Woodford v. Ngo

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2005 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

WOODFORD ET AL. v. NGO

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 05–416. Argued March 22, 2006—Decided June 22, 2006

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) requires a prisoner to

exhaust any available administrative remedies before challenging

prison conditions in federal court. 42 U. S. C. §1997e(a). Respondent

filed a grievance with California prison officials about his prison con

ditions, but it was rejected as untimely under state law. He subse

quently sued petitioner officials under §1983 in the Federal District

Court, which granted petitioners’ motion to dismiss on the ground

that respondent had not fully exhausted his administrative remedies

under §1997e(a). Reversing, the Ninth Circuit held that respondent

had exhausted those remedies because none remained available to

him.

Held: The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion

of administrative remedies. Pp. 5–21.

(a) Petitioners claim that a prisoner must complete the administra

tive review process in accordance with applicable procedural rules,

including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit in federal

court, but respondent contends that §1997e(a) allows suit once ad

ministrative remedies are no longer available, regardless of the rea

son. To determine the correct interpretation, the Court looks for

guidance to both administrative and habeas corpus law, where ex

haustion is an important doctrine. Administrative law requires

proper exhaustion of administrative remedies, which “means using

all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly.” Pozo v.

McCaughtry, 286 F. 3d 1022, 1024. Habeas law has substantively

similar rules, though its terminology is different. Pp. 5–11.

(b) Given this background, the Court is persuaded that the PLRA

requires proper exhaustion. Pp. 11–17.

(1) By referring to “such administrative remedies as are avail

2 WOODFORD v. NGO

Syllabus

able,” §1997e(a)’s text strongly suggests “exhausted” means what it

means in administrative law. P. 11.

(2) Construing §1997e(a) to require proper exhaustion also serves

the PLRA’s goals. It gives prisoners an effective incentive to make

full use of the prison grievance process, thus providing prisons with a

fair opportunity to correct their own errors. It reduces the quantity

of prisoner suits. And it improves the quality of those suits that are

filed because proper exhaustion often results in creation of an admin

istrative record helpful to the court. In contrast, respondent’s inter

pretation would make the PLRA’s exhaustion scheme totally ineffec

tive, since exhaustion’s benefits can be realized only if the prison

grievance system is given a fair opportunity to consider the griev

ance. That cannot happen unless the grievant complies with the sys

tem’s critical procedural rules. Respondent’s arguments that his in

terpretation would filter out frivolous claims are unpersuasive.

Pp. 11–14.

(3) As interpreted by respondent, the PLRA exhaustion require

ment would be unprecedented. No statute or case purports to require

exhaustion while at the same time allowing a party to bypass delib

erately the administrative process by flouting the agency’s procedural

rules. None of his models is apt. He first suggests that the PLRA re

quirement was patterned on habeas law as it existed between 1963

and 1977 when, under Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 438, a federal ha

beas claim could be procedurally defaulted only if the prisoner delib

erately bypassed state remedies. That would be fanciful, however.

The PLRA was enacted contemporaneously with the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which gave federal habeas

review a structure markedly different from what existed before 1977.

Furthermore, respondent’s interpretation would not duplicate that

scheme, for it would permit a prisoner to bypass deliberately admin

istrative review with no risk of sanction. Respondent next suggests

that the PLRA exhaustion requirement is patterned on §14(b) of the

Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and §706(e) of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but neither provision is in any

sense an exhaustion provision. Pp. 14–17.

(c) Respondent’s remaining arguments regarding §1997e(a)’s inter

pretation are also unconvincing. Pp. 17–21.

403 F. 3d 620, reversed and remanded.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,

and SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed an

opinion concurring in the judgment. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting

opinion, in which SOUTER and GINSBURG, JJ., joined.

Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 05–416

_________________

JEANNE S. WOODFORD, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.

VIET MIKE NGO

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 22, 2006]

JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether a prisoner can

satisfy the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s exhaustion

requirement, 42 U. S. C. §1997e(a), by filing an untimely

or otherwise procedurally defective administrative griev

ance or appeal. We hold that proper exhaustion of admin

istrative remedies is necessary.

I

A

Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of

1995 (PLRA), 110 Stat. 1321–71, as amended, 42 U. S. C.

§1997e et seq., in 1996 in the wake of a sharp rise in pris

oner litigation in the federal courts, see, e.g., Alexander v.

Hawk, 159 F. 3d 1321, 1324–1325 (CA11 1998) (citing

statistics). The PLRA contains a variety of provisions

designed to bring this litigation under control. See, e.g.,

§1997e(c) (requiring district courts to weed out prisoner

claims that clearly lack merit); §1997e(e) (prohibiting

claims for emotional injury without prior showing of

physical injury); §1997e(d) (restricting attorney’s fees).

A centerpiece of the PLRA’s effort “to reduce the quan

2 WOODFORD v. NGO

Opinion of the Court

tity . . . of prisoner suits” is an “invigorated” exhaustion

provision, §1997e(a). Porter v. Nussle, 534 U. S. 516, 524

(2002). Before 1980, prisoners asserting constitutional

claims had no obligation to exhaust administrative reme

dies. See Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U. S. 249, 251 (1971)

(per curiam). In the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Per

sons Act, §7, 94 Stat. 349, Congress enacted a weak ex

haustion provision, which authorized district courts to

stay actions under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983 for

a limited time while a prisoner exhausted “such plain,

speedy, and effective administrative remedies as are

available.” §1997e(a)(1) (1994 ed.). “Exhaustion under

the 1980 prescription was in large part discretionary; it

could be ordered only if the State’s prison grievance sys

tem met specified federal standards, and even then, only

if, in the particular case, the court believed the require

ment ‘appropriate and in the interests of justice.’ ” Nussle,

supra, at 523 (quoting §1997e). In addition, this provision

did not require exhaustion if the prisoner sought only

money damages and such relief was not available under

the relevant administrative scheme. See McCarthy v.

Madigan, 503 U. S. 140, 150–151 (1992).

The PLRA strengthened this exhaustion provision in

several ways. Exhaustion is no longer left to the discre

tion of the district court, but is mandatory. See Booth v.

Churner, 532 U. S. 731, 739 (2001). Prisoners must now

exhaust all “available” remedies, not just those that meet

federal standards. Indeed, as we held in Booth, a prisoner

must now exhaust administrative remedies even where

the relief sought—monetary damages—cannot be granted

by the administrative process. Id., at 734. Finally, ex

haustion of available administrative remedies is required

for any suit challenging prison conditions, not just for

suits under §1983. Nussle, supra, at 524.

Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006)

3

Opinion of the Court

B

California has a grievance system for prisoners who

seek to challenge their conditions of confinement. To

initiate the process, an inmate must fill out a simple form,

Dept. of Corrections, Inmate/Parolee Appeal Form, CDC

602 (12/87) (hereinafter Form 602), that is made “readily

available to all inmates.” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15,

§3084.1(c) (2004). The inmate must fill out two parts of

the form: part A, which is labeled “Describe Problem,” and

part B, which is labeled “Action Requested.” Then, as

explained on Form 602 itself, the prisoner “must first

informally seek relief through discussion with the appro

priate staff member.” App. 40–41. The staff member fills

in part C of Form 602 under the heading “Staff Response”

and then returns the form to the inmate.

If the prisoner is dissatisfied with the result of the

informal review, or if informal review is waived by the

State, the inmate may pursue a three-step review process.

See §§3084.5(b)–(d). Although California labels this “for

mal” review (apparently to distinguish this process from

the prior step), the three-step process is relatively simple.

At the first level, the prisoner must fill in part D of Form

602, which states: “If you are dissatisfied, explain below.”

Id., at 40. The inmate then must submit the form, to

gether with a few other documents, to the Appeals Coordi

nator within 15 working days—three weeks—of the action

taken. §3084.6(c). This level may be bypassed by the

Appeals Coordinator in certain circumstances. §3084.5(b).

Within 15 working days after an inmate submits an ap

peal, the reviewer must inform the inmate of the outcome

by completing part E of Form 602 and returning the form

to the inmate.

If the prisoner receives an adverse determination at this

first level, or if this level is bypassed, the inmate may

proceed to the second level of review conducted by the

warden. §§3084.5(c), (e)(1). The inmate does this by

4 WOODFORD v. NGO

Opinion of the Court

filling in part F of Form 602 and submitting the form

within 15 working days of the prior decision. Within 10

working days thereafter, the reviewer provides a decision

on a letter that is attached to the form. If the prisoner’s

claim is again denied or the prisoner otherwise is dissatis

fied with the result, the prisoner must explain the basis

for his or her dissatisfaction on part H of the form and

mail the form to the Director of the California Department

of Corrections and Rehabilitation within 15 working days.

§3084.5(e)(2). An inmate’s appeal may be rejected where

“[t]ime limits for submitting the appeal are exceeded and

the appellant had the opportunity to file within the pre

scribed time constraints.” §3084.3(c)(6).

C

Respondent is a prisoner who was convicted for murder

and is serving a life sentence in the California prison

system. In October 2000, respondent was placed in ad

ministrative segregation for allegedly engaging in “inap

propriate activity” in the prison chapel. Two months later,

respondent was returned to the general population, but

respondent claims that he was prohibited from participat

ing in “special programs,” including a variety of religious

activities. Approximately six months after that restriction

was imposed, respondent filed a grievance with prison

officials challenging that action. That grievance was

rejected as untimely because it was not filed within 15

working days of the action being challenged. See

§§3084.3(c)(6), 3084.6(c).

