holding that “[n]othing resembling probable cause existed” when an officer merely observed an individual talking to a number of known narcotics addicts, did not know the nature of the conversations, and saw nothing pass between them; the inference that persons who talk to addicts are engaged in drug trafficking “is simply not the sort of reasonable inference required to support an intrusion by the police upon an individual’s security.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “[n]othing resembling probable cause existed” when an officer merely observed an individual talking to a number of known narcotics addicts, did not know the nature of the conversations, and saw nothing pass between them; the inference that persons who talk to addicts are engaged in drug trafficking “is simply not the sort of reasonable inference required to support an intrusion by the police upon an individual’s security.”
- stating 12 that “deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers 13 are strong indicia of mens rea, and when coupled with specific knowledge on the part 14 of the officer relating the suspect to the evidence of crime, they are proper factors to 15 be considered in the decision to make an arrest”
- stating that “deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea, and when coupled with specific knowledge on the part of the officer relating the suspect to the evidence of crime, they are proper factors to be considered in the decision to make an arrest”
- explaining that because of the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness re- Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 5 ALITO, J., dissenting quirement, “[t]he constitutional validity of a warrantless search is pre-eminently the sort of question which can only be decided in the concrete factual context of the individual case”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Davis, 08ap-102 (11-6-2008), 2008 Ohio 5756 (2008)
{¶ 20} Defendant's reliance upon Bowyer and Sibron in this case is unavailing because those cases are factually distinguishable from the present case.
Distinguished by United States v. Robert Craig and Peter v. Pappas, United States of America v. Frank P. North, Jr., and Estate of Jack E. Walker, 907 F.2d 653 (1990)
id. at 50-58, 88 S.Ct. at 1896-1900, and its decision is inapposite to the issue in this case.
Distinguished by Nixon v. United States, 1979 D.C. App. LEXIS 382 (1979)
Those decisions, properly reflecting the teaching of Terry and its companion, Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63-64, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968), are inapposite given the context and scope of this particular stop.
Distinguished by State v. Singleton, 1977 Mo. App. LEXIS 2754 (1977)
Sibron, 88 S.Ct. 1889, relied upon by appellant, is distinguishable on facts indicating a search to discover evidence instead of weapons under circumstances not justifying a reasonable fear for the officer’s or others’ safety.
The opinion
Mr. Justice White,
concurring.
I join Parts I-IV of the Court’s opinion. With respect to appellant Peters, I join the affirmance of his conviction, not because there was probable cause to arrest, a question I do not reach, but because there was probable cause to stop Peters for questioning and thus to frisk him for dangerous weapons. See my concurring *70 opinion in Terry v. Ohio, ante, p. 34. While patting down Peters’ clothing the officer “discovered an object in his pocket which might have been used as a weapon.” Ante, at 67. That object turned out to be a package of burglar’s tools. In my view those tools were properly admitted into evidence.