holding that a defendant who chooses to testify waives his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination with respect to the testimony he gives, and that waiver is no less effective or complete because the defendant may have been motivated to take the witness stand in the first place only by reason of the strength of the lawful evidence adduced against him
How later courts described this case
- holding that a defendant who chooses to testify waives his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination with respect to the testimony he gives, and that waiver is no less effective or complete because the defendant may have been motivated to take the witness stand in the first place only by reason of the strength of the lawful evidence adduced against him
- holding that defendant who chooses to testify waives privilege against compulsory self-incrimination with respect to the testimony and that waiver no less effective or complete because defendant motivated to take witness stand in first place only by reason of strength of lawful evidence
- observing that “[a] defendant who chooses to testify waives [her] privilege against compulsory self-incrimination . . . , [even though] the defendant may have been motivated to take the witness stand in the first place only by reason of the strength of the lawful evidence adduced against [her]”
- observing that “[a] defendant who chooses to testify waives his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination . . . , [even though] the defendant may 31 have been motivated to take the witness stand in the first place only by reason of the strength of the lawful evidence adduced against him.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled — as noted by a later court — not on the Supreme Court's list
The district court reasoned that Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 88 S.Ct. 2008, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968), which held that in some situations trial testimony can be the fruit of an illegally admitted confession, and therefore inadmissible, was no longer good law.
unconfirmed confidenceReported overruled implicitly by Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) — not on the Supreme Court's list
The District Court also held that Elstad implicitly overruled Harrison, citing United States ex rel.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Billie, 881 So. 2d 637 (2004)
The Harrison Rule is inapplicable outside the context of an illegally obtained confession.
Distinguished by Littlejohn v. State, 75 O.B.A.J. 608 (2004)
Because this Court on direct appeal found that Littlejohn’s confession to Tingle was inadmissible on due process grounds,14 the State contends Harrison is inapposite.
Distinguished by Paul Kordenbrock v. Gene Scroggy, Warden, Kentucky State Penitentiary, 889 F.2d 69 (1989)
Appellant’s reliance on Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 88 S.Ct. 2008, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968) is inapposite.
Distinguished by Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801 (1982)
The State argues that Harrison and the instant case are distinguishable and that appellant would have taken the stand at the first trial in order to establish self-defense even if the illegally obtained statement had not been admitted.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Harlan,
dissenting.
Like my Brother Black and my Brother White, I am unable to understand why the Court reverses this petitioner’s conviction. There is no suggestion that the testimony in question, given on the stand with the *227 advice of counsel, was somehow unreliable. Nor, as the opinion of MR. Justice White amply demonstrates, is there any plausible argument that a rule excluding such evidence from use at a later trial adds an ounce of deterrence against police violation of the Mallory rule.
I do not doubt that “voluntariness” is not always a purely subjective question as to the defendant’s state of mind; it may involve an objective analysis of the fairness of the situation in which government agents placed him. Nor would I rule out the possibility that a direct product of unlawful official activity might properly be excludable as a fruit of that activity — even where the product is so unforeseeable that a deterrent rationale for exclusion will not suffice — on the ground that the Government should not play an ignoble part.
But these concepts do not reach this case. Here, apparently in all good faith, the Government offered at one trial an out-of-court confession by petitioner. It was objected to on the ground that it had been obtained in violation of the Mallory rule. That objection was overruled, and the defense had to decide how to proceed. While defense counsel may have believed he had good grounds for reversal on appeal (as the Court of Appeals later held he did) he also had to present a defense in an effort to persuade the jury to acquit. That defense had of course to be structured to meet the Government’s case as it stood — including but not limited to the admitted confession — and counsel decided to put his client on the stand. *
*228 The situation was one that criminal and civil defendants face all the time: believing that error has been committed that will result in reversal on appeal, they must nevertheless present a defense, and in doing so may help the other side on retrial. The situation here is no different in principle from the sacrifice of surprise, or the conveyance of important leads to the other side, that may occur because a trial continues even after error has been committed. It is a price that is paid for having a system of justice that insists, generally, upon full trials before appellate review of points of law. It is a problem that can be avoided, within our system, only by doing what is done here, namely, reaching the wrong result as between the litigants. For me this is not acceptable doctrine.
This case is altogether different from Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U. S. 346, 350 , in which I took the position that when a first confession is involuntary a later confession produced by the erroneous impression that the cat was already out of the bag should also be considered involuntary. Here (1) petitioner’s out-of-court confes *228 sion was not involuntary; (2) petitioner’s in-court statements were given upon the advice of counsel, and there is no indication whatever that petitioner misunderstood the position he was in; (3) the in-court testimony could not possibly have been thought merely cumulative of the confession, for it (a) was given in order to rebut the confession and (b) damaged petitioner’s position in a manner quite independent of the use of the confession.