Opinion

State of Arizona v. Francisco L Encinas Valenzuela

  • 239 Ariz. 299
  • 737 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 6
  • 371 P.3d 627
  • 2016 Ariz. LEXIS 116
  • 2016 WL 1637656
Court
Arizona Supreme Court
Filed
Apr 26, 2016
Status
Published
On the bench
Timmer, Pelander, Brutinel, Berch, Bales
Cited by
68 cases
Authority
More cited than 43.3%

finding good faith exception applied when officer “did not ‘deliberately, recklessly, or with gross negligence’ conduct the search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, but instead acted with ‘an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that the admonition was lawful”

How later courts described this case

  • finding good faith exception applied when officer “did not ‘deliberately, recklessly, or with gross negligence’ conduct the search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, but instead acted with ‘an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that the admonition was lawful”
  • explaining that “[a]lthough the Fourth Amendment generally prohibits warrantless searches, they are permitted if there is free and voluntary consent to search,” which “[t]he [S]tate must prove by a preponderance of the evidence”
  • holding that "a trial court should examine the totality of the circumstances to decide whether consent was voluntary, even when given after a law enforcement officer's assertion of lawful authority to search"
  • “[I]t would require a rare case for the defendant’s own statement to be seen as prejudicial to the extent it should be excluded under Rule 403.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

STATE OF ARIZONA,

Appellee,

v.

FRANCISCO L. ENCINAS VALENZUELA,

Appellant.

No. CR-15-0222-PR

Filed April 26, 2016

Appeal from the Superior Court in Cochise County

The Honorable Karl D. Elledge, Judge

No. CR-201300076

AFFIRMED

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division Two

237 Ariz. 307, 350 P.3d 811 (App. 2015)

VACATED

COUNSEL:

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General, John R. Lopez IV, Solicitor

General, Joseph T. Maziarz, Chief Counsel, Criminal Appeals Section,

Diane Leigh Hunt (argued), Assistant Attorney General, Tucson, Attorneys

for State of Arizona

Mark F. Willimann (argued), The Law Office of Mark F. Willimann, LLC,

Tucson, Attorney for Francisco L. Encinas Valenzuela

Bruce Washburn, Scottsdale City Attorney, Ken Flint, Assistant City

Prosecutor, Scottsdale, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae City of Scottsdale

Jeffrey D. Bartolino (argued), Law Offices of Jeffrey D. Bartolino, Tucson;

and David J. Euchner, Pima County Public Defender’s Office, Tucson,

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice

STATE V. VALENZUELA

Opinion of the Court

Dean Brault, Pima County Legal Defender, Scott A. Martin, Assistant Legal

Defender, Tucson, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Pima County Legal

Defender’s Office

Michelle L. Behan, Nesci & St. Louis, P.L.L.C., Tucson, Attorneys for

Amicus Curiae National College for DUI Defense, Inc.

JUSTICE TIMMER authored the opinion of the Court, in which VICE

CHIEF JUSTICE PELANDER and JUSTICES BRUTINEL and BERCH

(RETIRED) joined, and CHIEF JUSTICE BALES concurred in part and

dissented in part.

JUSTICE TIMMER, opinion of the Court:

¶1 Although the Fourth Amendment generally prohibits

warrantless searches, they are permitted if there is free and voluntary

consent to search. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); State

v. Butler, 232 Ariz. 84, 87 ¶ 13, 302 P.3d 609, 612 (2013). Consent cannot be

deemed to be given “freely and voluntarily” if the subject of a search merely

acquiesces to a claim of lawful authority. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S.

543, 548–49 (1968).

¶2 Arizona’s implied consent law provides that “[a] person who

operates a motor vehicle in this state gives consent . . . to a test or tests of

the person’s blood, breath, urine or other bodily substance” if the person is

arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (“DUI”). A.R.S.

§ 28-1321(A). Nevertheless, “the statute generally does not authorize law

enforcement officers to administer the test without a warrant unless the

[operator] expressly agrees to the test.” Carrillo v. Houser, 224 Ariz. 463, 463

¶ 1, 232 P.3d 1245, 1245 (2010). The issue here is whether, for Fourth

Amendment purposes, a driver arrested for DUI voluntarily consented to

give samples of his blood and breath after a police officer advised him that

“Arizona law requires you to submit” to breath, blood or other bodily

substance tests chosen by law enforcement. We hold that showing only that

consent was given in response to this admonition fails to prove that an

arrestee’s consent was freely and voluntarily given. Because the

admonition in this case was given in good faith reliance on precedent,

however, exclusion of the test results is neither appropriate nor required.

2

STATE V. VALENZUELA

Opinion of the Court

I. BACKGROUND

¶3 In reviewing the denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress,

we consider only “evidence presented at the suppression hearing and view

the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling.”

State v. Hausner, 230 Ariz. 60, 70 ¶ 23, 280 P.3d 604, 614 (2012).

¶4 In August 2012, a Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) officer

found Francisco Valenzuela asleep in the driver’s seat of his stopped truck

with the engine running and the vehicle in gear. After spotting an open

container of alcohol, detecting a strong odor of alcohol, and observing signs

that Valenzuela was impaired, the officer arrested Valenzuela on suspicion

of DUI.

¶5 After taking Valenzuela to a police station, the officer read

Valenzuela an “admin per se” form, which provided, in part, that “Arizona

law requires you to submit to and successfully complete tests of breath,

blood or other bodily substance as chosen by a law enforcement officer to

determine alcohol concentration or drug content.” The officer stressed this

“requirement” three additional times and warned that refusal would result

in a one-year suspension of Valenzuela’s driver’s license. (Although the

officer read from part of the form while testifying at the suppression

hearing, the form itself is not in the record.) Valenzuela cooperated and, in

response to the officer’s questions, stated he understood the admonition

and had no questions. He then submitted to breath and blood tests. After

the tests revealed that Valenzuela had an alcohol concentration (“AC”) in

excess of 0.20, the State charged him with five counts of aggravated DUI.

¶6 Valenzuela moved to suppress the test results. He argued

that he did not voluntarily consent to the tests, and the warrantless search

therefore violated his Fourth Amendment rights. After conducting a

suppression hearing at which only the DPS officer testified, the trial court

denied the motion, reasoning that the totality of the circumstances showed

that Valenzuela had voluntarily consented to the search. Based on the

parties’ stipulated facts, the court subsequently dismissed three counts,

convicted Valenzuela on the remaining counts, and imposed prison

sentences.

