stating that the government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests — -especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to ‘produce a result which [it] could not command directly.’ Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 [78 S.Ct. 1332, 1342, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460] [ (1958) ]. Such interference with constitutional rights is Impermissible
How later courts described this case
- stating that the government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests — -especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to ‘produce a result which [it] could not command directly.’ Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 [78 S.Ct. 1332, 1342, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460] [ (1958) ]. Such interference with constitutional rights is Impermissible
- concluding that "respondent’s lack of a contractual or tenure 'right' to re-employment ... is immaterial to his free speech claim. Indeed, twice before, this Court has specifically held that the nonrenewal of a nontenured public school teacher's one-year contract may not be predicated on his exer *479 cise of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights” and citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960) and Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967)
- concluding that "respondent's lack of a contractual or tenure `right' to re-employment... is immaterial to his free speech claim. Indeed, twice before, this Court has specifically held that the non-renewal of a non-tenured public school teacher's one-year contract may not be predicated on his exercise of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights" and citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) and Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589 (1967)
- holding that “[a] person’s interest in a benefit is a ‘property’ interest for due process purposes if there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit and that he may invoke a hearing” and finding that a teacher’s written contract with an explicit tenure provision may justify a legitimate claim of entitlement entitled to due process
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled on other grounds by Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) — not on the Supreme Court's list
408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972), overruled on other grounds by Rust v. 8 Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173
Supreme Court of the United StatesMay 23, 199112 citing opinionsother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead it
Distinguished
Distinguished by Bassett v. Snyder, 951 F. Supp. 2d 939 (2013)
The plaintiffs’ citation to Perry is also inapposite for a similar reason: in that case, a plaintiff was terminated, allegedly in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights.
Distinguished by Burkett v. Tuslaw Local School District Board of Education, 380 F. Supp. 812 (1974)
Turning to the law, this Court finds that the case of Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972) is distinguishable from the facts in the instant case in that the
Distinguished by Mahoney v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 13 Pa. Commw. 243 (1974)
Concerning the two Federal cases relied on by plaintiffs, we conclude that Perry v. Sindermann, supra, is inapposite since it related to a teacher in a state college system who alleged that he had not been rehired because of his criticism of the college governing board’s policies and that this was an infringement of his right of free speech under the First Amendment.
Distinguished by Gibson v. Butler, 1972 Tenn. LEXIS 375 (1972)
We consider, therefore, that the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570, decided on June 29, 1972, is inapplicable.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Brennan,
with whom Mr. Justice Douglas joins, dissenting in No. 71-162, ante, p. 564, and dissenting in part in No. 70-36.
Although I agree with Part I of the Court’s opinion in No. 70-36, I also agree with my Brother Marshall that “respondent [s] [were] denied due process when [their] contracts] [were] not renewed and [they were] not informed of the reasons and given an opportunity to respond.” Ante, at 590. Since respondents were entitled to summary judgment on that issue, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in No. 71-162, and, to the extent indicated by my Brother Marshall, I would modify the judgment of the Court of Appeals in No. 70-36.