Respondent appealed that decision internally without

success, and subsequently sued petitioners—California

correctional officials—under 42 U. S. C. §1983 in Federal

District Court. The District Court granted petitioners’

motion to dismiss because respondent had not fully ex

hausted his administrative remedies as required by

§1997e(a). See App. to Pet. for Cert. 24–25.

Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 5

Opinion of the Court

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and

held that respondent had exhausted administrative reme

dies simply because no such remedies remained available

to him. 403 F. 3d 620, 629–630 (2005). The Ninth Cir

cuit’s decision, while consistent with the decision of a

divided panel of the Sixth Circuit in Thomas v. Woolum,

337 F. 3d 720 (2003), conflicts with decisions of four other

Courts of Appeals. See Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F. 3d

1022, 1025 (CA7) (“To exhaust remedies, a prisoner must

file complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time,

the prison’s administrative rules require”), cert. denied,

537 U. S. 949 (2002); Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365

F. 3d 1181, 1185–1186 (CA10 2004) (same); Spruill v.

Gillis, 372 F. 3d 218, 230 (CA3 2004) (same); Johnson v.

Meadows, 418 F. 3d 1152, 1159 (CA11 2005) (same). We

granted certiorari to address this conflict, 546 U. S. ___

(2005), and we now reverse.

II

A

The PLRA provides as follows:

“No action shall be brought with respect to prison

conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any

other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail,

prison, or other correctional facility until such admin

istrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”

§1997e(a) (2000 ed.) (emphasis added).

There is no dispute that this language requires a pris

oner to “exhaust” administrative remedies, but the parties

differ sharply in their understanding of the meaning of

this requirement. Petitioners argue that this provision

requires proper exhaustion. This means, according to

petitioners, that a prisoner must complete the administra

tive review process in accordance with the applicable

procedural rules, including deadlines, as a precondition to

6 WOODFORD v. NGO

Opinion of the Court

bringing suit in federal court. Respondent, on the other

hand, argues that this provision demands what he terms

“exhaustion simpliciter.” Brief for Respondent 7. In his

view, §1997e(a) simply means that a prisoner may not

bring suit in federal court until administrative remedies

are no longer available. Under this interpretation, the

reason why administrative remedies are no longer avail

able is irrelevant. Bare unavailability suffices even if this

results from a prisoner’s deliberate strategy of refraining

from filing a timely grievance so that the litigation of the

prisoner’s claim can begin in federal court.

The key for determining which of these interpretations

of §1997e(a) is correct lies in the term of art “exhausted.”

Exhaustion is an important doctrine in both administra

tive and habeas law, and we therefore look to those bodies

of law for guidance.

B

“The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

is well established in the jurisprudence of administrative

law.” McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 193 (1969).

“The doctrine provides ‘that no one is entitled to judicial

relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the pre

scribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.’ ”

Ibid. (quoting Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303

U. S. 41, 50–51 (1938)). Exhaustion of administrative

remedies serves two main purposes. See McCarthy, 503

U. S., at 145.

First, exhaustion protects “administrative agency au

thority.” Ibid. Exhaustion gives an agency “an opportu

nity to correct its own mistakes with respect to the pro

grams it administers before it is haled into federal court,”

and it discourages “disregard of [the agency’s] procedures.”

Ibid.

Second, exhaustion promotes efficiency. Ibid. Claims

generally can be resolved much more quickly and eco

Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 7

Opinion of the Court

nomically in proceedings before an agency than in litiga

tion in federal court. In some cases, claims are settled at

the administrative level, and in others, the proceedings

before the agency convince the losing party not to pursue

the matter in federal court. See ibid.; Parisi v. Davidson,

405 U. S. 34, 37 (1972); McKart, supra, at 195. “And even

where a controversy survives administrative review, ex

haustion of the administrative procedure may produce a

useful record for subsequent judicial consideration.”

McCarthy, supra, at 145.

Because of the advantages of administrative review,

some aggrieved parties will voluntarily exhaust all ave

nues of administrative review before resorting to federal

court, and for these parties an exhaustion requirement is

obviously unnecessary. Statutes requiring exhaustion

serve a purpose when a significant number of aggrieved

parties, if given the choice, would not voluntarily exhaust.

Aggrieved parties may prefer not to exhaust administra

tive remedies for a variety of reasons. Although exhaus

tion promotes overall efficiency, a party may conclude—

correctly or incorrectly—that exhaustion is not efficient in

that party’s particular case. In addition, some aggrieved

parties may prefer to proceed directly to federal court for

other reasons, including bad faith.1 See Thomas, supra, at

752–753 (Rosen, J., dissenting in part and concurring in

judgment).

Because exhaustion requirements are designed to deal

with parties who do not want to exhaust, administrative

law creates an incentive for these parties to do what they

would otherwise prefer not to do, namely, to give the

agency a fair and full opportunity to adjudicate their

——————

1 One can conceive of an inmate’s seeking to avoid creating an admin

istrative record with someone that he or she views as a hostile fact-

finder, filing a lawsuit primarily as a method of making some correc

tions official’s life difficult, or perhaps even speculating that a suit will

mean a welcome—if temporary—respite from his or her cell.

8 WOODFORD v. NGO

Opinion of the Court

claims. Administrative law does this by requiring proper

exhaustion of administrative remedies, which “means

using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so

properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the

merits).” Pozo, 286 F. 3d, at 1024 (emphasis in original).

This Court has described the doctrine as follows: “[A]s a

general rule . . . courts should not topple over administra

tive decisions unless the administrative body not only has

erred, but has erred against objection made at the time

appropriate under its practice.” United States v. L. A.

Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U. S. 33, 37 (1952) (empha

sis added). See also Sims v. Apfel, 530 U. S. 103, 108

(2000); id., at 112 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and

concurring in judgment) (“On this underlying principle of

administrative law, the Court is unanimous”); id., at 114–

115 (BREYER, J., dissenting); Unemployment Compensa

tion Comm’n of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U. S. 143, 155

(1946); Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U. S. 552, 556–557

(1941); 2 K. Davis & R. Pierce, Administrative Law Trea

tise §15:8, pp. 341–344 (3d ed. 1994). Proper exhaustion

demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other

critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system

can function effectively without imposing some orderly

structure on the course of its proceedings.2

——————

2 The dissent makes two chief arguments regarding the doctrine of

exhaustion in administrative law. Neither is sound.

First, the dissent contends that, “in the absence of explicit statutory

directive,” proper exhaustion is required only in proceedings that are in

the nature of “appellate review proceedings.” Post, at 9 (opinion of

STEVENS, J.). The only authorities cited in support of this proposition

are Sims v. Apfel, 530 U. S. 103, 108–109 (2000)—which concerns differ

ent questions, i.e., issue exhaustion and the distinction between adver

sarial and non-adversarial proceedings—and an amici brief, which in

turns cites no supporting authority. See post, at 9 (citing Brief for Law

Professors 1). The amici brief argues that “[t]he conceptual key to this

case is [the] distinction” between an “original proceeding,” in which “the

court is simply determining the legality of out-of-court action,” and a

Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006)

9

Opinion of the Court

C

The law of habeas corpus has rules that are substan

tively similar to those described above. The habeas stat

ute generally requires a state prisoner to exhaust state

remedies before filing a habeas petition in federal court.

See 28 U. S. C. §§2254(b)(1), (c). “This rule of comity

reduces friction between the state and federal court sys

tems by avoiding the ‘unseem[liness]’ of a federal district

court’s overturning a state-court conviction without the

state courts having had an opportunity to correct the

——————

“review proceeding,” in which the court must “review the decision of

some other adjudicator.” Id., at 2–3. According to the amici brief,

habeas petitions are prime examples of “review proceeding[s]” because

they “ask federal courts to review the decisions of state courts.” Id., at

3. This argument is deeply flawed.

“[H]abeas corpus [is] an original . . . civil remedy for the enforcement

of the right to personal liberty, rather than . . . a stage of the state

criminal proceedings . . . or as an appeal therefrom.” Fay v. Noia, 372

U. S. 391, 423–424 (1963) (footnote omitted). And habeas law includes

the “judge-made doctrine of procedural default.” Post, at 5, n. 4. This

shows that the dissent and the amici brief are incorrect in contending

that a proper exhaustion requirement is incompatible with an original

proceeding.

Second, the dissent argues that, even if administrative law generally

requires proper exhaustion, respondent falls within an exception to

that rule. Post, at 11. As the dissent puts it, “[b]ecause respondent has

raised constitutional claims, . . . the Court may not, as a matter of

federal common law, apply an extrastatutory waiver requirement

against him.” Ibid. But we are not applying an “extrastatutory”

requirement “as a matter of federal common law.” Ibid. We are inter

preting and applying the statutory requirement set out in the PLRA

exhaustion provision. We interpret the PLRA exhaustion provision to

require proper exhaustion, not the unprecedented scheme of exhaustion

simpliciter that the respondent advocates. As for the suggestion that

the PLRA might be meant to require proper exhaustion of non-

constitutional claims but not constitutional claims, we fail to see how

such a carve-out would serve Congress’ purpose of addressing a flood of

prisoner litigation in the federal courts, see supra, at 1, when the

overwhelming majority of prisoner civil rights and prison condition

suits are based on the Constitution.