3

STATE V. VALENZUELA

Opinion of the Court

¶7 In a divided decision, the court of appeals affirmed. State v.

Valenzuela, 237 Ariz. 307, 316 ¶ 35, 350 P.3d 811, 820 (App. 2015). The

majority examined the totality of the circumstances and concluded that the

trial court did not err in finding Valenzuela’s consent voluntary. Id. at 315

¶ 31, 350 P.3d at 819. The dissenting judge recognized the need to generally

examine the totality of the circumstances to determine the voluntariness of

consent. Id. at 317 ¶ 39, 350 P.3d at 821 (Eckerstrom, C.J., dissenting).

Relying on Bumper, he nevertheless reasoned that when the evidence shows

that police asserted lawful authority to search, “a court’s analysis has

reached its end; voluntary consent cannot be found as a matter of law.” Id.

Because, in his view, the admonition asserts a claim of lawful authority, the

dissenting judge concluded as a matter of law that Valenzuela could not

have voluntarily consented to testing. Id. at 318 ¶ 45, 350 P.3d at 822.

¶8 We granted Valenzuela’s petition for review because it

presents a recurring legal question of statewide importance. We have

jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5, of the Arizona Constitution and

A.R.S. § 12-120.24.

II. DISCUSSION

¶9 We review the denial of a motion to suppress evidence for

abuse of discretion, considering the facts in the light most favorable to

sustaining the ruling. State v. Wilson, 237 Ariz. 296, 298 ¶ 7, 350 P.3d 800,

802 (2015). “An error of law committed in reaching a discretionary

conclusion may, however, constitute an abuse of discretion.” Busso-

Estopellan v. Mroz, 238 Ariz. 553, 554 ¶ 5, 364 P.3d 472, 473 (2015) (citation

omitted).

A. Fourth Amendment principles

¶10 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution

protects individuals against “unreasonable searches and seizures,” and any

evidence collected in violation of this provision is generally inadmissible in

a subsequent criminal trial. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654 (1961) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). A compelled blood draw or breath

test administered pursuant to § 28-1321 is a search subject to the Fourth

Amendment’s restrictions. See Butler, 232 Ariz. at 87 ¶ 10, 302 P.3d at 612

(citing Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1556 (2013)). A warrantless

search is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless one of

4

STATE V. VALENZUELA

Opinion of the Court

a few well-established exceptions applies. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338

(2009).

¶11 One exception to the warrant requirement is a search

conducted with consent. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219. When the state

relies on consent to justify a warrantless search, as it does here, it “has the

burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily

given.” Id. at 222 (citation omitted). Whether consent is voluntary or “the

product of duress or coercion, express or implied,” is a factual issue

resolved by reviewing the totality of circumstances, including any “subtly

coercive police questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective state

of the person who consents.” Id. at 227, 229; see also Butler, 232 Ariz. at 87

¶ 13, 88 ¶ 19, 302 P.3d at 612, 613. The state must prove voluntary consent

by a preponderance of the evidence.1 Ariz. R. Crim. P. 16.2(b).

B. Application of admonishment given pursuant

to § 28-1321, Arizona’s implied consent law

¶12 Valenzuela argues that, under Bumper, his consent to

providing blood and breath samples must be deemed involuntary because

he consented only after the officer advised that Arizona law required him

to submit to testing. The State responds, and the court of appeals majority

agreed, that Bumper is distinguishable, and the totality of the circumstances

evidences Valenzuela’s voluntary consent to the search. Valenzuela, 237

Ariz. at 311 ¶¶ 12–13, 315 ¶ 31, 350 P.3d at 815, 819.

¶13 In Bumper, law enforcement officers went to a home where a

suspect lived with his grandmother. 391 U.S. at 546. After the grandmother

opened the door, an officer announced he had a warrant to search her home,

she said, “Go ahead,” and the search unearthed evidence against the

grandson. Id. In a subsequent suppression hearing in the grandson’s

criminal case, the prosecutor did not produce a warrant but relied solely on

the grandmother’s consent to justify the lawfulness of the search. Id. The

1In State v. Cañez, this Court mistakenly stated that the state must prove

voluntary consent “by clear and positive evidence in unequivocal words or

conduct expressing consent.” 202 Ariz. 133, 151 ¶ 53, 42 P.3d 564, 582 (2002)

(quoting State v. Kananen, 97 Ariz. 233, 235, 399 P.2d 426, 427 (1965)). After

Kananen was decided, however, this Court promulgated Rule 16.2(b), which

replaced the clear-and-positive-evidence standard.

5

STATE V. VALENZUELA

Opinion of the Court

grandmother testified that “[the officer] said he was the law and had a

search warrant to search the house, why I thought he could go ahead. I

believed he had a search warrant. I took him at his word.” Id. at 547. After

quoting this testimony, the Court relied on a line of older cases to hold that

the prosecution failed in its burden to show that the grandmother freely

and voluntarily consented because the record demonstrated only her

“acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.” Id. at 548–49, 549 n.13 (citing

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S.

313, 317 (1921)). It reasoned that “[w]hen a law enforcement officer claims

authority to search a home under a warrant, he announces in effect that the

occupant has no right to resist the search. The situation is instinct with

coercion—albeit colorably lawful coercion. Where there is coercion there

cannot be consent.” Id. at 550; see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435

(1991) (noting that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated when police

request and obtain consent to search “as long as the police do not convey a

message that compliance with their requests is required”).

¶14 Valenzuela, the court of appeals dissent, and our dissenting

colleague read Bumper as holding that consent is necessarily involuntary

whenever police have asserted lawful authority to search, regardless of

other circumstances. See Valenzuela, 237 Ariz. at 317 ¶ 39, 350 P.3d at 821

(Eckerstrom, C.J., dissenting); infra ¶ 41. Although Bumper did not directly

address whether other circumstances should be examined or a per se rule

applied in deciding whether a consent was freely given or in acquiescence

to an assertion of lawful authority, it arguably rejected the former approach

by not crediting the grandmother’s additional testimony that “I let them

search, and it was all my own free will. Nobody forced me at all.” See

Bumper, 391 U.S. at 556 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at

234 (noting that Bumper did not focus on the grandmother’s subjective

mindset). But another explanation is that the Court simply examined the

circumstances surrounding the consent objectively, as it has done in

subsequently decided Fourth Amendment decisions, see Florida v. Jimeno,

500 U.S. 248, 252 (1991) (scope of consensual search); Illinois v. Rodriguez,

497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990) (third party consent); United States v. Mendenhall,

446 U.S. 544, 554–55 (1980) (seizure), and concluded that the grandmother

acquiesced to an assertion of lawful authority even though she had no

objection to the officers executing on the warrant.

