holding that “the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s entry of judgment in favor of named plaintiffs over their objections did not moot their private case or controversy, and that respondents’ individual interest in the litigation . . . is sufficient to permit their appeal of the adverse certification ruling” (emphasis and footnote omitted)
How later courts described this case
- holding that “the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s entry of judgment in favor of named plaintiffs over their objections did not moot their private case or controversy, and that respondents’ individual interest in the litigation . . . is sufficient to permit their appeal of the adverse certification ruling” (emphasis and footnote omitted)
- explaining __________________ _____ that "appeal may be permitted from an adverse ruling collateral to the judgment on the merits at the behest of the party who has prevailed on the merits, so long as that party retains a stake in the appeal satisfying the requirements of Art. III"
- holding that plaintiffs can appeal denial of class certification despite a tender to named plaintiffs in a class action of the amounts claimed in their individual capacities, followed by the entry of judgment in their favor on the basis of that tender, over their objection
- recognizing that credit card holders’ “desire to shift part of the costs of litigation to those who will share in its benefits if the class is certified and ultimately prevails” constituted “a continuing individual interest” in the issue of class certification
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Lucas v. Dynegy Inc., 770 F.3d 1064 (2014)
Roper, however, is inapposite.
Distinguished by Yaakov v. Act, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 2d 124 (2013)
It is also worth noting that the Supreme Court explained in Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, - U.S. -, -, 133 S.Ct. 1523, 1532, 185 L.Ed.2d 636 (2013) that only "because Roper is distinguishable on the facts” did the Court "need not consider its continuing validity in light of our subsequent decision in Lewis.”
Distinguished by Potter v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc., 329 F.3d 608 (2003)
Roper is also distinguishable from this appeal because a policy consideration underlying the Court's decision-preventing defendants from "picking off" named plaintiffs to avoid appellate review of a denial of class certification-does not apply here.
Distinguished by Warner/elektra/atlantic Corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants/cross-Appellees v. County of Dupage, Defendant-Appellee/cross-Appellant, 991 F.2d 1280 (1993)
445 U.S. 326, 337, 100 S.Ct. 1166, 1173, 63 L.Ed.2d 427 (1980), is distinguishable because the Court believed that the finding that the winning party sought to appeal might have collateral estoppel effect.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Rehnquist,
concurring.
I write briefly to state what seems to me to be sufficient differences between this case and United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, post, p. 388, to allow the appeal of the denial of class certification in this case, and to. dismiss the attempted appeal of the same question in Geraghty as moot. If I were writing on a clean slate, I might well resolve both these cases against the respondents. But the Court today has not cleaned the slate or been successful in formulating any sound princi *341 ples to replace what seem to me to be the muddled and inconsistent ones of the past. Compare Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393 (1975), with Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747 (1976); United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385, 393 (1977), with Pasadena City Bd. of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430 (1976); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 469, 470, n. 15 (1978), with Indianapolis School Comm’rs v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975); and now this case, with United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty.
Article III, and this Court’s precedents in Jacobs, supra, and Spangler, supra, require dismissal of the action in Geraghty because there is simply no individual interest remaining, no certified class or intervenors to supply that interest, and the action is not within that “narrow class of cases” that are “distinctly ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review.’ ” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 110, n. 11 (1975). The facts in this case, in contrast, fit within the framework of the precedents permitting continuation of the action.
The distinguishing feature here is that the defendant has made an unaccepted offer of tender in settlement of the individual putative representative’s claim. The action is moot in the Art. Ill sense only if this Court adopts a rule that an. individual seeking to proceed as a class representative is required to accept a tender of only his individual claims. So long as the court does not require such acceptance, the individual is required to prove his case and the requisite Art. Ill adversity continues. Acceptance need not be mandated under our precedents since the defendant has not offered all that has been requested in the complaint (i. e., relief for the class) and any other rule would give the defendant the practical power to make the denial of class certification questions unreviewable. Since adversity is in fact retained, and this set of facts fits within a “narrow class of cases” where a contrary rule would lead to the “reality” that “otherwise the issue would evade review,” I think our precedents provide for the main *342 tenance of this action. Sosna, supra, at 402, n. 11 ; Gerstein, supra. Accordingly, I join in the opinion of the Court in this case and in Mr. Justice Powell’s dissent in Geraghty.