10 WOODFORD v. NGO

Opinion of the Court

constitutional violation in the first instance.” O’Sullivan

v. Boerckel, 526 U. S. 838, 845 (1999) (alteration in origi

nal). A state prisoner is generally barred from obtaining

federal habeas relief unless the prisoner has properly

presented his or her claims through one “complete round

of the State’s established appellate review process.” Ibid.

In practical terms, the law of habeas, like administra-

tive law, requires proper exhaustion, and we have de

scribed this feature of habeas law as follows: “To . . . ‘pro

tect the integrity’ of the federal exhaustion rule, we ask

not only whether a prisoner has exhausted his state reme

dies, but also whether he has properly exhausted those

remedies . . . .” Id., at 848 (citation omitted; emphasis in

original).

The law of habeas, however, uses terminology that

differs from that of administrative law. In habeas, the

sanction for failing to exhaust properly (preclusion of

review in federal court) is given the separate name of

procedural default, although the habeas doctrines of ex

haustion and procedural default “are similar in purpose

and design and implicate similar concerns,” Keeney v.

Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U. S. 1, 7 (1992). See also Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 731–732 (1991). In habeas,

state-court remedies are described as having been “ex

hausted” when they are no longer available, regardless of

the reason for their unavailability. See Gray v. Nether

land, 518 U. S. 152, 161 (1996). Thus, if state-court reme

dies are no longer available because the prisoner failed to

comply with the deadline for seeking state-court review or

for taking an appeal, those remedies are technically ex

hausted, ibid., but exhaustion in this sense does not

automatically entitle the habeas petitioner to litigate his

or her claims in federal court. Instead, if the petitioner

procedurally defaulted those claims, the prisoner generally

is barred from asserting those claims in a federal habeas

proceeding. Id., at 162; Coleman, supra, at 744–751.

Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 11

Opinion of the Court

III

With this background in mind, we are persuaded that

the PLRA exhaustion requirement requires proper

exhaustion.

A

The text of 42 U. S. C. §1997e(a) strongly suggests that

the PLRA uses the term “exhausted” to mean what the

term means in administrative law, where exhaustion

means proper exhaustion. Section 1997e(a) refers to “such

administrative remedies as are available,” and thus points

to the doctrine of exhaustion in administrative law.

B

Construing §1997e(a) to require proper exhaustion also

fits with the general scheme of the PLRA, whereas re

spondent’s interpretation would turn that provision into a

largely useless appendage. The PLRA attempts to elimi

nate unwarranted federal-court interference with the

administration of prisons,3 and thus seeks to “affor[d]

corrections officials time and opportunity to address com

plaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal

case.” Nussle, 534 U. S., at 525. See also Booth, 532 U. S.,

at 739. The PLRA also was intended to “reduce the quan

tity and improve the quality of prisoner suits.” Nussle,

supra, at 524.

Requiring proper exhaustion serves all of these goals. It

gives prisoners an effective incentive to make full use of

the prison grievance process and accordingly provides

prisons with a fair opportunity to correct their own errors.

This is particularly important in relation to state correc

tions systems because it is “difficult to imagine an activity

in which a State has a stronger interest, or one that is

more intricately bound up with state laws, regulations,

——————

3 See, e.g., 18 U. S. C. §3626(b)(2) (termination of prison-conditions

consent decrees).

12 WOODFORD v. NGO

Opinion of the Court

and procedures, than the administration of its prisons.”

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475, 491–492 (1973).

Proper exhaustion reduces the quantity of prisoner suits

because some prisoners are successful in the administra

tive process, and others are persuaded by the proceedings

not to file an action in federal court.4 Finally, proper

exhaustion improves the quality of those prisoner suits

that are eventually filed because proper exhaustion often

results in the creation of an administrative record that is

helpful to the court. When a grievance is filed shortly

after the event giving rise to the grievance, witnesses can

be identified and questioned while memories are still

fresh, and evidence can be gathered and preserved.

While requiring proper exhaustion serves the purposes

of the PLRA, respondent’s interpretation of §1997e(a)

——————

4 The dissent’s objection, post, at 4, that exhaustion simpliciter is

enough to reduce frivolous prisoner suits is not well taken. First, what

matters is not whether proper exhaustion was necessary to reach that

goal, but whether proper exhaustion was mandated by Congress.

Second, the empirical support for the dissent’s conclusion is weak. The

dissent points to a drop in volume of prisoner litigation between 1995

and 2000 and concludes that it was “clearly a direct result of the

PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.” Post, at 12. But this mistakes

correlation for causation: A requirement of exhaustion simpliciter will

not, absent a mollified prisoner, prevent a case from being docketed—

and thus appearing in the filing statistics the dissent cites. The credit

for reduced filings more likely belongs to the PLRA’s enactment of 28

U. S. C. §1915A (requiring district courts to screen “before docketing, if

feasible” prisoner civil complaints), and its amendments to §1915

(forbidding frequent-filer prisoners from proceeding in forma pauperis).

Finally, prisoner civil rights and prison conditions cases still account

for an outsized share of filings: From 2000 through 2005, such cases

represented between 8.3% and 9.8% of the new filings in the federal

district courts, or on average about one new prisoner case every other

week for each of the nearly 1000 active and senior district judges across

the country. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts,

Judicial Facts and Figures, tbls. 1.1, 4.4, 4.6, http://www.uscourts.gov/

judicialfactsfigures/contents.html (as visited June 19, 2006, and avail

able in Clerk of Court’s case file).

Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 13

Opinion of the Court

would make the PLRA exhaustion scheme wholly ineffec

tive. The benefits of exhaustion can be realized only if the

prison grievance system is given a fair opportunity to

consider the grievance. The prison grievance system will

not have such an opportunity unless the grievant complies

with the system’s critical procedural rules. A prisoner

who does not want to participate in the prison grievance

system will have little incentive to comply with the sys

tem’s procedural rules unless noncompliance carries a

sanction, and under respondent’s interpretation of the

PLRA noncompliance carries no significant sanction. For

example, a prisoner wishing to bypass available adminis

trative remedies could simply file a late grievance without

providing any reason for failing to file on time. If the

prison then rejects the grievance as untimely, the prisoner

could proceed directly to federal court. And acceptance of

the late grievance would not thwart the prisoner’s wish to

bypass the administrative process; the prisoner could

easily achieve this by violating other procedural rules

until the prison administration has no alternative but to

dismiss the grievance on procedural grounds. We are

confident that the PLRA did not create such a toothless

scheme.

Respondent argues that his interpretation of the PLRA’s

exhaustion provision would filter out frivolous claims

because, by the time the deadline for filing a grievance has

passed, the inmate may no longer wish to file suit. Brief

for Respondent 43. But since the deadline for filing an

administrative grievance is generally not very long—14 to

30 days according to the United States, see Brief for

United States as Amicus Curiae 29, and even less accord

ing to respondent, see Brief for Respondent 30, n. 17—it is

doubtful that Congress thought requiring a prisoner to

wait this long would provide much of a deterrent. Indeed,

many prisoners would probably find it difficult to prepare,

file, and serve a civil complaint before the expiration of the

14 WOODFORD v. NGO

Opinion of the Court

deadline for filing a grievance in many correctional

systems.

Respondent also contends that his interpretation of the

PLRA exhaustion requirement would filter out frivolous

claims because prisoners could not simply wait until the

deadline for filing an administrative grievance had passed.

According to respondent, “most grievance systems give

administrators the discretion to hear untimely griev

ances,” and therefore a prisoner “will be required to file an

untimely grievance and thereby give the grievance sys

tem” the opportunity to address the complaint. Id., at 43.

But assuming for the sake of argument that the premise of

this argument is correct, i.e., that a court could never

conclude that administrative remedies were unavailable

unless an administrative decision had so held, but see

Coleman, 501 U. S., at 735, n., a prisoner who does not

want to participate in the prison grievance process would

have little difficulty in forcing the prison to dismiss his

administrative case on procedural grounds. Under the

California system, for example, a prisoner has numerous

opportunities to miss deadlines. Therefore, the task of

engineering such a dismissal of a grievance on procedural

grounds is unlikely to be sufficient to alter the conduct of a

prisoner whose objective is to bypass the administrative

process.

C

Finally, as interpreted by respondent, the PLRA ex

haustion requirement would be unprecedented. Respon

dent has not pointed to any statute or case that purports

to require exhaustion while at the same time allowing a

party to bypass deliberately the administrative process by

flouting the agency’s procedural rules. It is most unlikely

that the PLRA, which was intended to deal with what was

perceived as a disruptive tide of frivolous prisoner litiga

tion, adopted an exhaustion requirement that goes further

Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 15

Opinion of the Court

than any other model that has been called to our attention

in permitting the wholesale bypassing of administrative

remedies. Respondent identifies three models for the

scheme of “exhaustion simpliciter” that he believes is set

out in the PLRA, but none of these examples is apt.

Respondent first looks to habeas law as it existed prior

to Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977). Before then,

a federal habeas claim could be procedurally defaulted

only if the prisoner deliberately bypassed state remedies.

See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 438 (1963). It would be

fanciful, however, to suggest that the PLRA exhaustion

requirement was patterned on habeas law as it existed in

the years between Fay and Wainwright. As respondent

stresses, the PLRA was enacted contemporaneously with

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA), 110 Stat. 104, which gave federal habeas review

a structure markedly different from that which existed in

the period between Fay and Wainwright.

