recognizing that "[p]lainly, the [United States Supreme] Court d[oes] not view the 'immediately apparent' language . . . as establishing any requirement that a police officer 'know' that certain items are contraband or evidence of a crime," but rather "that '[t]he seizure of property in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity' " (third alteration in original) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980))
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that "[p]lainly, the [United States Supreme] Court d[oes] not view the 'immediately apparent' language . . . as establishing any requirement that a police officer 'know' that certain items are contraband or evidence of a crime," but rather "that '[t]he seizure of property in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity' " (third alteration in original) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980))
- explaining that “[b]oth sides to the controversy” over the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement “appear to recognize a distinction between searches and seizures that take place on a man’s property . . . and those carried out elsewhere. It is accepted . . . that a search or seizure carried out on a suspect’s premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless the police can show that it falls within one of a carefully defined set of exceptions based on the presence of ‘exigent circumstances’”
- explaining that examples of general search warrants are those authorizing searches for and seizures of such vague categories of items as " 'smuggled goods,' " " 'obscene materials,' " " 'books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party of Texas,' " " 'illegally obtained films,' " and " 'stolen property' "
- concluding that if the Court were to hold the automobile exception applies to a vehicle parked in a residential driveway “where there was no stopping and the vehicle was unoccupied ... it is but a short step to the .position that it is never necessary for the police to obtain a warrant before searching and seizing an automobile, provided that ■they have probable cause.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled in part, on other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) — not on the Supreme Court's list
403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971), abrogated in part by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128
Supreme Court of the United StatesJun 4, 199033 citing opinionsother groundsin partunconfirmed confidenceRead itReported overruled on other grounds by Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982) — not on the Supreme Court's list
403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), overruled on other grounds by Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 102 S.Ct. 812, 70 L.Ed.2d 778 (1982)).
Questioned by People v. Caserta, 123 Ill. App. 3d 608 (1984)
We further note that in Texas v. Brown (1983), 460 U.S. 730, 743, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502, 514-15, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1543-44, the plurality, and the concurring opinion of Justice White, call into question the “inadvertent” viewing requirement enunciated in Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 91 S. Ct. 2022.
Questioned by United States v. James Henry Rollins, A/K/A "Lee Evans", 522 F.2d 160 (1975)
Hampshire, supra, casts doubt upon the continuing validity of such reliance.
Questioned in part by United States v. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d 589 (1985)
Finally, although it is perhaps true that the FBI agents who arrested Rooney could have blocked off the driveway and immobilized the white truck, and so one of the reasons given in Coolidge for not permitting a warrantless search would apply here, the continued vitality of that particular reasoning is doubtful.
Declined to follow by Harris v. State, 948 So. 2d 583 (2006)
We decline to adopt this construction of Coolidge.
and 1 more.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Jones, Unpublished Decision (3-2-2000) (2000)
We distinguish Coolidge, supra, from these facts because there, the court precluded the search of a vehicle located in the driveway without first obtaining a search warrant where Coolidge had been arrested inside his home for murder and the police had no reasonable expectation of finding contraband in the vehicle.
Distinguished by United States v. Steven Peterson, United States of America v. Mary Peterson, 867 F.2d 1110 (1989)
403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), is inapplicable.
Distinguished by United States v. Levasseur, 699 F. Supp. 965 (1988)
403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed. 2d 564 (1971) are clearly distinguishable from the instant case.
Distinguished by Commonwealth v. Lett, 393 Mass. 141 (1984)
403 U.S. 443 (1971), is inapplicable “in situations where the police knew what they were looking for, what they might expect to find and in fact
The opinion
Mr. Chief Justice Burger,
dissenting in. part and concurring in part.
I join the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White and in Parts II and III of Mr. Justice Black’s concurring and dissenting opinion. I also agree with most of what is said in Part I of Mr. Justice Black’s opinion, but I am not prepared to accept the proposition that the Fifth Amendment requires the exclusion of evidence *493 seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. I join in Part III of Mr. Justice Stewart’s opinion.
This case illustrates graphically the monstrous price we pay for the exclusionary rule in which we seem to have imprisoned ourselves. See my dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, ante, p. 411.
On the merits of the case I find not the slightest basis in the record to reverse this conviction. Here again the Court reaches out, strains, and distorts rules that were showing some signs of stabilizing, and directs a new trial which will be held more than seven years after the criminal acts charged.
Mr. Justice Stone, of the Minnesota Supreme Court, called the kind of judicial functioning in which the Court indulges today “bifurcating elements too infinitesimal to be split.”