explaining that the actual malice “standard administers an extremely powerful antidote to the inducement to media self- censorship of the common-law rule of strict liability for libel and slander” but also “exacts a correspondingly high price from the victims of defamatory falsehood” such that states may define the standard of liability for injury to private individuals “so long as they do not impose liability without fault”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the actual malice “standard administers an extremely powerful antidote to the inducement to media self- censorship of the common-law rule of strict liability for libel and slander” but also “exacts a correspondingly high price from the victims of defamatory falsehood” such that states may define the standard of liability for injury to private individuals “so long as they do not impose liability without fault”
- explaining that in New York Times, the Court “intended to free criticism of public officials from the restraints imposed by the common law of defamation,” and that “those who hold governmental office may recover for injury to reputation only on clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth”
- stating that "there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact" and that "[t]hey belong to that category of utterances which `are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality'"
- stating that “the States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth” and defining statement made with actual malice as one made' “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Declined to follow by Gail Bierman and Beth Weier v. Scott Weier and Author Solutions, Inc., 2013 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 5 (2013)
We refuse to extend the Gertz holding to actions between a private individual and a non-media defendant.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985)
Accordingly, the court held “that as a matter of federal constitutional law, the media protections outlined in Gertz are inapplicable to nonmedia defamation actions.
Distinguished by Renwick v. News & Observer Publishing Co., 63 N.C. App. 200 (1983)
Id. The case under discussion is clearly distinguishable because the underlying fact is alleged to be false.
Distinguished by Shylock, Inc. v. Covenant Broad. Corp. of La., 352 So. 2d 379 (1978)
However, appellees contend that Gertz, supra, is inapplicable since appellant here is a corporation and not a private person.
The opinion
Mr. Chief Justice Burger,
dissenting.
The doctrines of the law of defamation have had a gradual evolution primarily in the state courts. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), and its progeny this Court entered this field.
Agreement or disagreement with the law as it has evolved to this time does not alter the fact that it has been orderly development with a consistent basic rationale. In today’s opinion the Court abandons the tradi *355 tional thread so far as the ordinary private citizen is concerned and introduces the concept that the media will be liable for negligence in publishing defamatory statements with respect to such persons. Although I agree with much of what Mr. Justice White states, I do not read the Court’s new doctrinal approach in quite the way he does. I am frank to say I do not know the parameters of a “negligence” doctrine as applied to the news media. Conceivably this new doctrine could inhibit some editors, as the dissents of Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan suggest. But I would prefer to allow this area of law to continue to evolve as it has up to now with respect to private citizens rather than embark on a new doctrinal theory which has no jurisprudential ancestry.
The petitioner here was performing a professional representative role as an advocate in the highest tradition of the law, and under that tradition the advocate is not to be invidiously identified with his client. The important public policy which underlies this tradition — the right to counsel — would be gravely jeopardized if every lawyer who takes an “unpopular” case, civil or criminal, would automatically become fair game for irresponsible reporters and editors who might, for example, describe the lawyer as a “mob mouthpiece” for representing a client with a serious prior criminal record, or as an “ambulance chaser” for representing a claimant in a personal injury action.
I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for reinstatement of the verdict of the jury and the entry of an appropriate judgment on that verdict.