc.), they cannot be considered “present” for any purpose. I respectfully disagree. In my opinion, when a proper class-action complaint is filed, the absent members of the class should be considered parties to the case or controversy at least for the limited purpose of the court’s Art. Ill jurisdiction. If the district judge fails to certify the class, I believe they remain parties until a final determination has been made that the action may not be maintained as a class action. Thus, the continued viability of the case or controversy, as those words are used in Art. III, does not depend on the district judge’s initial answer to the certification question; rather, it depends on the plaintiffs’ right to have a class certified. 1
*343 Accordingly, even if the named plaintiff’s personal stake in the lawsuit is effectively eliminated, 2 no question of mootness arises simply because the remaining adversary parties are unnamed. 3 Rather, the issue which arises is whether the *344 named plaintiff continues to be a proper class representative for the purpose of appealing the adverse class determination. Cf. East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395, 403-406 ; United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, post, at 407. In my judgment, in this case, as in Geraghty, the named plaintiffs clearly remained appropriate representatives of the class at least for that limited purpose. 4
I therefore join the opinion of the Court.
There is general agreement that, if a class has been properly certified, the case does not become moot simply because the class representative’s individual interest in the merits of the litigation has expired. In such a case the absent class members’ continued stake in the controversy is sufficient to maintain its viability under Art. III. In a case in which certification has been denied by the district court, however, a court of appeals cannot determine whether the members of the class continue to have a stake in the outcome until it has determined whether the action can properly be maintained as a class action. If it is not a proper class action, then the entire case is moot. If, on the other hand, the district court’s refusal to certify the class was erroneous, I believe there remains *343 a live controversy which the courts have jurisdiction to resolve under Art. m.
I recognize that there is tension between the approach I have suggested and the Court’s sua sponte decision in Indianapolis School Comm’rs v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 . See also Pasadena City Bd. of Education v. Spanglet, 427 U. S. 424, 430 . As Mr. Justice Blackmun points out in United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, post, at 400, n. 7, that case is distinguishable from this case because it involved an attempt to litigate the merits of an appeal on behalf of an improperly certified class. I agree that the Court could not properly consider the merits until the threshold question of whether a class should have been certified was resolved. However, I disagree with the Court’s conclusion that the entire action had to be dismissed as moot. In my view, the absent class members remained sufficiently present so that a remand on the class issue would have been a more appropriate resolution.
Just as absent class members whose status has not been fully adjudicated are not “present” for purposes of litigating the merits of the case, I would not find them present for purposes of sharing costs or suffering an adverse judgment. If a class were ultimately certified, the class members would, of course, retain the right to opt out.
I agree with the Court’s determination in this case and in Geraghty that the respective named plaintiffs continue to have a sufficient personal stake in the outcome to satisfy Art. III requirements. See ante, at 340; Geraghty, post, at 404.
The status of unnamed members of an uncertified class has always been difficult, to define accurately. Such persons have been described by this Court as “parties in interest,” see Smith v. Swormstedt, 16 How. 288, 303 ; as "interested parties,” see Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U. S. 356, 366 ; or as "absent parties,” see Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32, 42-45 . There is nothing novel in my suggestion that such “absent parties” may be regarded as parties for the limited purpose of analyzing the status of the case or controversy before a certification order has been entered. Indeed, since the concept of “absent parties” was developed long before anyone conceived of certification orders, I find it difficult to understand why the existence of a case or controversy in a constitutional sense should depend on compliance with a procedural requirement that was first created in 1966.
My view of the jurisdictional issue would not necessarily enlarge the fiduciary responsibilities of the class representative as Mr. Justice Powell suggests, see post, at 358-359, n. 21. In any event, I do not share the concern expressed in his opinion about the personal liability of a class representative for costs and attorney’s fees if the case is ultimately lost. Anyone who voluntarily engages in combat — whether in the courtroom or elsewhere — must recognize that some of his own blood may be spilled.