Furthermore, respondent’s interpretation of §1997e(a)

would not duplicate the scheme that existed in habeas

during that interval. As interpreted by respondent,

§1997e(a) would permit a prisoner to bypass deliberately

and flagrantly administrative review without any risk of

sanction. Because it is unlikely that the PLRA was in

tended to permit this, the two Courts of Appeals that have

held that §1997e(a) does not require proper exhaustion

both pointedly stated that their decisions did not allow a

prisoner to bypass deliberately administrative remedies.

See 403 F. 3d, at 629; Thomas, 337 F. 3d, at 732, and n. 4.

Neither of these courts, however, explained how §1997e(a)

can be interpreted in this way—that is, so that it does not

require proper exhaustion but somehow proscribes delib

erate bypass.

Apparently recognizing that such an interpretation

neither has a statutory basis nor refers to a concept of

exhaustion from an existing body of law, respondent does

16 WOODFORD v. NGO

Opinion of the Court

not contend that §1997e(a) prohibits deliberate bypass; in

his view, all that §1997e(a) demands is that a prisoner

wait until any opportunity for administrative review has

evaporated. But in making this argument, respondent

asks us to hold that the PLRA was meant to adopt an

exhaustion scheme that stands in sharp contrast to both

current and past habeas law and is unlike any other ex

haustion scheme that has been called to our attention.

Respondent next suggests that the PLRA exhaustion

requirement was patterned on §14(b) of the Age Discrimi

nation in Employment Act of 1967, (ADEA), 81 Stat. 607,

codified at 29 U. S. C. §633(b), and §706(e) of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 260, as redesignated

and amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e–5(e), but these are im

plausible models. Neither of these provisions makes

reference to the concept of exhaustion, and neither is in

any sense an exhaustion provision.

In Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U. S. 750 (1979), we

considered §14(b) of the ADEA, which provides that, if a

State has an agency to redress state-law age-related em

ployment-discrimination claims, an ADEA claim may not

be brought in federal court “before the expiration of sixty

days after proceedings have been commenced under the

State law.” 29 U. S. C. §633(b) (emphasis added). This

provision makes no reference to the exhaustion of state

remedies, only to the “commence[ment]” of state proceed

ings, and this provision leaves no doubt that proper com

mencement of those proceedings is not required. As we

noted, see Oscar Mayer, 441 U. S., at 759, §14(b) of the

ADEA states that the requirement of commencement is

satisfied merely by sending the state agency a signed

statement of the pertinent facts, and §14(b) explicitly

provides that the commencement requirement does not

entail compliance with any other state procedural rule,

including a deadline for initiating the state proceeding,

id., at 760. We see little similarity between §14(b), which

Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 17

Opinion of the Court

merely requires the commencement of state proceedings

and explicitly does not require timely commencement, and

42 U. S. C. §1997e(a), which expressly requires exhaustion

of available administrative remedies with no reference to a

federally based limiting principle.

Section 706(e) of Title VII is also fundamentally differ

ent from the PLRA exhaustion provision. As interpreted

by this Court, §706(e) means that a complainant who

“initially institutes proceedings with a state or local

agency with authority to grant or seek relief from the

practice charged” must “file a charge” with that agency, or

“have the EEOC refer the charge to that agency, within

240 days of the alleged discriminatory event . . . .” EEOC

v. Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U. S. 107, 110–111

(1988). Following the reasoning of Oscar Mayer, we held

that this filing requirement did not demand that the

charge submitted to the state or local authority be filed in

compliance with the authority’s time limit. 486 U. S., at

123–125. Because §706(e) of Title VII, refers only to the

filing of a charge with a state or local agency and not to

the exhaustion of remedies, §706(e) cannot be viewed as a

model for the PLRA exhaustion provision.

IV

Respondent’s remaining arguments regarding the inter

pretation of 42 U. S. C. §1997e(a) are unconvincing. Rely

ing on the use of the term “until” in the phrase “until such

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted,”

respondent contends that “[t]he use of the temporal word

‘until’ . . . conveys a timing requirement: it assumes that

the question to be answered is simply whether the pris

oner can file suit now or must wait until later.” Brief for

Respondent 11. Likewise, according to respondent, the

use of the present tense (“such administrative remedies as

are available,” §1997e(a) (emphasis added)), requires “a

focus on whether any administrative remedies are pres

18 WOODFORD v. NGO

Opinion of the Court

ently available.” Id., at 12. But saying that a party may

not sue in federal court until the party first pursues all

available avenues of administrative review necessarily

means that, if the party never pursues all available ave

nues of administrative review, the person will never be

able to sue in federal court. Thus, §1997e(a)’s use of the

term “until” and the present tense does not support re

spondent’s position.

Respondent attaches significance to the fact that the

PLRA exhaustion provision does not expressly state that a

prisoner must have “properly exhausted” available admin

istrative remedies, whereas a tolling provision of the

AEDPA provides that the time for filing a federal habeas

petition is tolled during the period when “a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral

review . . . is pending.” 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(2) (emphasis

added). In our view, respondent draws an unreasonable

inference from the difference in the wording of these two

provisions. Although the AEDPA and the PLRA were

enacted at roughly the same time, they are separate and

detailed pieces of legislation. Moreover, the AEDPA and

PLRA provisions deal with separate issues: tolling in the

case of AEDPA and exhaustion in the case of the PLRA.

Respondent maintains that his interpretation of the

PLRA exhaustion provision is bolstered by another PLRA

provision, 42 U. S. C. §1997e(c)(2), that permits a district

court to dismiss certain prisoner claims “without first

requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies.”

According to respondent, this provision shows that Con

gress thought that, at the point when a district court

might make such a ruling (which would typically be well

after the filing of the complaint), a prisoner might still

have the opportunity to exhaust administrative remedies.

Because short administrative filing deadlines would make

this impossible, respondent contends, Congress cannot

have thought that a prisoner’s failure to comply with those

Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 19

Opinion of the Court

deadlines would preclude litigation in federal court.

Respondent’s argument is unconvincing for at least two

reasons. First, respondent has not shown that Congress

had reason to believe that every prison system would have

relatively short and categorical filing deadlines. Indeed,

respondent asserts that most grievance systems give

administrators the discretion to hear untimely grievances.

Second, even if dismissals under §1997e(c)(2) typically

occur when the opportunity to pursue administrative

remedies has passed, §1997e(c)(2) still serves a useful

function by making it clear that the PLRA exhaustion

requirement is not jurisdictional, and thus allowing a

district court to dismiss plainly meritless claims without

first addressing what may be a much more complex ques

tion, namely, whether the prisoner did in fact properly

exhaust available administrative remedies.5

Respondent next argues that the similarity between the

wording of the PLRA exhaustion provision and the

AEDPA exhaustion provision, 28 U. S. C. §2254(c), shows

that the PLRA provision was meant to incorporate the

narrow technical definition of exhaustion that applies in

habeas. We reject this argument for two reasons.

First, there is nothing particularly distinctive about the

wording of the habeas and PLRA exhaustion provisions.

They say what any exhaustion provision must say—that a

judicial remedy may not be sought or obtained unless,

until, or before certain other remedies are exhausted. It

is, therefore, unrealistic to infer from the wording of the

PLRA provision that Congress framed and adopted that

——————

5 Questions regarding the timeliness of prisoner filings occur fre

quently. See, e.g., Wallace v. Burbury, 305 F. Supp. 2d 801, 806 (ND

Ohio 2003); Pusey v. Belanger, No. Civ. 02–351–SLR, 2004 WL 2075472

(D. Del., Sept. 14, 2004); Eakle v. Tennis, No. Civ. 4:CV–04–2040, 2005

WL 2266270 (MD Pa., Sept. 16, 2005); Williams v. Briley, No. 04 C

5701, 2005 WL 1498865 (ND Ill., June 21, 2005); Issac v. Nix, No. Civ.

A. 2:04CV172RWS, 2006 WL 861642 (ND Ga., Mar. 30, 2006).

20 WOODFORD v. NGO

Opinion of the Court

provision with habeas law and not administrative law in

mind. Indeed, the wording of the PLRA provision (a pris

oner may not bring an action with respect to prison condi

tions “until such administrative remedies as are available

are exhausted”) is strikingly similar to our description of

the doctrine of administrative exhaustion (“ ‘no one is

entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened

injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been

exhausted,’ ” McKart, 395 U. S., at 193 (citation omitted;

emphasis added)).

Second, respondent’s suggestion that the PLRA was

meant to incorporate the same technical distinction that

exists in habeas law without providing any sanction to

prevent willful noncompliance—not even the deliberate

bypass standard of Fay—would produce a scheme that in

practical terms is radically different from the habeas

scheme. Copying habeas’ narrow definition of exhaustion

without furnishing any sanction to promote compliance

would be like copying the design for an airplane but omit

ting one of the wings.

Respondent contends that requiring proper exhaustion

will lead prison administrators to devise procedural re

quirements that are designed to trap unwary prisoners

and thus to defeat their claims. Respondent does not

contend, however, that anything like this occurred in his

case, and it is speculative that this will occur in the future.

Corrections officials concerned about maintaining order in

their institutions have a reason for creating and retaining

grievance systems that provide—and that are perceived by

prisoners as providing—a meaningful opportunity for

prisoners to raise meritorious grievances. And with re

spect to the possibility that prisons might create proce

dural requirements for the purpose of tripping up all but

the most skillful prisoners, while Congress repealed the

“plain, speedy, and effective” standard, see 42 U. S. C.