¶15 Schneckloth indicates that Bumper did not establish a per se

rule. The issue in Schneckloth concerned what the prosecution must show

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STATE V. VALENZUELA

Opinion of the Court

to demonstrate that a consent to search was given voluntarily. 412 U.S. at

223. The Court held that “whether a consent to a search was in fact

‘voluntary’ or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is

a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the

circumstances.” Id. at 227. Referring to its prior decisions to demonstrate

the need for a “careful sifting of the unique facts and circumstances of each

case,” the Court stated that “if under all the circumstances it has appeared that

the consent was not given voluntarily—that it was coerced by threats or

force, or granted only in submission to a claim of lawful authority—then we have

found the consent invalid and the search unreasonable.” Id. at 233

(emphasis added). Significantly, the Court cited Bumper, Johnson, and Amos

for this principle, removing any doubt that it intended that courts make the

totality-of-circumstances inquiry in cases involving an assertion of lawful

authority to search. See id. Indeed, Justice Marshall acknowledged this

intent in his dissent by criticizing the majority for including Bumper-like

scenarios within the totality-of-circumstances inquiry. See id. at 283

(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“We did not [in Bumper] inquire into all the

circumstances, but focused on a single fact, the claim of authority, even

though the grandmother testified that no threats were made. . . . It may be

that, on the facts of that case, her consent was under all the circumstances

involuntary, but it is plain that we did not apply the test adopted by the

Court today.”).

¶16 The Schneckloth Court’s discussion of Johnson, which Bumper

relied on, further supports our view. In Johnson, federal narcotics agents

smelled burning opium outside a hotel room and gained entry after one

agent knocked on the door, identified himself as a lieutenant, and then

stated, “I want to talk to you a little bit.” 333 U.S. at 12. The defendant

opened the door, “stepped back acquiescently and admitted [the agents].”

Id. The Court held that a subsequent search of the room violated the Fourth

Amendment because “[e]ntry to defendant’s living quarters . . . was

demanded under color of office. It was granted in submission to authority

rather than as an understanding and intentional waiver of a constitutional

right.” Id. at 13. In Schneckloth, after characterizing Johnson’s use of the term

“waiver” as a synonym for “consent search,” the Court stated that the

Johnson Court “arrived at the conclusion that there had been no ‘waiver’

from an analysis of the totality of the objective circumstances—not from the

absence of any express indication of Johnson’s knowledge of a right to

refuse or the lack of explicit warnings.” 412 U.S. at 243 n.31 (emphasis

added).

7

STATE V. VALENZUELA

Opinion of the Court

¶17 Our dissenting colleague suggests that we are misreading

Schneckloth as displacing the Court’s holdings in Bumper, Johnson, and Amos.

See infra ¶ 39. That is incorrect. We merely reject the notion that whenever

a law enforcement officer has asserted a claim of lawful authority to search,

“a court’s analysis has reached its end” and consent must be deemed

involuntary as a matter of law. See Valenzuela, 237 Ariz. at 317 ¶ 39, 350

P.3d at 821 (Eckerstrom, C.J., dissenting). The Bumper line of cases survives

to invalidate any consent given only in acquiescence to an assertion of a

lawful authority to search. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983)

(plurality opinion) (citing Schneckloth and Bumper to note that the burden to

prove consent is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of

lawful authority); Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 329 (1979)

(relying on Bumper to hold that “‘consent’ given in the face of ‘colorably

lawful coercion’” was invalid). We read Schneckloth and Bumper

harmoniously as requiring a court to examine the circumstances

surrounding an assertion of lawful authority to search to determine

whether the consent was sufficiently independent of the assertion to

remove its taint. If not, the consent was not freely and voluntarily given.

¶18 Although it might be difficult to prove that consent given

after an assertion of lawful authority to search was nevertheless freely

given, we should not preclude the possibility that it could happen. For

example, consent conceivably could be voluntary if, after an officer asserts

lawful authority to search, the officer retracts that assertion or an attorney

advises that the search is not lawfully required before the subject of the

search consents. See Kunzler v. Pima Cty. Superior Court, 154 Ariz. 568, 570,

744 P.2d 669, 671 (1987) (holding that a person arrested for DUI has the right

to consult an attorney before taking a breath test when such consultation

would not delay or interfere with the investigation or test taking); State v.

Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 571 (Minn. 2013) (“The fact that [defendant]

consulted with counsel before agreeing to take each [AC] test reinforces the

conclusion that his consent was not illegally coerced” as “an attorney

functions as an objective advisor who could explain the alternative choices

to the driver”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In such

cases, a court might find that any subsequently granted consent was not

compelled by the original assertion of authority.

¶19 Our dissenting colleague’s position is not far removed from

ours. He rejects an examination of other circumstances only when consent

to a search “is immediately preceded by an assertion of lawful authority.”

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STATE V. VALENZUELA

Opinion of the Court

See infra ¶ 47. It is unlikely, but not impossible, that the state could meet its

burden to prove that consent is voluntary if given immediately after an

assertion of lawful authority to search. Cf. Hoover v. Beto, 467 F.2d 516, 521

(5th Cir. 1972) (deciding Bumper did not invalidate consent given

immediately after officer said he had a warrant to search a home when the

defendant, a criminal practice attorney, told officer that “his warrant was

not necessary and to come on into his home and search wherever he

wanted”); Earls v. State, 496 S.W.2d 464, 466, 468 (Tenn. 1973) (rejecting

argument that Bumper provides “a blanket prohibition” and concluding

that consent provided after presentation of warrant was voluntary when

the defendant threw it to the ground and stated, “You needn’t to have

brought a search warrant. You gentlemen are welcome to search anywhere

on my premises you want to search and take anything you find.”).

Regardless, the Schneckloth Court rejected the type of per se rule the dissent

proposes. See 412 U.S. at 229 (“The problem of reconciling the recognized

legitimacy of consent searches with the requirement that they be free from

any aspect of official coercion cannot be resolved by any infallible

touchstone.”); see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 (2002)

(noting that “there are no per se rules” in deciding whether consent was

voluntary).

