stating that the government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests — -especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to ‘produce a result which [it] could not command directly.’ Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 [78 S.Ct. 1332, 1342, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460] [ (1958) ]. Such interference with constitutional rights is Impermissible
How later courts described this case
- stating that the government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests — -especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to ‘produce a result which [it] could not command directly.’ Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 [78 S.Ct. 1332, 1342, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460] [ (1958) ]. Such interference with constitutional rights is Impermissible
- concluding that "respondent’s lack of a contractual or tenure 'right' to re-employment ... is immaterial to his free speech claim. Indeed, twice before, this Court has specifically held that the nonrenewal of a nontenured public school teacher's one-year contract may not be predicated on his exer *479 cise of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights” and citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960) and Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967)
- concluding that "respondent's lack of a contractual or tenure `right' to re-employment... is immaterial to his free speech claim. Indeed, twice before, this Court has specifically held that the non-renewal of a non-tenured public school teacher's one-year contract may not be predicated on his exercise of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights" and citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) and Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589 (1967)
- holding that “[a] person’s interest in a benefit is a ‘property’ interest for due process purposes if there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit and that he may invoke a hearing” and finding that a teacher’s written contract with an explicit tenure provision may justify a legitimate claim of entitlement entitled to due process
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled on other grounds by Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) — not on the Supreme Court's list
408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972), overruled on other grounds by Rust v. 8 Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173
Supreme Court of the United StatesMay 23, 199112 citing opinionsother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead it
Distinguished
Distinguished by Bassett v. Snyder, 951 F. Supp. 2d 939 (2013)
The plaintiffs’ citation to Perry is also inapposite for a similar reason: in that case, a plaintiff was terminated, allegedly in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights.
Distinguished by Burkett v. Tuslaw Local School District Board of Education, 380 F. Supp. 812 (1974)
Turning to the law, this Court finds that the case of Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972) is distinguishable from the facts in the instant case in that the
Distinguished by Mahoney v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 13 Pa. Commw. 243 (1974)
Concerning the two Federal cases relied on by plaintiffs, we conclude that Perry v. Sindermann, supra, is inapposite since it related to a teacher in a state college system who alleged that he had not been rehired because of his criticism of the college governing board’s policies and that this was an infringement of his right of free speech under the First Amendment.
Distinguished by Gibson v. Butler, 1972 Tenn. LEXIS 375 (1972)
We consider, therefore, that the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570, decided on June 29, 1972, is inapplicable.
The opinion
*605 Mr. Justice Marshall,
dissenting in part.
Respondent was a teacher in the state college system of the State of Texas for a decade before the Board of Regents of Odessa Junior College decided not to renew his contract. He brought this suit in Federal District Court' claiming that the decision not to rehire him was in retaliation for his public criticism of the policies of the college administration in violation of the First Amendment, and that because the decision was made without giving him a statement of reasons and a hearing, it denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment for petitioners, but the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. This Court affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I agree with Part I of the Court’s opinion holding that respondent has presented a bona fide First Amendment claim that should be considered fully by the District Court. But, for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Board of Regents v. Roth, No. 71-162, ante, p. 587, I would modify the judgment of the Court of Appeals to direct the District Court to enter summary judgment for respondent entitling him to a statement of reasons why his contract was not renewed and a hearing on disputed issues of fact.