holding that the government cannot satisfy its burden of proving that consent was freely and voluntarily given when homeowner simply stated “go ahead” in response to police declaration of a warrant to search the residence; “[t]he situation is instinct with coercion — albeit colorably lawful coercion”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the government cannot satisfy its burden of proving that consent was freely and voluntarily given when homeowner simply stated “go ahead” in response to police declaration of a warrant to search the residence; “[t]he situation is instinct with coercion — albeit colorably lawful coercion”
- holding that a defendant’s consent to search was invalid when the defendant consented after police claimed to have a warrant to search the defendant’s home because the police action conveyed that the defendant had “no right to resist the search”
- holding that officers may not obtain consent to search through a “false claim of legal authority”
- ruling that the government’s burden of proving consent “cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Brown v. McClennen ex rel. County of Maricopa, 239 Ariz. 521 (2016)
The State responds that Bumper is distinguishable because the admonition here correctly stated Arizona law, and Brown could have chosen to revoke the consent supplied by the implied consent law.
Distinguished by State of Arizona v. Francisco L Encinas Valenzuela, 239 Ariz. 299 (2016)
The State responds, and the court of appeals majority agreed, that Bumper is distinguishable, and the totality of the circumstances evidences Valenzuela’s voluntary consent to the search.
Distinguished by Commonwealth v. MacK, 568 Pa. 329 (2002)
We believe that Bumper is distinguishable from the instant case.
Distinguished by United States v. Acosta, 786 F. Supp. 494 (1992)
The Court concludes that Bumper is inapposite as it involves the consent to search exception to the warrant requirement and its holding pertains only to the requirements of that exception.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Harlan,
concurring.
While I join in the judgment of the Court and in Part II of its opinion, I am prompted to add a brief note.
*552 I share, as I am sure every member of the majority does, Mr. Justice Black’s abhorrence of the brutal crime of which petitioner stands convicted. To avoid any misapprehension, I wish to make it perfectly clear that reversal of this conviction is not a “penalty” imposed on the State for infringement of federal constitutional rights. Reversal by this Court results, as always, only from a decision that petitioner was not constitutionally proved guilty and hence there is no legally valid basis for imposition of a penalty upon him.
In determining whether a criminal defendant was convicted “according to law,” the test is not and cannot be simply whether this Court finds credible the evidence against him. Crediting or discrediting evidence is the function of the trier of fact, in this case a jury. The jury’s verdict is a lawful verdict, however, only if it is based upon evidence constitutionally admissible. When it is not, as it is not here, reversal rests on the oldest and most fundamental principle of our criminal jurisprudence- — that a defendant is entitled to put the prosecution to its lawful proof.
The evidence against petitioner consisted in part of a gun that he alleged was unlawfully taken from the home of Mrs. Leath, where petitioner was living. The State contended that Mrs. Leath had consented to the search of her home. However, this “consent” was obtained immediately after a sheriff told Mrs. Leath that he had a search warrant, that is, that he had a lawful right to enter her home with or without consent. Nothing Mrs. Leath said in response to that announcement can be taken to mean that she considered the officers welcome in her home with or without a warrant. What she would have done if the sheriff had not said he had a warrant is, on this record, a hypothetical question about an imaginary situation that Mrs. Leath never faced.
*553 Of course, if the officers had a valid search warrant, no consent was required to make the search lawful. There was a search warrant in this case, and it remains possible that this warrant was issued under circumstances meeting all the requirements of the Federal Constitution. Consequently, if this were a situation where a state court had simply chosen the wrong line of constitutional analysis of this search, I would vote to remand the case to give the prosecution an opportunity to justify the search on proper grounds. However, as noted by the Court, the prosecution here explicitly and repeatedly renounced any reliance on the warrant. Like all other parties to lawsuits, a prosecutor has an obligation to the courts (including this Court) and to other parties to present its claims at the earliest appropriate time, and to create an adequate record. Cf. Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U. S. 571, 573 (separate note of Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Harlan).
Finally, if I were persuaded that the admission of the gun was “harmless error,” I would vote to affirm, and if I were persuaded that it was arguably harmless error, I would vote to remand the case for state consideration of the point. But the question cannot be whether, in the view of this Court, the defendant actually committed the crimes charged, so that the error was “harmless” in the sense that petitioner got what he deserved. The question is whether the error was such that it cannot be said that petitioner’s guilt was adjudicated on the basis of constitutionally admissible evidence, which means, in this case, whether the properly admissible evidence was such that the improper admission of the gun could not have affected the result.
I do not think this can be said here. The critical question was the identity of the perpetrator of these crimes. The State introduced eyewitness identification of petitioner by his two victims, and a gun with which there *554 was evidence these victims were shot, together with testimony that it had been found in petitioner’s place of abode. The jury could, of course, have found the testimony of the victims credible beyond a reasonable doubt, and convicted petitioner on this basis alone. But it might well not have. The addition of a tangible crosscheck linking petitioner with the crime can hardly be said, from the judicial vantage point, to have been harmless surplusage.