¶20 Since Schneckloth, the Court’s declarations in other cases

involving voluntary consent to search bolster the view that a court must

examine the totality of the circumstances even when officers assert a lawful

authority to search. See Drayton, 536 U.S. at 207 (“[T]he Court has repeated

that the totality of the circumstances must control” in deciding consent);

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 558–59 (examining circumstances surrounding

consent to decide whether the district court properly found consent

voluntary rather than coerced). Other courts have also supported this view.

See, e.g., United States v. Juarez, 573 F.2d 267, 273–74 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting

Bumper and Schneckloth, then examining the totality of circumstances to

conclude that defendant gave voluntary consent by saying, “[t]hat’s fine”

after officer said “Well, I am going to have to search you”); Byars v. State,

533 S.W.2d 175, 180 (Ark. 1976) (“[W]e do not take Bumper to mean that an

accused can never be deemed to have consented to a search, if a search

warrant had been obtained and the accused was aware of that fact. Rather,

we consider that this question is determined by the particular facts present

when the consent is purportedly given.”). This Court has likewise focused

on the totality of the circumstances, including but not limited to an officer’s

reading of an admin per se form, in determining whether a DUI suspect’s

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STATE V. VALENZUELA

Opinion of the Court

consent to search was freely and voluntarily given. See Butler, 232 Ariz. at

88–89, ¶¶ 19–20, 302 P.3d at 613–14.

¶21 For these reasons, we hold that a trial court should examine

the totality of the circumstances to decide whether consent was voluntary,

even when given after a law enforcement officer’s assertion of lawful

authority to search. We neither decide whether the court should apply an

objective or subjective standard to resolve this issue nor identify whose

perspective—the search subject’s, the officer’s, or a hypothetical third

party’s— from which to view the voluntariness of consent. The parties did

not brief these issues, and the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment

jurisprudence after Schneckloth has cast doubt on pinpointing the correct

approach. Cf. Megan Annitto, Consent Searches of Minors, 38 N.Y.U. Rev. L.

& Soc. Change 1, 8–9 (2014) (describing shift in the Supreme Court from

examining subjective factors to instead considering whether an officer

reasonably believed that consent was voluntary); Blanca L. Hernández,

Incapacity to Refuse Consent: Fourth Amendment Offenses in Consensual

Searches of Individuals with Mental Illness, 23 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Soc. Just. 387,

399–400 (Spring 2014) (noting that the Drayton Court strayed from

Schneckloth’s assessment of the consenter’s personal perspective and mental

state in favor of examining the conduct of law enforcement); Nancy Leong

& Kira Suyeishi, Consent Forms and Consent Formalism, 2013 Wis. L. Rev. 751,

760–61 (2013) (“Following Mendenhall, the Supreme Court suggested in a

number of cases that the court should determine whether an officer’s

actions were reasonable from an objective standpoint, rather than a

subjective one . . . . The Court has not, however, explicitly overruled

Schneckloth, leaving doubt regarding the extent to which consent searches

should take subjective factors into account.”). In any event, we would reach

the same conclusion here regardless of which approach is followed.

¶22 Based on our review of the suppression hearing evidence, we

conclude that the State failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence

that Valenzuela’s consent was voluntary. Bumper and Johnson direct this

outcome. By telling Valenzuela multiple times that Arizona law required

him to submit to and complete testing to determine AC or drug content, the

officer invoked lawful authority and effectively proclaimed that Valenzuela

had no right to resist the search. See Bumper, 391 U.S. at 549; Johnson, 333

U.S. at 13–15. At the time of these repeated admonitions, Valenzuela had

been arrested and taken to a police station. Nothing in the record suggests

that the officer retracted the assertion of lawful authority to conduct a

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STATE V. VALENZUELA

Opinion of the Court

warrantless search or that other circumstances existed to dispel the

coerciveness of the admonitions before Valenzuela granted consent.

¶23 Our society expects, and unquestionably demands, that

people follow directives issued by law enforcement officers. Cf. Bumper,

391 U.S. at 549 n.14 (noting that acquiescence to a warrant demonstrates “an

intention to abide by the law” and “show[s] a regard for the supremacy of

the law”); see also Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a Law-Abiding

Society: Taking Public Views About Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal

Authorities into Account When Formulating Substantive Law, 28 Hofstra L. Rev.

707, 716 (2000) (“Citizens regard it as appropriate for police officers to direct

citizen behavior, and they follow these directives without requiring

explanation or justification.”). That is what Valenzuela did here.

Consequently, Valenzuela’s “consent,” like the grandmother’s consent in

Bumper, was merely an acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.

¶24 The State argues that Bumper is distinguishable because the

officer there effectively told the grandmother she had no right to resist the

search by claiming to have a warrant, while the DPS officer here correctly

informed Valenzuela that Arizona law required him to submit to testing or

his license would be suspended. The implied consent law, however,

nowhere “requires” a DUI arrestee to submit to testing, and the DPS

officer’s admonition therefore did not mirror the statute. See A.R.S. § 28-

1321(A), (B) (stating that although a DUI arrestee “gives consent” to testing

of blood, breath, or other bodily substance, he “shall be requested to submit

to and successfully complete” any such test) (emphasis added). But even

assuming that the officer accurately paraphrased the law, this distinction is

immaterial. The Bumper Court’s ruling turned on the grandmother’s

acquiescence to the officer’s assertion of lawful authority to search

regardless of the truthfulness of the officer’s claim to possess a warrant. See

Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548–49 (holding that the prosecutor’s burden to prove

that consent was voluntarily given “cannot be discharged by showing no

more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority”). The officer’s claim

of authority to search was “instinct with coercion” whether or not he

actually possessed a valid warrant. See. id. at 549 (“A search conducted in

reliance upon a warrant cannot later be justified on the basis of consent if it

turns out that the warrant was invalid.”); see also Lo-Ji Sales, 442 U.S. at 329

(citing Bumper and holding that after a business’s agent was arrested and

made aware of “the presumed authority” of a search warrant, his

compliance with officers’ requests could not be considered free and

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STATE V. VALENZUELA

Opinion of the Court

voluntary consent to a search); State v. Medicine, 865 N.W.2d 492, 498 ¶ 13

(S.D. 2015) (holding that Bumper applies whether an officer honestly

represents authority or fabricates it). Consequently, whether the officer

here correctly recited Arizona’s implied consent law is immaterial.

