describing the Sixth Circuit’s factual consideration as “in a purely descriptive vein: no findings of fact made by the District Court were reversed as having been clearly erroneous, and the Court of Appeals engaged in no factfinding of its own based on evidence adduced before the District Court”
How later courts described this case
- describing the Sixth Circuit’s factual consideration as “in a purely descriptive vein: no findings of fact made by the District Court were reversed as having been clearly erroneous, and the Court of Appeals engaged in no factfinding of its own based on evidence adduced before the District Court”
- "[O]nly if there has been a systemwide impact may there be a systemwide remedy"
- “When a case involves the administration of a state’s schools, as federal judges, we try to sit on our hands.”
- “[O]ur cases have . . . firmly recognized that local autonomy of school districts is a vital national tradition.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294 (1984)
We also note that the remedial limits imposed by Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 97 S.Ct. 2766, 53 L.Ed.2d 851 (1977), are inapposite to this case.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Stevens,
concurring.
With the caveat that the relevant finding of intent in a case of this kind necessarily depends primarily on objective evidence concerning the effect of the Board’s action, rather than the subjective motivation of one or more members of the Board, see Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 253-254 (Stevens, J., concurring), I join the Court’s opinion.