§1997e(a)(1) (1994 ed.) (repealed 1996), we have no occa

Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 21

Opinion of the Court

sion here to decide how such situations might be

addressed.

Respondent argues that requiring proper exhaustion is

harsh for prisoners, who generally are untrained in the

law and are often poorly educated. This argument over

looks the informality and relative simplicity of prison

grievance systems like California’s, as well as the fact that

prisoners who litigate in federal court generally proceed

pro se and are forced to comply with numerous unforgiving

deadlines and other procedural requirements.

* * *

For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and remand the case for

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 1

BREYER, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 05–416

_________________

JEANNE S. WOODFORD, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.

VIET MIKE NGO

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 22, 2006]

JUSTICE BREYER, concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the Court that, in enacting the Prison

Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U. S. C. §1997e(a),

Congress intended the term “exhausted” to “mean what

the term means in administrative law, where exhaustion

means proper exhaustion.” Ante, at 11. I do not believe

that Congress desired a system in which prisoners could

elect to bypass prison grievance systems without conse

quences. Administrative law, however, contains well

established exceptions to exhaustion. See Sims v. Apfel,

530 U. S. 103, 115 (2000) (BREYER, J., joined by Rehnquist,

C. J., and SCALIA and KENNEDY, JJ., dissenting) (constitu

tional claims); Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term

Care, Inc., 529 U. S. 1, 13 (2000) (futility); McKart v. United

States, 395 U. S. 185, 197–201 (1969) (hardship); McCarthy

v. Madigan, 503 U. S. 140, 147–148 (1992) (inadequate or

unavailable administrative remedies); see generally II R.

Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise §15 (4th ed. 2002).

Moreover, habeas corpus law, which contains an exhaustion

requirement that is “substantively similar” to administra

tive law’s and which informs the Court’s opinion, ante, at 9

10, also permits a number of exceptions. See post, at 5, n. 5

(STEVENS, J., dissenting) (noting that habeas corpus law

permits “petitioners to overcome procedural defaults if they

can show that the procedural rule is not firmly established

2 WOODFORD v. NGO

BREYER, J., concurring in judgment

and regularly followed, if they can demonstrate cause and

prejudice to overcome a procedural default, or if enforcing

the procedural default rule would result in a miscarriage of

justice” (citations omitted)).

At least two Circuits that have interpreted the statute

in a manner similar to that which the Court today adopts

have concluded that the PLRA’s proper exhaustion re

quirement is not absolute. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F. 3d

218, 232 (CA3 2004); Giano v. Goord, 380 F. 3d 670, 677

(CA2 2004). In my view, on remand, the lower court

should similarly consider any challenges that petitioner

may have concerning whether his case falls into a tradi

tional exception that the statute implicitly incorporates.

Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 1

STEVENS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 05–416

_________________

JEANNE S. WOODFORD, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.

VIET MIKE NGO

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 22, 2006]

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER and

JUSTICE GINSBURG join, dissenting.

The citizen’s right to access an impartial tribunal to

seek redress for official grievances is so fundamental and

so well established that it is sometimes taken for granted.

A state statute that purported to impose a 15-day period of

limitations on the right of a discrete class of litigants to

sue a state official for violation of a federal right would

obviously be unenforceable in a federal court. The ques

tion in this case is whether, by enacting the exhaustion

requirement in the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995

(PLRA), Congress intended to authorize state correction

officials to impose a comparable limitation on prisoners’

constitutionally protected right of access to the federal

courts. The text of the statute, particularly when read in

the light of our well-settled jurisprudence, provides us with

the same unambiguous negative answer that common sense

would dictate.

I

Congress enacted the following exhaustion requirement

in the PLRA:

“No action shall be brought with respect to prison

conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any

other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail,

2 WOODFORD v. NGO

STEVENS, J., dissenting

prison, or other correctional facility until such admin

istrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42

U. S. C. §1997e(a).

This provision requires prisoners to exhaust informal

remedies before filing a lawsuit under federal law. They

must file an administrative grievance and, if the resolu

tion of that grievance is unsatisfactory to them, they must

exhaust available administrative appeals. The statute,

however, says nothing about the reasons why a grievance

may have been denied; it does not distinguish between a

denial on the merits and a denial based on a procedural

error. It does not attach any significance to a prison offi

cial’s decision that a prisoner has made procedural mis

steps in exhausting administrative remedies. In the

words of federal courts jurisprudence, the text of the

PLRA does not impose a waiver, or a procedural default,

sanction, upon those prisoners who make such procedural

errors. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 125–126, n. 28

(1982) (explaining that “the problem of waiver is separate

from the question whether a state prisoner has exhausted

state remedies”).1 The plain text of the PLRA simply

requires that “such administrative remedies as are avail

able” be exhausted before the prisoner can take the seri

ous step of filing a federal lawsuit against the officials who

hold him in custody.

Today, however, the Court concludes that the “PLRA

exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion,” ante,

at 10. The absence of textual support for that conclusion

is a sufficient reason for rejecting it. Unlike 28 U. S. C.

——————

1 Because we have used the term “waiver” in referring to this sanction

in the habeas corpus context, I use that term in this opinion. Strictly

speaking, it would be more accurate to characterize this sanction as a

“forfeiture” sanction, as there is no question that prisoners do not, by

making a procedural error in the course of exhausting administrative

remedies, purposefully relinquish their right to bring constitutional

claims in federal court.

Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 3

STEVENS, J., dissenting

§2244(d)(2), a tolling provision of the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which was signed

into law just two days before the PLRA, 42 U. S. C.

§1997e(a) lacks any textual requirement of proper exhaus

tion. See Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S. 4, 8 (2000) (explaining

the importance of the textual requirement that an applica

tion be “properly filed” under 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(2)). In

stead, just as in the habeas context, under the PLRA a

prisoner “who has [procedurally] defaulted his federal

claims in [a state prison grievance proceeding] meets the

technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no state

remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.” Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 732 (1991). Accordingly, under the

plain text of 42 U. S. C. §1997e(a), respondent satisfied his

duty to exhaust available administrative remedies before

filing a federal lawsuit.

II

The majority essentially ignores the PLRA’s text,2

suggesting instead that general administrative law princi

ples, which allow courts in certain circumstances to im

pose procedural default sanctions as a matter of federal

common law, suggest we should read waiver into the

PLRA. However, as discussed in Part III, infra, our cases

make clear that such extratextual waiver sanctions are

only appropriate if a statute directs a federal court to act

——————

2 The majority does not claim that the plain language of the statute

dictates its decision, but rather that the text “strongly suggests” that

the PLRA includes a procedural default sanction, ante, at 10. The

majority then states: “Section 1997e(a) refers to ‘such administrative

remedies as are available,’ and thus points to the doctrine of exhaustion

in administrative law.” Ibid. The reference to “administrative reme

dies” simply addresses the fact that the review procedures provided by

prison officials are administrative in character rather than judicial. At

any rate, as discussed in Part III, infra, the doctrine of exhaustion in

administrative law does not support the majority’s engraftment of a

procedural default sanction into the PLRA.

4 WOODFORD v. NGO

STEVENS, J., dissenting

as an appellate tribunal directly reviewing the decision of

a federal agency. Because actions brought under Rev.

Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, such as respondent’s, are

de novo proceedings in federal district court, the majority’s

invocation of these common-law principles is seriously

misguided.

The majority’s disregard of the plain text of the PLRA is

especially unjustified in light of the backdrop against

which the statute was enacted. We presume, of course,

that Congress is familiar with this Court’s precedents and

expects its legislation to be interpreted in conformity with

those precedents. See, e.g., Edelman v. Lynchburg College,

535 U. S. 106, 117, n. 13 (2002); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U. S.

516, 528 (2002); North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U. S.

29, 34 (1995). This strong presumption is even more forceful

when the underlying precedent is “ ‘unusually important.’ ”

Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School Dist., 524 U. S.

274, 294, n. 1 (1998) (quoting Cannon v. University of Chi

cago, 441 U. S. 677, 699 (1979)). Consistent with this pre

sumption, if we have already provided a definitive interpre

tation of the language in one statute, and Congress then

uses nearly identical language in another statute, we will

give the language in the latter statute an identical interpre

tation unless there is a clear indication in the text or legisla

tive history that we should not do so. See, e.g., United

States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482, 495 (1997). Under these

elementary principles of statutory interpretation, the

PLRA’s exhaustion requirement does not incorporate a

procedural default component.

As the Solicitor General correctly points out in his brief

supporting petitioners, “the PLRA’s exhaustion provision

is essentially identical to that of the habeas corpus stat

ute.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13. Spe

cifically, a provision in the federal habeas statute, first

enacted in 1948 as a codification of a previous judge-made

Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 5

STEVENS, J., dissenting

rule,3 bars relief “unless it appears that . . . the applicant

has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the

State,” 28 U. S. C. §2254(b)(1)(A).4 The PLRA similarly

bars judicial relief “until such administrative remedies as

are available are exhausted,” 42 U. S. C. §1997e(a). The

only noteworthy distinction between the two provisions is

that 28 U. S. C. §2254(b)(1)(A) uses the word “unless,”

whereas 42 U. S. C. §1997e(a) uses the word “until.” If

anything, this distinction suggests that the exhaustion

requirement in the PLRA is less amenable to a waiver

sanction than the comparable requirement in the habeas

statute: The word “until” indicates a temporal condition

whereas the word “unless” would have been more appro

priate for a procedural bar.

