holding that a search “conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is per se unreasonable... subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions” and that “one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- holding that a search “conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is per se unreasonable... subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions” and that “one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)
- stating that if a defendant’s confession is not “ ‘the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker’ ” and “ ‘if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process’ ” (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961))
- holding that “knowledge of a right to refuse [consent] is not a prerequisite of a voluntary consent” and noting that “[a]lmost without exception, the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver has been applied only to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair trial”
- stating that, in the context of an automobile search, “if under all circumstances it has appeared that the consent was not given voluntarily — that it was coerced by threats or force, or granted only in submission to a claim of lawful authority — then we have found the consent invalid and the search unreasonable.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by State of Arizona v. Francisco L Encinas Valenzuela, 239 Ariz. 299 (2016)
The parties did not brief these issues, and the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence after Schneckloth has cast doubt on pinpointing the correct approach.
Distinguished
Distinguished by People v. Goforth, 222 Mich. App. 306 (1997)
People v Reed, 393 Mich 342, 363-364; 224 NW2d 867 (1975), followed Schneckloth and held that a waiver analysis is inapplicable to consent searches.
The opinion
Me. Justice Douglas,
dissenting.
I agree with the Court of Appeals that “verbal assent” to a search is not enough, that the fact that consent was given to the search does not imply that the suspect knew that the alternative of a refusal existed. 448 F. 2d 699, 700 . As that court stated:
“[U]nder many circumstances a reasonable person might read an officer's ‘May I’ as the courteous ex *276 pression of a demand backed, by force of law.” Id., at 701 .
A considerable constitutional guarantee rides on this narrow issue. At the time of the search there was no probable cause to believe that the car contained contraband or other unlawful articles. The car was stopped only because a headlight and the license plate light were burned out. The car belonged to Alcala’s brother, from whom it was borrowed, and Alcala had a driver’s license. Traffic citations were appropriately issued. The car was searched, the present record showing that Alcala consented. But whether Alcala knew he had the right to refuse, we do not know. All the Court of Appeals did was to remand the case to the District Court for a finding — and if necessary, a hearing on that issue.
I would let the case go forward on that basis. The long, time-consuming contest in this Court might well wash out. At least we could be assured that, if it came back, we would not be rendering an advisory opinion. Had I voted to grant this petition, I would suggest we dismiss it as improvidently granted. But, being in the minority, I am bound by the Rule of Four.