holding that “[n]othing resembling probable cause existed” when an officer merely observed an individual talking to a number of known narcotics addicts, did not know the nature of the conversations, and saw nothing pass between them; the inference that persons who talk to addicts are engaged in drug trafficking “is simply not the sort of reasonable inference required to support an intrusion by the police upon an individual’s security.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “[n]othing resembling probable cause existed” when an officer merely observed an individual talking to a number of known narcotics addicts, did not know the nature of the conversations, and saw nothing pass between them; the inference that persons who talk to addicts are engaged in drug trafficking “is simply not the sort of reasonable inference required to support an intrusion by the police upon an individual’s security.”
- stating 12 that “deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers 13 are strong indicia of mens rea, and when coupled with specific knowledge on the part 14 of the officer relating the suspect to the evidence of crime, they are proper factors to 15 be considered in the decision to make an arrest”
- stating that “deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea, and when coupled with specific knowledge on the part of the officer relating the suspect to the evidence of crime, they are proper factors to be considered in the decision to make an arrest”
- explaining that because of the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness re- Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 5 ALITO, J., dissenting quirement, “[t]he constitutional validity of a warrantless search is pre-eminently the sort of question which can only be decided in the concrete factual context of the individual case”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Davis, 08ap-102 (11-6-2008), 2008 Ohio 5756 (2008)
{¶ 20} Defendant's reliance upon Bowyer and Sibron in this case is unavailing because those cases are factually distinguishable from the present case.
Distinguished by United States v. Robert Craig and Peter v. Pappas, United States of America v. Frank P. North, Jr., and Estate of Jack E. Walker, 907 F.2d 653 (1990)
id. at 50-58, 88 S.Ct. at 1896-1900, and its decision is inapposite to the issue in this case.
Distinguished by Nixon v. United States, 1979 D.C. App. LEXIS 382 (1979)
Those decisions, properly reflecting the teaching of Terry and its companion, Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63-64, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968), are inapposite given the context and scope of this particular stop.
Distinguished by State v. Singleton, 1977 Mo. App. LEXIS 2754 (1977)
Sibron, 88 S.Ct. 1889, relied upon by appellant, is distinguishable on facts indicating a search to discover evidence instead of weapons under circumstances not justifying a reasonable fear for the officer’s or others’ safety.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Fortas,
concurring.
1. I would construe St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U. S. 41 (1943), in light of later cases, to mean that a criminal case is moot if it appears that no collateral legal consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction. (Cf. majority opinion, ante, at 57-58.)
2. I join without qualification in the Court’s judgment and opinion concerning the standards to be used in determining whether § 180-a as applied to particular situations is constitutional. But I would explicitly reserve the possibility that a statute purporting to authorize a warrantless search might be so extreme as to justify our concluding that it is unconstitutional “on its face,” regardless of the facts of the particular case. To the extent that the Court’s opinion may indicate the contrary, I disagree. (Cf. majority opinion, ante, at 59-62.)
3. In Sibron’s case (No. 63), I would conclude that we find nothing in the record of this case or pertinent principles of law to cause us to disregard the confession of error by counsel for Kings County. I would not discourage confessions of error nor would I disregard them. (Cf. majority opinion, pt. II, ante, at 58-59.)