explaining that the actual malice “standard administers an extremely powerful antidote to the inducement to media self- censorship of the common-law rule of strict liability for libel and slander” but also “exacts a correspondingly high price from the victims of defamatory falsehood” such that states may define the standard of liability for injury to private individuals “so long as they do not impose liability without fault”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the actual malice “standard administers an extremely powerful antidote to the inducement to media self- censorship of the common-law rule of strict liability for libel and slander” but also “exacts a correspondingly high price from the victims of defamatory falsehood” such that states may define the standard of liability for injury to private individuals “so long as they do not impose liability without fault”
- explaining that in New York Times, the Court “intended to free criticism of public officials from the restraints imposed by the common law of defamation,” and that “those who hold governmental office may recover for injury to reputation only on clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth”
- stating that "there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact" and that "[t]hey belong to that category of utterances which `are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality'"
- stating that “the States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth” and defining statement made with actual malice as one made' “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Declined to follow by Gail Bierman and Beth Weier v. Scott Weier and Author Solutions, Inc., 2013 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 5 (2013)
We refuse to extend the Gertz holding to actions between a private individual and a non-media defendant.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985)
Accordingly, the court held “that as a matter of federal constitutional law, the media protections outlined in Gertz are inapplicable to nonmedia defamation actions.
Distinguished by Renwick v. News & Observer Publishing Co., 63 N.C. App. 200 (1983)
Id. The case under discussion is clearly distinguishable because the underlying fact is alleged to be false.
Distinguished by Shylock, Inc. v. Covenant Broad. Corp. of La., 352 So. 2d 379 (1978)
However, appellees contend that Gertz, supra, is inapplicable since appellant here is a corporation and not a private person.
The opinion
*353 Mr. Justice Blackmun,
concurring.
I joined Mr. Justice Brennan’s opinion for the plurality in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 29 (1971). I did so because I concluded that, given New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), and its progeny (noted by the Court, ante, at 334-336, n. 6), as well as Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U. S. 130 (1967), the step taken in Rosen-bloom, extending the New York Times doctrine to an event of public or general interest, was logical and inevitable. A majority of the Court evidently thought otherwise, as is particularly evidenced by Mr. Justice White’s separate concurring opinion there and by the respective dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Harlan and of Mr. Justice Marshall joined by Mr. Justice Stewart.
The Court today refuses to apply New York Times to the private individual, as contrasted with the public official and the public figure. It thus withdraws to the factual limits of the pre-Rosenbloom cases. It thereby fixes the outer boundary of the New York Times doctrine and says that beyond that boundary, a State is free to define for itself the appropriate standard of media liability so long as it does not impose liability without fault. As my joinder in Rosenbloom’s plurality opinion would intimate, I sense some illogic in this.
The Court, however, seeks today to strike a balance between competing values where necessarily uncertain assumptions about human behavior color the result. Although the Court’s opinion in the present case departs from the rationale of the Rosenbloom plurality, in that the Court now conditions a libel action by a private person upon a showing of negligence, as contrasted with a showing of willful or reckless disregard, I am willing to *354 join, and do join, the Court’s opinion and its judgment for two reasons:
1. By removing the specters of presumed and punitive damages in the absence of New York Times malice, the Court eliminates significant and powerful motives for self-censorship that otherwise are present in the traditional libel action. By so doing, the Court leaves what should prove to be sufficient and adequate breathing space for a vigorous press. What the Court has done, I believe, will have little, if any, practical effect on the functioning of responsible journalism.
2. The Court was sadly fractionated in Bosenbloom. A result of that kind inevitably leads to uncertainty. I feel that it is of profound importance for the Court to come to rest in the defamation area and to have a clearly defined majority position that eliminates the unsureness engendered by Rosenbloom’s diversity. If my vote were not needed to create a majority, I would adhere to my prior view. A definitive ruling, however, is paramount. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S., at 170 (Black, J., concurring); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374, 398 (1967) (Black, J., concurring); United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62, 97 (1971) (separate statement).
For these reasons, I join the opinion and the judgment of the Court.