Notwithstanding the use of the word “unless” in 28

U. S. C. §2254(b)(1)(A), as the majority correctly recog

nizes, we have held that state-court remedies are “ex

hausted” for the purposes of the federal habeas statute so

long as “they are no longer available, regardless of the

reason for their unavailability,” ante, at 9. In other words,

the exhaustion requirement in the federal habeas statute

does not incorporate a procedural default sanction.5

——————

3 See generally O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U. S. 838, 850–853 (1999)

(STEVENS, J., joined by GINSBURG and BREYER, JJ., dissenting) (tracing

history of exhaustion requirement in habeas law).

4 This language is, in relevant part, identical to the language as it

was enacted in 1948. See 62 Stat. 967.

5 In habeas law it is a separate judge-made doctrine of procedural

default, stemming from our decision in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S.

72 (1977), that may bar relief even though a claim has been exhausted.

This procedural default doctrine is based on unique considerations of

comity in the habeas context, including the need to ensure that the state

criminal trial remains the “main event” rather than a “tryout on the road”

for a later federal habeas proceeding. Id., at 90 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Moreover, procedural default in habeas is closely related to the

principle that this Court lacks certiorari jurisdiction to review a state-

court judgment that rests on an adequate and independent state proce

dural ground. See id., at 81–82. It is undisputed that these unique

6 WOODFORD v. NGO

STEVENS, J., dissenting

Between Congress’ codification of the exhaustion re

quirement in federal habeas law and Congress’ adoption of

an essentially identical exhaustion requirement in the

PLRA, we decided no fewer than six cases in which we

stated explicitly that a habeas petitioner satisfies the

statutory exhaustion requirement so long as state-court

remedies are no longer available to him at the time of the

federal-court filing, regardless of the reason for their

unavailability. See Coleman, 501 U. S., at 731; Castille v.

Peoples, 489 U. S. 346, 351 (1989); Teague v. Lane, 489

U. S. 288, 298 (1989); Engle, 456 U. S., at 125, n. 8; Hum

phrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504, 516 (1972); Fay v. Noia, 372

U. S. 391, 434–435 (1963).

The Court rejects the obvious analogy to habeas law

because the wording of the PLRA’s exhaustion provision is

also “strikingly similar to our description of the doctrine of

administrative exhaustion, (“ ‘no one is entitled to judicial

relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the pre

——————

considerations do not apply in the context of 42 U. S. C. §1983 suits,

because the “very purpose of §1983 was to interpose the federal courts

between the States and the people, as guardians of the people’s federal

rights.” Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 242 (1972). Accordingly, the

majority correctly does not suggest that we incorporate our procedural

default jurisprudence from the federal habeas context into prison condi

tions suits under §1983.

Nonetheless, I fear that the majority’s analysis may actually create a

harsher procedural default regime under the PLRA than the judge-

made procedural default doctrine in habeas law. But see Muhammad v.

Close, 540 U. S. 749, 751 (2004) (per curiam) (stating that “[p]risoners

suing under §1983 . . . generally face a substantially lower gate [than

prisoners seeking habeas corpus relief], even with the requirement of the

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 that administrative opportunities be

exhausted first” (citing 42 U. S. C. §1997e(a))). Our habeas jurisprudence

allows petitioners to overcome procedural defaults if they can show that

the procedural rule is not firmly established and regularly followed, see

James v. Kentucky, 466 U. S. 341, 348 (1984), if they can demonstrate

cause and prejudice to overcome a procedural default, or if enforcing

the procedural default rule would result in a miscarriage of justice, see

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478 (1986).

Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 7

STEVENS, J., dissenting

scribed administrative remedy has been exhausted,’ ” ante,

at 20 (quoting McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 193

(1969), in turn citing Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding

Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 50–51 (1938)). The language quoted by

the majority from our case law is indeed similar to the

language of the PLRA (and the habeas corpus statute).

But this provides no help to the majority: We clearly used

this language to describe only an exhaustion requirement,

not a procedural default sanction.

The quoted language originally appeared in Justice

Brandeis’ opinion in Myers, 303 U. S., at 50–51. Myers is a

simple exhaustion case: The question presented was

whether an employer could seek the immediate intervention

of federal courts in response to a complaint filed with the

National Labor Relations Board that it had engaged in

unfair labor practices, or whether it had to await the conclu

sion of the Board’s proceedings to avail itself of judicial

review. The case was purely about timing—there was no

discussion whatever of procedural default.

McKart clearly recognized that the language of Myers

concerned only exhaustion, not procedural default. Imme

diately after quoting Myers, the McKart Court discussed the

benefits of exhaustion (primarily avoiding premature inter

ruption of the agency process), and drew an analogy to

judicial rules that limit interlocutory appeals, without

making any reference to procedural default. See 395 U. S.,

at 193–194. It was not until later in the opinion that the

McKart Court turned to a discussion of the considerations

underlying the imposition of a procedural default sanction

in cases “where the administrative process is at an end and

a party seeks judicial review of a decision that was not

appealed through the administrative process.” Id., at 194.

In sum, the language the majority quotes from McKart

further supports the presumption that Congress intended

the exhaustion requirement in the PLRA to be read in

conformity with our decisions interpreting the exhaustion

8 WOODFORD v. NGO

STEVENS, J., dissenting

requirement in the federal habeas statute—that is, to

require exhaustion, but not to impose a waiver sanction

for procedural errors made in the course of exhaustion.

III

Absent any support for a procedural default sanction in

the text of the PLRA, the Court turns to background prin

ciples of administrative law in an effort to justify its hold

ing. See ante, at 7–8. The Court’s discussion of these

background administrative law principles misapprehends

our precedent.

As a general rule in the administrative law context,

courts should not “ ‘topple over administrative decisions

unless the administrative body has not only erred, but has

erred against objection made at the appropriate time under

its practice.’ ” Ante, at 8 (quoting United States v. L. A.

Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U. S. 33, 37 (1952)). This

doctrine is, “like most judicial doctrines, subject to numer

ous exceptions. Application of the doctrine to specific

cases requires an understanding of its purposes and of the

particular administrative scheme involved.” McKart, 395

U. S., at 193 (footnote omitted); see id., at 198–201 (declin

ing to apply waiver doctrine in the circumstances of the case

before it).

The waiver doctrine in administrative law is “largely [a]

creatur[e] of statute.” Sims v. Apfel, 530 U. S. 103, 107

(2000). In other words, many statutes explicitly prohibit

courts from considering claims “ ‘that ha[ve] not been

urged’ ” before the administrative agency. Id., at 108

(quoting National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. §160(e)

(1982 ed.)). See L. A. Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U. S., at 36,

n. 6 (collecting statutes). It is important to emphasize

that statutory waiver requirements always mandate, by

their plain terms, that courts shall not consider arguments

not properly raised before the agency; we have never

Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 9

STEVENS, J., dissenting

suggested that the word “exhaustion,” standing alone,

imposes a statutory waiver requirement. Accordingly, the

Court’s claim that a procedural default sanction is man

dated by simply “interpreting and applying the statutory

requirement set out in the PLRA exhaustion provision,”

ante, at 9, n. 2, is patently erroneous.

In the federal administrative law context we have also

imposed waiver requirements even in the absence of ex

plicit statutory directive. This judge-made rule, discussed

extensively by the majority, see ante, at 6–8, however, is

based on “an analogy to the rule that appellate courts will

not consider arguments not raised before trial courts.”

Sims, 530 U. S., at 108–109. As amici curiae law profes

sors explain, this is because, in the context of such appel

late review proceedings, procedural errors in the course of

exhaustion naturally create bars to review because the

decision under review rests on a procedural ground. Brief

for Law Professors 1. Moreover, the rule that appellate

tribunals will not consider claims not properly exhausted

below prevents parties from being unfairly surprised on

appeal by resolution of issues about which they lacked an

opportunity or incentive to introduce evidence at trial.

See Sims, 530 U. S., at 109. Accordingly, whether a court

should impose a procedural default sanction for issues not

properly exhausted in a prior administrative proceeding

“depends on the degree to which the analogy to normal

adversarial litigation applies in a particular administra

tive proceeding.” Ibid. (citing L. A. Tucker Truck Lines

and Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U. S. 552 (1941)). If the

analogy does not hold, we will not impose a procedural

default sanction. See Sims, 530 U. S., at 108–110.6

——————

6 The majority’s attempt to distinguish Sims as concerning “different

questions,” ante, at 8, n. 2, is perplexing, particularly in light of the fact

that the United States, in its brief supporting petitioners, relies on

Sims to argue that our administrative law decisions support the propo

sition that the Court should impose a waiver sanction into the PLRA.

10 WOODFORD v. NGO

STEVENS, J., dissenting

Applying these principles, it is clear that ordinary prin

ciples of administrative law do not justify engrafting

procedural default into the PLRA. The purpose of a 42

U. S. C. §1983 action such as that filed by respondent is

not to obtain direct review of an order entered in the

grievance procedure, but to obtain redress for an alleged

violation of federal law committed by state corrections

officials. See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 242

(1972). It is undisputed that the PLRA does nothing to

change the nature of the federal action under §1983; pris

oners who bring such actions after exhausting their ad

ministrative remedies are entitled to de novo proceedings

in the federal district court without any deference (on

issues of law or fact) to any ruling in the administrative

grievance proceedings. In sum, because federal district

court proceedings in prison condition litigation bear no

resemblance to appellate review of lower court decisions,

the administrative law precedent cited by the majority

makes clear that we should not engraft a judge-made

procedural default sanction into the PLRA.7 The major

ity’s misapprehension of our precedent is especially trou

——————

See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 11. Although the particu

lar procedural error made during the exhaustion of administrative

remedies was different in Sims than the procedural error at issue here,

our analysis in Sims concerned the circumstances under which we

should or should not engraft a waiver sanction into the administrative

exhaustion process generally. See 530 U. S., at 108–112; id., at 112–

113 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id.,

at 114–115 (BREYER, J., dissenting).

