holding that a defendant who chooses to testify waives his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination with respect to the testimony he gives, and that waiver is no less effective or complete because the defendant may have been motivated to take the witness stand in the first place only by reason of the strength of the lawful evidence adduced against him
How later courts described this case
- holding that a defendant who chooses to testify waives his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination with respect to the testimony he gives, and that waiver is no less effective or complete because the defendant may have been motivated to take the witness stand in the first place only by reason of the strength of the lawful evidence adduced against him
- holding that defendant who chooses to testify waives privilege against compulsory self-incrimination with respect to the testimony and that waiver no less effective or complete because defendant motivated to take witness stand in first place only by reason of strength of lawful evidence
- observing that “[a] defendant who chooses to testify waives [her] privilege against compulsory self-incrimination . . . , [even though] the defendant may have been motivated to take the witness stand in the first place only by reason of the strength of the lawful evidence adduced against [her]”
- observing that “[a] defendant who chooses to testify waives his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination . . . , [even though] the defendant may 31 have been motivated to take the witness stand in the first place only by reason of the strength of the lawful evidence adduced against him.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled — as noted by a later court — not on the Supreme Court's list
The district court reasoned that Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 88 S.Ct. 2008, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968), which held that in some situations trial testimony can be the fruit of an illegally admitted confession, and therefore inadmissible, was no longer good law.
unconfirmed confidenceReported overruled implicitly by Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) — not on the Supreme Court's list
The District Court also held that Elstad implicitly overruled Harrison, citing United States ex rel.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Billie, 881 So. 2d 637 (2004)
The Harrison Rule is inapplicable outside the context of an illegally obtained confession.
Distinguished by Littlejohn v. State, 75 O.B.A.J. 608 (2004)
Because this Court on direct appeal found that Littlejohn’s confession to Tingle was inadmissible on due process grounds,14 the State contends Harrison is inapposite.
Distinguished by Paul Kordenbrock v. Gene Scroggy, Warden, Kentucky State Penitentiary, 889 F.2d 69 (1989)
Appellant’s reliance on Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 88 S.Ct. 2008, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968) is inapposite.
Distinguished by Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801 (1982)
The State argues that Harrison and the instant case are distinguishable and that appellant would have taken the stand at the first trial in order to establish self-defense even if the illegally obtained statement had not been admitted.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Black,
dissenting.
It seems to me that the Court in this case carries the Court-made doctrine of excluding evidence that is “fruit of the poisonous tree” to a wholly illogical and completely unreasonable extent. For this and many of the reasons suggested by my Brother White’s dissent, I agree that holdings like this make it far more difficult to protect society “against those who have made it impossible to live today in safety.” I would affirm this conviction.