¶25 The State also argues that Bumper is inapplicable because,

regardless of the DPS officer’s admonitions in this case, Valenzuela

consented to the search pursuant to § 28-1321(A) by operating a vehicle

within the state. Although § 28-1321 validly provides an arrestee’s consent

to civil penalties for refusing or failing to complete requested tests, we have

rejected the contention that the implied consent law operates to

prospectively provide consent to a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.

See Butler, 232 Ariz. at 88 ¶ 18, 302 P.3d at 613 (“[I]ndependent of § 28-1321,

the Fourth Amendment requires an arrestee’s consent to be voluntary to

justify a warrantless blood draw.”); Carrillo, 224 Ariz. at 463 ¶ 1, 232 P.3d at

1245 (interpreting § 28-1321 to require either an arrestee’s express consent

or a warrant before an officer can administer a test). According to the State,

however, the United States Supreme Court suggested in McNeely that

implied consent laws validly require arrestees to submit to blood draws and

are sufficient to satisfy the consent exception to the warrant requirement,

unless the arrestee withdraws consent.

¶26 The State misreads McNeely. The issue there was whether the

dissipation rate of alcohol in the bloodstream constitutes an exigency that

justifies warrantless searches in all drunk-driving cases. 133 S. Ct. at 1556.

The Court rejected a per se exigency exception and held that “[w]hether a

warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be

determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at

1563. In responding to Missouri’s argument that requiring a warrant to

draw blood would undermine efforts to combat drunk-driving, the Court

pointed out that states “have a broad range of legal tools to . . . secure [AC]

evidence without undertaking warrantless nonconsensual blood draws.”

Id. at 1566 (plurality opinion). As one example, the Court noted that all

states “have adopted implied consent laws that require motorists . . . to

consent to [AC] testing if they are arrested,” and such laws impose

significant consequences, such as license suspension, when an arrestee

withdraws consent. Id. The Court did not suggest, however, that implied

consent laws supply an arrestee’s constitutionally valid consent to a

warrantless search. From the context of the discussion, we read the Court’s

reference to implied consent laws as meaning that these laws likely

12

STATE V. VALENZUELA

Opinion of the Court

convince many drivers to give consent rather than suffer the statutory

consequences for not doing so, thereby sparing law enforcement the need

to secure a warrant. See id.

¶27 The court of appeals majority distinguished Bumper because,

unlike the grandmother there, Valenzuela supposedly knew he could

refuse consent. Valenzuela, 237 Ariz. at 311 ¶ 13, 350 P.3d at 815. It reasoned

that § 28-1321 permits a driver to refuse a warrantless search, and the DPS

officer here gave Valenzuela that choice by informing him that a refusal

would result in a civil penalty and prompt the officer to seek a warrant to

compel testing. Id. We disagree. The officer’s testimony is unclear whether

he provided this information to Valenzuela. But even if he did so, he

effectively asked Valenzuela to either follow Arizona law (submit to

testing) or violate Arizona law (refuse to submit to testing). That

Valenzuela might have been informed of the consequences for refusal does

not alter the fact that the officer coerced Valenzuela’s consent by repeatedly

telling him that Arizona law “required” him to submit to testing, implying

that he had no legal right to refuse.

¶28 We do not hold today that § 28-1321 violates the Fourth

Amendment or that officers must cease advising arrestees about the law’s

requirements and the civil consequences for refusal.2 See Campbell v.

Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 554, 479 P.2d 685, 697 (1971) (finding “no

merit” to the argument that Arizona’s implied consent law violates the

Fourth Amendment). But officers must inform arrestees in a way that does

not coerce consent by stating or implying that officers have lawful

authority, without a warrant, to compel samples of blood, breath, or other

bodily substances.

¶29 A law enforcement officer can invoke the implied consent law

without infringing on an arrestee’s Fourth Amendment rights by following

the procedure set forth in § 28-1321(B). After making a DUI arrest, the

officer should ask whether the arrestee will consent to provide samples of

blood, breath, or other bodily substances for testing. If the arrestee

expressly agrees and successfully completes testing, the officer need not

2The Supreme Court is currently considering whether, in the absence of a

warrant, a state may criminalize a person’s refusal to submit to a test to

detect a person’s AC. See Bernard v. Minnesota, 136 S. Ct. 615 (2015);

Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 614 (2015).

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STATE V. VALENZUELA

Opinion of the Court

advise the arrestee of the statutory consequences for refusing consent. The

officer must, however, advise the arrestee before testing that the outcome

of the tests may result in the penalties set forth in § 28-1321(B)(1) and (2). If

the arrestee refuses to consent to testing or fails to successfully complete the

tests, the officer should advise the arrestee of the consequences for refusal

or incomplete testing as provided in § 28-1321(B), and then ask again

whether the arrestee will consent to testing. Although this choice “will not

be an easy or pleasant one for a suspect to make,” this difficulty does not

make the decision coerced. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564 (1983)

(considering Fifth Amendment challenge to admission in evidence of

refusal given in response to implied consent admonition). If the arrestee

again refuses to agree to testing or fails to successfully complete testing, a

test must not be given unless the officer secures a search warrant, except

that the officer may validly obtain a sample of blood or other bodily

substances taken for medical purposes, A.R.S. §§ 28-1321(D)(1), -1388(E).

Alternatively, the state might revise its implied consent admin per se form

to mirror one used in South Dakota, which provides the arrestee with a clear

choice whether to submit to testing or refuse consent. See Neville, 459 U.S.

at 555 n.2.

¶30 In sum, we hold that the State failed to carry its burden to

show by a preponderance of the evidence that Valenzuela freely and

voluntarily consented to providing samples of his blood and breath. By

advising Valenzuela after he was arrested and detained that Arizona law

required him to submit to testing, the officer invoked lawful authority to

compel consent. Because nothing in the suppression hearing record dispels

the coercive implication of the officer’s repeated admonition, the trial court

erred by finding that Valenzuela had voluntarily consented to the search

and then denying the motion to suppress the test results on that basis. Cf.

Medicine, 865 N.W.2d at 500 ¶ 17 (holding consent to blood draw

involuntary when, among other circumstances, it was given after officer

informed arrestee that South Dakota law provides that drivers

automatically consent to blood draws).

