rejecting argument that petitioner should have invoked “any of a number of possible alternatives to state habeas including ‘a suit for injunction, a writ of prohibition, or mandamus or a declaratory judgment in the state courts,’ or perhaps other relief under the State Administrative Procedure Act.... as a prerequisite to taking [] claims to federal court”
How later courts described this case
- rejecting argument that petitioner should have invoked “any of a number of possible alternatives to state habeas including ‘a suit for injunction, a writ of prohibition, or mandamus or a declaratory judgment in the state courts,’ or perhaps other relief under the State Administrative Procedure Act.... as a prerequisite to taking [] claims to federal court”
- recognizing challenges to prison “living conditions and disciplinary measures” are “cognizable in federal habeas corpus”
- holding that where a habeas corpus petition presents § 1983 claims challenging conditions of confinement, the petition should be construed as a civil rights action
- holding that district courts have discretion to construe a 10 habeas petition attacking conditions of confinement as a federal civil rights complaint
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled on other grounds by Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006) — not on the Supreme Court's list
404 U.S. 249, 251 (1971), overruled on other grounds by Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81
Supreme Court of the United StatesJun 22, 20067 citing opinionsother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead itReported superseded by statute, as recognized in Woodford v. Ngo — not on the Supreme Court's list
404 U.S. 249, 251 (1971), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84
Supreme Court of the United StatesJun 22, 200612 citing opinionsby statuteother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead it
The opinion
Mr. Chief Justice Burger,
dissenting.
This case is singularly inappropriate for summary reversal without an adequate record, and without briefs *253 or argument. The Court assumes without citation of authority that further resort to state remedies would be futile; the District Judge, far more familiar than we with the local situation, thought otherwise. The Court does not rest its reversal on this ground, however, for it blandly treats petitioners’ habeas corpus petitions as complaints under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 , an approach that petitioners’ experienced counsel has studiously and appropriately avoided. Petitioners had previously filed complaints expressly under § 1983, which were denied after full hearing. It is conceded in the petition for certiorari that almost all of the claims involved in those actions underlie the instant habeas corpus proceeding; but petitioners’ counsel argues that the doctrine of res judicata has no application in habeas corpus. The Court does not explain why this argument is not lost if the habeas corpus petitions are treated as complaints under § 1983.
I had previously thought that summary reversal was limited to cases where the error was manifest. Here, however, the Court has challenged the conclusion of the Court of Appeals largely on the basis of surmise and has gone on to reverse on a theory that thé Court of Appeals was not asked to consider and presumably could not have considered.