recognizing that "[p]lainly, the [United States Supreme] Court d[oes] not view the 'immediately apparent' language . . . as establishing any requirement that a police officer 'know' that certain items are contraband or evidence of a crime," but rather "that '[t]he seizure of property in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity' " (third alteration in original) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980))
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that "[p]lainly, the [United States Supreme] Court d[oes] not view the 'immediately apparent' language . . . as establishing any requirement that a police officer 'know' that certain items are contraband or evidence of a crime," but rather "that '[t]he seizure of property in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity' " (third alteration in original) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980))
- explaining that “[b]oth sides to the controversy” over the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement “appear to recognize a distinction between searches and seizures that take place on a man’s property . . . and those carried out elsewhere. It is accepted . . . that a search or seizure carried out on a suspect’s premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless the police can show that it falls within one of a carefully defined set of exceptions based on the presence of ‘exigent circumstances’”
- explaining that examples of general search warrants are those authorizing searches for and seizures of such vague categories of items as " 'smuggled goods,' " " 'obscene materials,' " " 'books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party of Texas,' " " 'illegally obtained films,' " and " 'stolen property' "
- concluding that if the Court were to hold the automobile exception applies to a vehicle parked in a residential driveway “where there was no stopping and the vehicle was unoccupied ... it is but a short step to the .position that it is never necessary for the police to obtain a warrant before searching and seizing an automobile, provided that ■they have probable cause.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled in part, on other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) — not on the Supreme Court's list
403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971), abrogated in part by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128
Supreme Court of the United StatesJun 4, 199033 citing opinionsother groundsin partunconfirmed confidenceRead itReported overruled on other grounds by Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982) — not on the Supreme Court's list
403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), overruled on other grounds by Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 102 S.Ct. 812, 70 L.Ed.2d 778 (1982)).
Questioned by People v. Caserta, 123 Ill. App. 3d 608 (1984)
We further note that in Texas v. Brown (1983), 460 U.S. 730, 743, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502, 514-15, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1543-44, the plurality, and the concurring opinion of Justice White, call into question the “inadvertent” viewing requirement enunciated in Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 91 S. Ct. 2022.
Questioned by United States v. James Henry Rollins, A/K/A "Lee Evans", 522 F.2d 160 (1975)
Hampshire, supra, casts doubt upon the continuing validity of such reliance.
Questioned in part by United States v. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d 589 (1985)
Finally, although it is perhaps true that the FBI agents who arrested Rooney could have blocked off the driveway and immobilized the white truck, and so one of the reasons given in Coolidge for not permitting a warrantless search would apply here, the continued vitality of that particular reasoning is doubtful.
Declined to follow by Harris v. State, 948 So. 2d 583 (2006)
We decline to adopt this construction of Coolidge.
and 1 more.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Jones, Unpublished Decision (3-2-2000) (2000)
We distinguish Coolidge, supra, from these facts because there, the court precluded the search of a vehicle located in the driveway without first obtaining a search warrant where Coolidge had been arrested inside his home for murder and the police had no reasonable expectation of finding contraband in the vehicle.
Distinguished by United States v. Steven Peterson, United States of America v. Mary Peterson, 867 F.2d 1110 (1989)
403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), is inapplicable.
Distinguished by United States v. Levasseur, 699 F. Supp. 965 (1988)
403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed. 2d 564 (1971) are clearly distinguishable from the instant case.
Distinguished by Commonwealth v. Lett, 393 Mass. 141 (1984)
403 U.S. 443 (1971), is inapplicable “in situations where the police knew what they were looking for, what they might expect to find and in fact
The opinion
Me. Justice Hablan,
concurring.
From the several opinions that have been filed in this case it is apparent that the law of search and seizure is due for an overhauling. . State and federal law enforcement officers and prosecutorial authorities must find quite intolerable the present state of uncertainty, which extends even to such an everyday question as the circumstances under which police may enter a man’s property to arrest him and seize a vehicle believed to have been used during the commission of a crime.
I would begin this process of re-evaluation by overruling Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), and Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 (1963). The former of these . cases made the federal “exclusionary rule” applicable to the States. The latter forced the States to follow all the ins and outs of this Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions, handed down in federal cases.
In combination Mapp and Ker have been primarily responsible' for bringing about serious distortions and incongruities in this field of constitutional law. Basically these have had two aspects, as I believe an examination of our more reeient opinions and certiorari docket will show. First, the States have been put in a federal mold with respect to this aspect of criminal law enforcement, thus depriving the country of the opportunity to observe *491 the effects of different procedures in similar settings. See, e. g., Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665 (1970), suggesting that the assumed “deterrent value” of the exclusionary rule has never been adequately demonstrated or disproved, and pointing out that because of Mapp all comparative statistics are 10 years old and no new ones can be obtained. Second, in order to leave some room for the States to cope with their own diverse problems, there has been generated a tendency to relax federal requirements under the Fourth Amendment, which now govern state procedures as well. For an illustration of that tendency in another constitutional field, again resulting from the infelicitous “incorporation” doctrine, see Williams v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78 (1970). Until we face up to the basic constitutional mistakes of Mapp and Ker , no solid progress in setting things straight in search and seizure law will, in my opinion, occur.
But for Mapp and Ker , I would have little difficulty in voting to sustain this conviction, for I do not think that anything the State did in this case could be said to offend those values which are “at the core of the Fourth Amendment.” Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 27 (1949); cf. Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128 (1954); Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952).
Because of Mapp and Ker , however, this case must be judged in terms of federal standards, and on that basis I concur, although not without difficulty, in Parts I, II-D, and III of the Court’s opinion and in the judgment of the Court. * It must be recognized that the case is a close one. The reason I am tipped in favor, of Mr. Jus *492 tice Stewart’s position is that a contrary result in this case would, I fear, go far toward relegating the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to a position 'of little consequence in federal search and seizure law, a course which seems to me opposite to the one we took in Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969), two Terms ago. .
Recent scholarship has suggested that in emphasizing the warrant requirement over' the reasonableness of the search the Court has “stood the fourth amendment on its head” from a historical standpoint. T. Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 23-24 (1969). This issue is perhaps most clearly presented in the casé of a warrantless entry into a man’s home to arrest him on probable cause.- The validity of such entry was left open in Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493, 499-500 (1958), and although my Brothers White and Stewart both feel that their contrary assumptions on this point are at the root of their disagreement in this case, ante, at 477-479; post, at 510-512, 521, the Court again leaves the issue open. Ante, at 481. In my opinion it does well to do so. This matter should not be decided in a state case not squarely presenting the issue and where it was not fully briefed and argued. I intimate no view on this subject, but until it is ripe for decision, I hope in a federal case, I am unwilling to lend my support to setting back the trend of our recent decisions.
Beeause of my views as to the retroactivity of Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969), I do not believe the seizure of the Pontiac can be upheld as incident to Coolidge’s arrest. ■ See my separate opinion in Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 675 (1971).