C. Good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule

¶31 The State alternatively argues, as it did at the suppression

hearing, that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies, and

the trial court therefore properly denied the motion to suppress. The

exclusionary rule, which allows suppression of evidence obtained in

14

STATE V. VALENZUELA

Opinion of the Court

violation of the Fourth Amendment, is a prudential doctrine invoked to

deter future violations. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 131 S. Ct. 2419,

2426 (2011). “Exclusion is ‘not a personal constitutional right,’ nor is it

designed to ‘redress the injury’ occasioned by an unconstitutional search.”

Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, when law enforcement officers “act with

an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful,”

deterrence is unnecessary and the exclusionary rule does not apply. Id. at

2427–28 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also A.R.S. § 13-

3925 (codifying good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule).

¶32 The good-faith exception applies here. Well before the DPS

officer advised Valenzuela from the admin per se form, this Court

characterized Arizona’s implied consent law as “requir[ing] a person to

submit to a chemical test of his blood, [breath] or urine if arrested for [DUI]

or face a . . . suspension of his driver’s license.” Campbell, 106 Ariz. at 546,

479 P.2d at 689. In State v. Brito, 183 Ariz. 535, 538–39, 905 P.2d 544, 547–48

(App. 1995), the court of appeals rejected an argument that the same admin

per se form read to Valenzuela incorrectly advised that Arizona law requires

submission to testing before asking for consent. The court concluded that

the admonition’s language conformed to our decision in Campbell and

“does not misstate the law,” and that “a licensed driver does not have an

unfettered right to refuse to take a blood alcohol test or breath test upon the

request of a law enforcement officer”). See also Jefferson Lankford, Arizona

DUI: A Manual for Police, Lawyers, and Judges 66, 133 (2001-2002 ed.) (stating

that “[t]he driver has the power but not the right to refuse testing under the

implied consent law” and including an “admin per se” form with language

identical to that used by the DPS officer here). Pursuant to a then-existing

statutory mandate, the court in Brito also reviewed the record for

fundamental error, which would have encompassed the court’s complete

case review for any prejudicial Fourth Amendment violations resulting

from use of the admonition, but found none. 183 Ariz. at 539, 905 P.2d at

548.

¶33 We today hold that consent given solely in acquiescence to

the admonition used here and in Brito is not free and voluntary under the

Fourth Amendment and cannot excuse the failure to secure a warrant. But

at the time of events here, the DPS officer followed binding precedent that

had sanctioned use of the admonition read to Valenzuela, and the good-

faith exception therefore applies. Cf. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429 (“An officer

who conducts a search in reliance on binding appellate precedent does no

15

STATE V. VALENZUELA

Opinion of the Court

more than ‘ac[t] as a reasonable officer would and should act’ under the

circumstances. . . . The deterrent effect of exclusion in such a case can only

be to discourage the officer from ‘do[ing] his duty.’”) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted).

¶34 The dissent contends that use of the admin per se form reflects

“recurring or systemic negligence” by law enforcement because this Court

in Carrillo “expressly reject[ed] Brito’s assertion that Arizona’s implied

consent statute requires suspects to submit to testing.” See infra ¶ 57. But

Carrillo did not address whether the implied consent statute “requires”

submission to testing as stated in Campbell and Brito. Instead, Carrillo held

that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the implied consent statute

requires that an arrestee “unequivocally manifest assent to the testing by

words or conduct” before officers can conduct warrantless testing. 224

Ariz. at 466 ¶ 19, 232 P.3d at 1249. We neither suggested that the

admonition used here to obtain that assent misstated the law or was

coercive, nor has this Court ever questioned or overruled Campbell or Brito.

Indeed, because the officer in Carrillo had not advised the defendant of the

implied consent law, the lawfulness of an admonition was not at issue. See

224 Ariz. at 463 ¶¶ 3–4, 232 P.3d at 1245. The dissent faults law enforcement

for failing to anticipate that we would disapprove the admin per se form in

the wake of Carrillo, but we are hard-pressed to do so when Carrillo is not

dispositive of the issue raised here, and our courts have continued to

approve the admonition. See State v. Oliver, No. 2 CA-CR 2014-0359 ¶¶ 23–

25 (Ariz. App. Aug. 18, 2015) (mem.) (following Brito to reject defendant’s

argument that the given admonitions, which mirrored ones given to

Valenzuela, misstated the implied consent statute); Valenzuela, 237 Ariz. at

313 ¶ 24, 350 P.3d at 817 (“[I]t is not a per se violation of the Fourth

Amendment if the officer phrases the admonition as a requirement.”).

¶35 In short, the DPS officer here did not “deliberately, recklessly,

or with gross negligence” conduct the search in violation of the Fourth

Amendment, but instead acted with “an objectively reasonable good-faith

belief” that the admonition was lawful. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427–28 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Suppression of Valenzuela’s test results would

not serve the exclusionary rule’s purposes. Cf. Herring v. United States, 555

U.S. 135, 144 (2009) (“To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must

be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and

sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the

justice system.”). For these reasons, the good-faith exception to the

16

STATE V. VALENZUELA

Opinion of the Court

exclusionary rule applies. The trial court therefore properly denied the

motion to suppress, albeit for a different reason. Cf. State v. Roseberry, 237

Ariz. 507, 508 ¶ 7, 353 P.3d 847, 848 (2015) (“We will affirm a trial court’s

decision if it is legally correct for any reason.”).

III. CONCLUSION

¶36 We vacate the court of appeals’ opinion and affirm

Valenzuela’s convictions and resulting sentences.

17

STATE V. VALENZUELA

CHIEF JUSTICE BALES, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part

Bales, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

¶37 I agree that Valenzuela did not voluntarily consent to the

warrantless search, and I therefore specially concur in parts I, II.A, and II.B

of the majority opinion. In two respects, however, I disagree with the

majority’s analysis. First, I would hold that a person cannot, as a matter of

law, be deemed to have voluntarily consented by acquiescing when police

assert a search is lawfully authorized (or, as the police stated here,

“required” by law). Second, I would not address, in the first instance, the

application of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, but if I had

to reach the merits, I would hold that the exception does not apply.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from parts II.C and III.

I.

¶38 Consistent with Schneckloth, the majority recognizes that the

voluntariness of consent to a search is determined by the “totality of the

circumstances.” Supra ¶ 11. In most cases, this inquiry is a factual

determination that considers various aspects of the setting in which a search

occurs, the conduct of law enforcement officers, and the characteristics of

the person who submits to the search. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226–27,

229; Butler, 232 Ariz. at 87–88, ¶¶ 13, 20, 302 P.3d at 612-13.