7 The majority’s suggestion that habeas law indicates otherwise, see

ante, at 8 n. 2, is incorrect. As explained above, see n. 5, supra, the

judge-made procedural default sanction in habeas law is based on

unique considerations that do not apply to §1983 suits. Our precedent

concerning judicial review of administrative proceedings, upon which

the majority purports to rely, see ante, at 11, makes clear that we will

not impose a waiver sanction when judicial review of the administra

tive decision does not resemble appellate review of lower court

decisions.

Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 11

STEVENS, J., dissenting

bling because, as the American Bar Association points out,

we should be particularly hesitant to impose “judicially

created procedural technicalities . . . ‘in a statutory

scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers,

initiate the process.’ ” Brief as Amicus Curiae 11 (quoting

Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U. S. 750, 765, n. 13

(1979)).8

Finally, the majority’s invocation of judge-made admin

istrative law principles fails for an entirely separate rea

son: An “established exception” to the judge-made doc

trine of procedural default in review of administrative

proceedings permits individuals to raise constitutional

complaints for the first time in federal court, even if they

failed to raise those claims properly before the agency.

Sims, 530 U. S., at 115 (BREYER, J., joined by Rehnquist,

C. J., and SCALIA and KENNEDY, JJ., dissenting) (citing

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 329, n. 10 (1976)).

Because respondent has raised constitutional claims,

under our precedent, the Court may not, as a matter of

federal common law, apply an extrastatutory waiver re

quirement against him.

IV

The principal arguments offered by the Court in support

of its holding are policy arguments that, in its view, are

grounded in the purposes of the PLRA.9 The majority

——————

8 The majority notes that many prisoners proceed pro se in federal

court, where there are also time limits and other procedural require

ments. See ante, at 20. However, the timeliness and other procedural

requirements of prison grievance systems are generally far more

stringent than those imposed by federal courts. See Brief for American

Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae 6, n. 1, 25–27; Brief for

Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization of Yale Law School as

Amicus Curiae A1–A7.

9 Of course, if the majority were serious that “what matters is not

whether proper exhaustion was necessary to reach [policy goals], but

whether proper exhaustion was mandated by Congress,” ante, at 12

12 WOODFORD v. NGO

STEVENS, J., dissenting

correctly identifies two of the principal purposes of the

PLRA: (1) affording corrections officials time and oppor

tunity to address complaints internally before the initia

tion of a federal lawsuit; and (2) reducing the quantity,

and improving the quality, of prison litigation. Both of

these purposes would be served by the PLRA, even if the

Court did not engraft a procedural default sanction into

the statute.

The first policy concern identified by the majority does

not even arguably justify either a timeliness requirement

or a procedural default sanction. Prison officials certainly

have the opportunity to address claims that were filed in

some procedurally defective manner; indeed, California,

like the vast majority of state prison systems, explicitly

gives prison administrators an opportunity to hear un

timely or otherwise procedurally defective grievances.

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §3084.3(c). See generally Roose

velt, Exhaustion Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act:

The Consequence of Procedural Error, 52 Emory L. J.

1771, 1810, and n. 192 (2003) (hereinafter Roosevelt).

Because it is undisputed that the PLRA mandates that

prisoners exhaust their administrative remedies before

filing a federal lawsuit, prison officials will have the op

portunity to address prisoners’ claims before a suit is

filed.10

Second, the PLRA has already had the effect of reducing

the quantity of prison litigation, without the need for an

extrastatutory procedural default sanction. As petitioners

——————

n. 4, its opinion would not rest almost entirely on policy arguments.

10 In this regard, the majority’s reference to Coleman v. Thompson,

501 U. S. 722, 735, n. (1991), see ante, at 14, is perplexing. If a prison

regulation explicitly grants prison officials discretion to consider

untimely or otherwise procedurally defective grievances, of course

prison grievance remedies would still be “available,” and thus unex

hausted, if a prisoner had not even tried to file a grievance simply

because it was untimely or otherwise procedurally defective.

Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 13

STEVENS, J., dissenting

themselves point out, the number of civil rights suits filed

by prisoners in federal court dropped from 41,679 in 1995

to 25,504 in 2000, and the rate of prisoner filing dropped

even more dramatically during that period, from 37 pris

oner suits per 1,000 inmates to 19 suits per 1,000 inmates.

By contrast, between 2000 and 2004, the rate of filing

remained relatively constant, dropping only “slight[ly]” to

approximately 16 suits per 1000 inmates. See Brief for

Petitioners 21–22. The sharp drop in prison litigation

between 1995 and 2000 occurred before the Seventh Cir

cuit’s opinion in Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F. 3d 1022

(2002), which was the first appellate decision engrafting a

procedural default sanction into the PLRA. Prior to Pozo,

the federal courts had regularly assumed that the PLRA

did not create any procedural default sanction, and dis

missals for failure to exhaust were without prejudice. See

Roosevelt 1780–1781 (discussing cases). Thus, the PLRA,

including its simple exhaustion requirement, was suffi

cient to reduce the quantity of prisoner suits without any

procedural default requirement. This is not surprising:

Because the exhaustion requirement always ensures that

prison officials have an opportunity to address claims

brought by prisoners before a federal lawsuit, some pris

oners will be “successful in the administrative process,

and others are persuaded by the proceedings not to file an

action in federal court,” ante, at 12, in part because “the

very fact of being heard . . . can mollify passions,” Booth v.

Churner, 532 U. S. 731, 737 (2001).11

Ordinary exhaustion also improves the quality of pris

oner suits. By giving prison officials an opportunity to

——————

11 Without any support, the majority speculates that the drop in suits

filed by prisoners between 1995 and 2000 resulted from other provi

sions of the PLRA. See ante, at 12, n. 4. Regardless, the aforemen

tioned statistics demonstrate that the procedural default sanction

imposed by the PLRA is unnecessary to reduce the quantity of prison

litigation.

14 WOODFORD v. NGO

STEVENS, J., dissenting

address a prisoner’s grievance before the initiation of the

lawsuit, ordinary exhaustion “often results in the creation

of an administrative record that is helpful to the court,”

ante, at 12. 12

I acknowledge, of course, that the majority’s creation of

a waiver sanction for procedural missteps during the

course of exhaustion will have an even more significant

effect in reducing the number of lawsuits filed by prison

ers. However, “no legislation pursues its purposes at all

costs. Deciding what competing values will or will not be

sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objective is

the very essence of legislative choice—and it frustrates

rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to

assume that whatever furthers the statute’s primary

objective must be the law.” Rodriguez v. United States,

480 U. S. 522, 525–526 (1987) (per curiam) (emphasis

deleted).

The competing values that Congress sought to effectuate

by enacting the PLRA were reducing the number of frivo

lous filings, on one hand, while preserving prisoners’

capacity to file meritorious claims, on the other. As ex

plained by Senator Hatch when he introduced the legisla

tion on the Senate floor, the PLRA was needed because the

——————

12 The majority also argues that ensuring strict compliance with strict

prison timeliness requirements (generally ranging from 48 hours to a

month, see n. 15, infra) will improve the quality of prisoner litigation

because if “a grievance is filed shortly after the event giving rise to the

grievance, witnesses can be identified and questioned while memories

are still fresh, and evidence can be gathered and preserved.” Ante, at

12. While these are advantages to filing grievances soon after the

alleged injury occurs, courts regularly resolve §1983 (and other) litiga

tion without such draconian time limitations. At any rate, as discussed

below, legislation does not pursue any one purpose at all costs, and the

marginal advantages of encouraging compliance with such short time

limitations do not justify judicially rewriting the PLRA’s exhaustion

requirement by engrafting a procedural default sanction into the

statute.

Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 15

STEVENS, J., dissenting

quantity of frivolous suits filed by prisoners was, in Sena

tor Hatch’s view, making it difficult for “courts to consider

meritorious claims.” 141 Cong. Rec. 27042 (Sept. 29,

1995). He continued: “Indeed, I do not want to prevent

inmates from raising legitimate claims. This legislation

will not prevent those claims from being raised.” Ibid.

Similarly, as Senator Thurmond, a cosponsor of the bill,

stated: “[The PLRA] will allow meritorious claims to be

filed, but gives the judge broader discretion to prevent

frivolous and malicious lawsuits filed by prison inmates.”

Id., at 27044.

But the procedural default sanction created by this

Court, unlike the exhaustion requirement created by

Congress, bars litigation at random, irrespective of

whether a claim is meritorious or frivolous.13 Consider, for

example, an inmate who has been raped while in prison.

