stating that the “compulsory 17 administration of a blood test . . . plainly involves the broadly conceived reach of a 18 search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment[,]” and also explaining that because 19 “[s]earch warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, . . . absent an 20 emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the human body are 3 1 concerned”
How later courts described this case
- stating that the “compulsory 17 administration of a blood test . . . plainly involves the broadly conceived reach of a 18 search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment[,]” and also explaining that because 19 “[s]earch warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, . . . absent an 20 emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the human body are 3 1 concerned”
- stating that the “compulsory administration of a blood test . . . plainly involves the broadly conceived reach of a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment[,]” and also explaining that because “[sjearch warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings,. . . absent an emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the human body are concerned”
- holding blood sample to test for alcohol content not testimonial, and noting "both federal and state courts have usually held that it offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture"
- stating that in deciding whether an intrusive body search is permissible, the court must consider whether the officer had a clear indication that incriminating evidence would be found, whether exigent circumstances existed if no warrant was obtained, and whether the officer extracted the evidence using a reasonable method and in a reasonable manner
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by State v. Syx, 190 Ohio App. 3d 845 (2010)
Id. While the holding of Schmerber remains intact, the court’s more recent decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009), — U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314, calls into doubt that the nontestimonial nature of a defendant’s body fluids applies to a test result derived from those same body fluids.
Declined to follow by Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013)
384 U.S. 757, 770 , declined to extend in McNeely, supra, 133 S.Ct. 1552
Distinguished
Distinguished by State of Minnesota v. Derek Lawrence Stavish, 2015 Minn. LEXIS 470 (2015)
Justice Page correctly points out Schmerber is factually distinguishable because Sergeant Martens was not required to investigate the scene of the accident and, unlike in Schmerber, the time necessary to transport the accused to the hospital was not a significant factor.
Distinguished by Commonwealth v. Vance, 85 Va. Cir. 173 (2012)
On this basis, the Court held that the “exigent circumstances” reasoning of Schmerber was inapplicable.
Distinguished by State v. Geiss, 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 11414 (2011)
Although the trial court found, and Geiss argues on appeal, that Sehmerber is distinguishable from the instant case because the defendant in Sehmerber had caused an accident with serious injuries and his blood was taken after he had already been transported to a hospital for treatment, Sehmerber’s holding has not been limited to such cases.
Distinguished by In re M. Children, 171 Misc. 2d 838 (1997)
That section governs the taking of blood, hair or other samples from a respondent’s body (see, Schmerber v California, 384 US 757 [1966]), and is inapplicable to mental health examinations for which CPLR 3121 (a) specifically provides (Koump v Smith, 25 NY2d 287 [1969]; Watson v State of New York, 53 AD2d 798 [3d Dept 1976]).
The opinion
Mr. Chief Justice Warren,
dissenting.
While there are other important constitutional issues in this case, I believe it is sufficient for me to reiterate my dissenting opinion in Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U. S. 432, 440 , as the basis on which to reverse this conviction.