¶39 “Where there is coercion there cannot be consent.” Bumper,

391 U.S. at 550. Bumper and earlier Supreme Court decisions recognize that

an assertion of lawful authority is inherently (although perhaps lawfully)

coercive. Thus, if submission to a search is immediately preceded by such

an assertion, consent cannot be deemed voluntary. See id. More

colloquially, these cases stand for the principle that people do not

“voluntarily” consent to searches when they do what the police say the law

requires them to do. This “lawful authority principle” is not displaced by

Schneckloth.

¶40 The lawful authority principle is clearly illustrated by Bumper,

where the Court held that a homeowner’s consent was involuntary solely

because it was immediately preceded by an officer’s assertion that he had a

warrant. Id. at 548–49. Bumper gave no weight to other circumstances of

the search. The homeowner was never placed in custody or threatened; she

told the officers to “go ahead and look all over the house.” Id. at 556 (Black,

18

STATE V. VALENZUELA

CHIEF JUSTICE BALES, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part

J., dissenting). She testified that she “had no objection to [the police]

making a search,” she allowed the search “entirely under her own free

will,” and she was not forced “at all.” Id.

¶41 Despite the circumstances suggesting the homeowner was

not pressured to submit, the Court in Bumper treated as dispositive the fact

that the search was immediately preceded by an assertion of lawful

authority by the police. Because such an assertion is inherently coercive, id.

at 550, any succeeding “consent” cannot be “freely and voluntarily given.”

Id. at 548–49. The Court effectively held that consent, in these

circumstances, cannot, as a matter of law, be deemed voluntary.

¶42 Bumper comports with prior Supreme Court decisions. In

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), the police, having traced the

smell of burning opium to a hotel room, gained entry by knocking on the

door, identifying themselves, and telling the occupant that they “want[ed]

to talk to [her] a little bit.” Id. at 12. The occupant stepped back

“acquiescently” and admitted the officers. Id. Rejecting any suggestion that

the occupant had consented to the entry, the Court observed that it “was

demanded under color of office” and “granted in submission to authority.”

Id. at 13. In ruling the entry was nonconsensual, the Court did not consider

other circumstances of the search.

¶43 Johnson in turn cited Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921),

where officers went to a home seeking evidence of illegally distilled

whiskey. Id. at 315. The officers gained entry by telling the suspect’s wife

that they were “revenue officers that had come to search the premises ‘for

violations of the revenue law.’” Id. Without otherwise assessing the

circumstances, the Court noted that any contention that the search had been

consensual “cannot be entertained,” because the officers had demanded

admission “to make a search . . . under government authority.” Id. at 317.

Foreshadowing Bumper, the Court noted that “it is perfectly clear that under

the implied coercion here presented,” the wife could not voluntarily

consent to the search (which the Court phrased as waiving the husband’s

constitutional rights). Id.

¶44 We should read Schneckloth as preserving the lawful authority

principle. Most significantly, the principle respects Fourth Amendment

values by recognizing that we expect people to comply with police

19

STATE V. VALENZUELA

CHIEF JUSTICE BALES, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part

assertions of lawful authority and that acquiescence in such assertions

should not be viewed as “freely and voluntarily” given consent.

¶45 Schneckloth, moreover, quoted Bumper’s reasoning

approvingly and otherwise indicates the Court did not intend to displace

its earlier case law. Citing Bumper, Johnson, and Amos, the Court noted “if

under all the circumstances it has appeared that the consent was not given

voluntarily—that it was coerced by threats or force, or granted only in

submission to a claim of lawful authority—then we have found the consent

invalid and the search unreasonable.” 412 U.S. at 233–34. This statement

should not be read as modifying the Court’s prior decisions, but instead as

recognizing that the lawful authority principle complements the “totality

of the circumstances” test. Immediately after making this statement,

Schneckloth explained that the Court had not found valid consent in Bumper,

noting that “(w)hen a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a

home under a warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right

to resist the search. The situation is instinct with coercion—albeit colorably

lawful coercion. Where there is coercion there cannot be consent.” Id. at

234 (quoting Bumper, 391 U.S. at 550).

¶46 Schneckloth did not itself involve an assertion of lawful

authority to conduct a search, but instead whether the prosecution must

show that a person knew he or she had a right to refuse in order to establish

that consent was voluntarily given. 412 U.S. at 223-24. In holding that such

knowledge is not a prerequisite, Schneckloth noted that this factor was not

considered in Bumper, Johnson, or Amos. Id. at 234. But recognizing that

these decisions did not require the prosecution to show a person

subjectively knew they could refuse to submit, or that voluntariness

depends on the “totality of the circumstances,” is not inconsistent with the

lawful authority principle. See id. at 243 n.31 (noting that Johnson and Amos

turned on objective circumstances of search rather than absence of

knowledge of right to refuse).

¶47 Indeed, Schneckloth itself noted “Our decision today is a

narrow one. We hold only that when the subject of a search is not in

custody and the State attempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent,

the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that it demonstrate that

the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or

coercion, express or implied.” 412 U.S. at 248. Although “[v]oluntariness

20

STATE V. VALENZUELA

CHIEF JUSTICE BALES, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part

is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances,” id. at 248–

49, the Court in Schneckloth also restated its earlier observation in Bumper

that assertions of lawful authority are inherently coercive. The best way to

reconcile the Supreme Court’s statements is to recognize that consent to a

search cannot, as a matter of law, be deemed voluntary when it is

immediately preceded by an assertion of lawful authority.

¶48 In rejecting this proposition, the majority identifies two

hypotheticals. Supra ¶ 18. The first is when an officer retracts an assertion

of lawful authority before a person accedes to a search. This hypothetical

does not argue against the lawful authority principle. The principle rests

on the inherent coerciveness of the assertion of lawful authority; it does not

apply when the assertion is withdrawn before a person assents to a search.

¶49 The second hypothetical – where an officer’s assertion of

authority is contradicted by a private third-party before the person submits

to a search – also does not support rejecting the lawful authority principle.

One might conclude that the inherently coercive nature of the officer’s

assertion cannot be dispelled by unofficial, third-party statements. To hold

otherwise would require finding that a person can completely ignore the

officer’s claimed authority and “freely” submit after a third party tells them

they need not do so. None of the cases cited by the majority, supra ¶ 18,

involve a third party contradicting an officer’s assertion of authority. Nor

need we address that issue here: the officer’s assertion immediately

preceded Valenzuela’s assent to the search.