Such a scenario is far from hypothetical; in enacting the

Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, 42 U. S. C. §15601,

et seq. (2000 ed., Supp. III), Congress estimated that some

one million people have been sexually assaulted in the

Nation’s prisons over the last 20 years, §15601(2). Al

though not all of these tragic incidents result in constitu

tional violations, the sovereign does have a constitutional

duty to “provide humane conditions of confinement,”

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U. S. 825, 832 (1994). Accord

ingly, those inmates who are sexually assaulted by guards,

or whose sexual assaults by other inmates are facilitated

by guards, have suffered grave deprivations of their

Eighth Amendment rights. Yet, the Court’s engraftment

of a procedural default sanction into the PLRA’s exhaus

tion requirement risks barring such claims when a pris

——————

13 Indeed, if anything, it will have a worse effect on meritorious

claims; prisoners who file frivolous claims are probably more likely

to be repeat filers, and to learn the ins and outs of all procedural

requirements.

16 WOODFORD v. NGO

STEVENS, J., dissenting

oner fails, inter alia, to file her grievance (perhaps because

she correctly fears retaliation14) within strict time re

quirements that are generally no more than 15 days, and

that, in nine States, are between 2 and 5 days.15

Much of the majority opinion seems to assume that,

absent the creation of a waiver sanction, prisoners will

purposely circumvent prison grievance proceedings. How

ever, prisoners generally lack both the incentive and the

capacity to engage in such evasive tactics. Because federal

courts do not provide any deference to administrative

decisions by prison officials and any later federal suit is de

novo, prisoners—even prisoners who are acting in bad

faith—lack an incentive to avoid filing an administrative

grievance unless they fear retaliation. Moreover, because

prisoners must exhaust administrative remedies, prison

officials can always thwart efforts by prisoners to avoid

the grievance process by simply exercising their discretion

to excuse any procedural defect in the presentation of the

prisoners’ claims.

At any rate, there is a simple solution that would allow

courts to punish prisoners who seek to deliberately bypass

state administrative remedies, but that would not impose

the draconian punishment of procedural default on prison

ers who make reasonable, good-faith efforts to comply with

relevant administrative rules but, out of fear of retalia

tion, a reasonable mistake of law, or simple inadvertence,

make some procedural misstep along the way. Federal

——————

14 See, e.g., Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F. 3d 433, 437, 439

(CADC 2000) (discussing how female prisoner had her underwear

confiscated as “ ‘contraband’ ” and was placed in solitary confinement

without a mattress as a result of talking to prison officials about the

sexual assaults and harassment to which guards had subjected her).

15 For a comprehensive discussion of state prison grievance system

filing deadlines, see Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as

Amici Curiae 6, n. 1, and Brief for Jerome N. Frank Legal Services

Organization of Yale Law School as Amicus Curiae A1–A7.

Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 17

STEVENS, J., dissenting

courts could simply exercise their discretion to dismiss

suits brought by the former group of litigants but not

those brought by the latter.

The majority argues that imposing a sanction against

prisoners who deliberately bypass administrative reme

dies “neither has a statutory basis nor refers to a concept

of exhaustion from an existing body of law,” ante, at 16. In

fact, this criticism applies to the majority’s engraftment of

an overinclusive procedural default sanction into the

PLRA. If this Court insists upon rewriting §1997e(a) in

light of its understanding of the statute’s purposes, surely

the majority should add to the statute no harsher a sanc

tion for making a procedural error during exhaustion than

is necessary to accomplish its policy goals.

Moreover, ordinary abstention principles allow federal

district courts to dismiss suits brought by prisoners who

have deliberately bypassed available state remedies.

Federal courts have the power to decline jurisdiction in

exceptional circumstances, including the need to promote

“wise judicial administration.” Quackenbush v. Allstate

Ins. Co., 517 U. S. 706, 716 (1996) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Indeed, in Fay, we emphasized the dis

cretion of district court judges in embracing precisely such

a deliberate bypass regime in the habeas corpus statute.

See 372 U. S., at 438. Applying such a deliberate bypass

sanction to the PLRA would ensure that prisoners who act

in bad faith are penalized, while not interfering with the

capacity of other inmates to litigate meritorious constitu

tional claims.

In sum, the version of the PLRA Congress actually

enacted, which includes an exhaustion requirement but

not a procedural default sanction, is plainly sufficient to

advance the policy values identified by the Court. More

over, if, as the Court worries, there are many prisoners

who act in bad faith and purposely eschew administrative

remedies, the imposition of a deliberate bypass standard

18 WOODFORD v. NGO

STEVENS, J., dissenting

would resolve that problem, without depriving litigants

who act in good faith but nonetheless make a procedural

error from obtaining judicial relief relating to their valid

constitutional claims. The majority’s holding is as unsup

ported by the policy concerns it discusses as it is by the

text of the statute.

V

The majority leaves open the question whether a pris

oner’s failure to comply properly with procedural require

ments that do not provide a “meaningful opportunity for

prisoners to raise meritorious grievances” would bar the

later filing of a suit in federal court. Ante, at 19–20. What

the majority has in mind by a “meaningful opportunity” is

unclear, and this question is sure to breed a great deal of

litigation in federal courts in the years to come.

For example, in this case, respondent filed a second

grievance after his first grievance was rejected, arguing

that his first grievance was in fact timely because he was

challenging petitioners’ continuing prohibition on his

capacity to participate in Catholic observances, such as

Confession, Holy Week services, and Bible study. The

prison again rejected this second grievance on timeliness

grounds, even though the denial of respondent’s capacity

to engage in religious activities was clearly ongoing, and

thus had occurred within the prison’s 15-day statute of

limitations. See 403 F. 3d 620, 622 (CA9 2005). Assuming

respondent explicitly requested the restoration of his right

to engage in religious activities within 15 days of the filing

of his second grievance and prison officials denied the

request, did petitioners’ grievance procedures fail to pro

vide respondent with a “meaningful opportunity” to raise

his claim, because, in light of the continuing nature of the

injury respondent is challenging, his grievance was in fact

timely? Cf. Klehr v. A. O. Smith Corp., 521 U. S. 179, 189

(1997) (explaining that, under the Clayton Act, each overt

Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 19

STEVENS, J., dissenting

act in the case of a “continuing violation,” such as a price-

fixing conspiracy, is sufficient to restart the statute of

limitations).

What about cases involving other types of procedural

missteps? Does a 48-hour limitations period furnish a

meaningful opportunity for a prisoner to raise meritorious

grievances in the context of a juvenile who has been raped

and repeatedly assaulted, with the knowledge and assis

tance of guards, while in detention? See Minix v. Pazera,

No. 1:04 CV 447 RM, 2005 WL 1799538, *2 (ND Ind., July

27, 2005). Does a prison grievance system provide such a

meaningful opportunity when women prisoners fail to file

timely grievances relating to a pattern of rape and sexual

harassment throughout a city’s prisons, because they

correctly fear retaliation if they file such complaints? See

Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia, 877 F. Supp. 634

(DC 1994). Are such remedies meaningful when a pris

oner files a grievance concerning a prison official having

encouraged him to commit suicide, which the prisoner

reasonably thinks raises one claim, but which prison

officials interpret to raise two separate claims—one re

lated to the guard’s comments and one related to the

prisoner’s failure to receive health care—and thus dismiss

for violating a prison regulation against including more

than one claim in a single grievance? See Harper v.

Laufenberg, No. 04–C–699–C, 2005 WL 79009, *3 (WD

Wis., Jan. 6, 2005). What if prison officials dismiss a

timely filed appeal because the prisoner explains that the

prison will take two weeks to finish making certain copies

of relevant documents by sending a letter to the Secretary

of the Department of Corrections, rather than to the Sec

retary of Inmate Grievances and Appeals, as he should

have under the prison regulations? See Keys v. Craig, 160

Fed. Appx. 125 (CA3 2005) (per curiam). More generally,

are remedies meaningful when prison officials refuse to

hear a claim simply because a prisoner makes some hy

20 WOODFORD v. NGO

STEVENS, J., dissenting

pertechnical procedural error? See Spruill v. Gillis, 372

F. 3d 218, 232 (CA3 2004) (imposing a procedural default

sanction in the PLRA, but stating that compliance with

grievance proceedings need only be “ ‘substantial’ ”); Giano

v. Goord, 380 F. 3d 670, 676–678 (CA2 2004) (stating that

failure to comply with procedural requirements in griev

ance proceedings may be excused based on special circum

stances, such as a prisoner’s reasonable, but mistaken,

understanding of prison regulations).

Depending on the answer to questions like these, the

majority’s interpretation of the PLRA may cause the

statute to be vulnerable to constitutional challenges.

“[T]he right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First

Amendment right to petition the Government for redress

of grievances.” Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB,

461 U. S. 731, 741 (1983). Accordingly, the Constitution

guarantees that prisoners, like all citizens, have a reasona

bly adequate opportunity to raise constitutional claims

before impartial judges, see, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U. S.

343, 351 (1996). Moreover, because access to the courts is a

fundamental right, see id., at 346, government-drawn

classifications that impose substantial burdens on the

capacity of a group of citizens to exercise that right require

searching judicial examination under the Equal Protection

Clause, see, e.g., Lyng v. Automobile Workers, 485 U. S.

360, 370 (1988).

The correct interpretation of the PLRA would obviate

the need for litigation over any of these issues. More

important, the correct interpretation of the statute would

recognize that, in enacting the PLRA, Members of Con

gress created a rational regime designed to reduce the

quantity of frivolous prison litigation while adhering to

their constitutional duty “to respect the dignity of all

persons,” even “those convicted of heinous crimes.” Roper

v. Simmons, 543 U. S. 551, 560 (2005). Because today’s

decision ignores that duty, I respectfully dissent.