¶50 The majority also implicitly recognizes that the Schneckloth

“totality test” must apply differently when, as is true here, an officer has

asserted lawful authority to conduct a search. The majority – like the

Supreme Court in Bumper and Johnson – does not find significant various

circumstances that generally apply under a “totality” test, but instead gives

dispositive weight to the officer’s repeated assertions of lawful authority.

Compare ¶¶ 22–23 (concluding that Valenzuela’s “consent,” like the

grandmother’s consent in Bumper, was involuntary because nothing

dispelled the coercive nature of the assertion of authority) with Valenzuela,

237 Ariz. at 315 ¶¶ 30-31, 350 P.3d at 819 (noting that various factors,

including suspect’s demeanor, emotional state, education, and intelligence,

should be considered); cf Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227, 249 (noting that

21

STATE V. VALENZUELA

CHIEF JUSTICE BALES, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part

suspect’s knowledge of right to refuse generally is a factor to be

considered).

¶51 A better path to the majority’s conclusion would be holding

that consent cannot, as a matter of law, be deemed voluntary when it is

immediately preceded by a claim of lawful authority. Reaffirming this

lawful authority principle would remain faithful to Supreme Court

precedent while protecting Fourth Amendment values and providing

clearer guidance for the public, law enforcement, and our courts.

II.

¶52 The majority, recognizing that Valenzuela’s consent was

involuntary, goes on to hold that the evidence obtained from the unlawful

search is admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary

rule. ¶¶ 30–32. The good-faith exception was not addressed by the trial

court or the court of appeals.

¶53 Application of the good-faith exception can involve

complicated considerations of the social costs and deterrent benefits from

excluding the evidence at issue. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S.

135, 141 (2009) (discussing whether to apply the good-faith exception to the

exclusionary rule requires analyzing the benefits of deterrence against the

social costs of excluding evidence in any particular case). The parties did

not discuss the exception in their briefs – indeed, the State merely afforded

the exception a passing mention in a footnote. Given the lack of briefing, I

would decline to address the good-faith exception and instead remand to

the trial court to consider, in the first instance, whether the issue has been

preserved and, if so, how it should be resolved.

¶54 On the merits, I disagree with the majority’s analysis. Davis

states that when law enforcement officers “act with an objectively

reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful,” deterrence is

unnecessary and the exclusionary rule does not apply. 131 S. Ct. at 2427–

28. But the rule serves an important deterrence purpose when there is

either deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct or “recurring or

systemic negligence.” Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428 (citing Herring, 555 U.S. at

144).

22

STATE V. VALENZUELA

CHIEF JUSTICE BALES, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part

¶55 In this case, the officer’s use of an MVD admin per se form

inaccurately telling people that they are required to submit to tests reflects

at least “recurring or systemic negligence.” Id. In applying the good-faith

exception to the exclusionary rule, courts expect that “[r]esponsible law-

enforcement officers will take care to learn what is required of them” under

binding precedent and “conform their conduct to these rules.” Id. at 2429

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

¶56 More than five years ago, in Carrillo v. Houser, 224 Ariz. 463,

232 P.3d 1245 (2010), this Court considered whether Arizona’s implied

consent statute, A.R.S. § 28-1321 – the same statute at issue today –

authorizes law enforcement officers to administer warrantless tests without

a person’s express consent. 224 Ariz. at 463 ¶ 1, 232 P.3d at 1245.

Recognizing that the underlying statutes allow people to refuse to submit

to testing, id. at 465 ¶ 11, 232 P.3d at 1247, we held that an officer must

obtain a warrant or express consent in order to administer a test. Id. at 466

¶¶ 18, 19, 232 P.3d at 1248.

¶57 Carrillo establishes that police officers were misstating the law

when they admonished arrestees, based on the MVD form, that they are

required to submit to tests. The misstatement does not occur just once. The

form states that “Arizona law requires you to submit” to a warrantless test,

and repeats that “requirement” under Arizona law no fewer than three

more times. To underscore the point, the form concludes by stating “You

are, therefore, required to submit to the specified tests.” Carrillo was

decided in 2010. Insofar as law enforcement officers have continued to

coercively admonish DUI suspects that “Arizona law requires” submission

to warrantless tests, they have ignored this Court’s binding precedent.

¶58 Given Carrillo, I cannot accept the majority’s conclusions that

“binding precedent” sanctioned the admonition given to Valenzuela and

“the good-faith exception therefore applies.” Supra ¶ 33. As a decision by

this Court, Carrillo is the binding authority regarding the meaning of the

implied consent statute, and its legal force does not depend on our

expressly singling out inconsistent lower court decisions or administrative

practices. The majority’s reliance on State v. Brito, 183 Ariz. 535, 539, 905

P.2d 544, 548 (App. 1995), is particularly misplaced, given that Carrillo

expressly rejects Brito’s assertion that Arizona’s implied consent statute

requires suspects to submit to testing. Cf. Carrillo, 224 Ariz. at 466 ¶ 18, 232

23

STATE V. VALENZUELA

CHIEF JUSTICE BALES, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part

P.3d at 1248 (noting that “the statute has always provided that an arrestee

may refuse to submit to tests but that doing so will result in the loss of the

arrestee’s license”). At the least, after Carrillo the admonition was of

dubious legality, and Davis should not apply.

¶59 Extending Davis to apply the good-faith exception when the

law is unsettled incentivizes, rather than deters, unconstitutional behavior.

See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). “Official awareness

of the dubious constitutionality of a practice would be counterbalanced by

official certainty that, so long as the Fourth Amendment law in the area

remained unsettled, evidence obtained through the questionable practice”

would not be excluded. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). Cf. Emily Ward, Note, From Pen to Patrol: How Arizona Law

Enforcement Applied Carrillo v. Houser, 53 Ariz. L. Rev. 345 (2011) (discussing

initial responses by law enforcement to Carrillo).

¶60 Here, the police incorrectly told drivers that they were

lawfully required to submit to tests, even though our 2010 decision in

Carrillo recognized that “the statute has always provided that any arrestee

may refuse to submit.” 224 Ariz. at 466 ¶ 18, 232 P.3d at 1248. Applying

the good-faith exception here effectively rewards the systemic failure to

revise the MVD admonition to accurately state the law. That result conflicts

with the reasoning of Davis and the goals of the exclusionary rule. Thus, I

respectfully dissent from parts II.C and III of the majority opinion.

24

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