Opinion

Estes v. Texas

  • 381 U.S. 532
  • 1 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1187
  • 6 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 2104
  • 85 S. Ct. 1628
  • 14 L. Ed. 2d 543
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Filed
Jun 7, 1965
Status
Published
Author
White
On the bench
Clark, Warren, Harlan, Stewart, Douglas, Goldberg, Black, Brennan, White
Cited by
1,423 cases
Authority
More cited than 24.0%

recognizing that “[t]he free press has been a mighty catalyst in awakening public interest in governmental affairs, exposing corruption among public officers and employees and generally informing the citizenry of public events and occurrences, including court proceedings”

How later courts described this case

  • recognizing that “[t]he free press has been a mighty catalyst in awakening public interest in governmental affairs, exposing corruption among public officers and employees and generally informing the citizenry of public events and occurrences, including court proceedings”
  • holding that trial publicity, failure of trial judge to control proceedings, and televising of hearing "inherently prevented a sober search for the truth"
  • holding that a plea-bargain proceeding in which no issues are contested is still a trial
  • holding that a defendant had been denied due process because a pre-trial hearing had been televised live and then rebroadcast, and because the court proceedings had been disrupted by the presence of the media

Written by the judges who cited it.

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by State v. Jaime, 233 P.3d 554 (2010)

    While this proposition is true, Estes is inapposite.
    Washington Supreme CourtMay 27, 2010Read it
  • Distinguished by Thompson, Al v. State (2004)

    Estes, however, is easily distinguishable.
    Texas Court of Appeals, 14th District (Houston)Jul 29, 2004Read it
  • Distinguished by People v. Manson, 61 Cal. App. 3d 102 (1976)

    Both Estes and Sheppard are distinguishable on several grounds.
    California Court of AppealAug 13, 1976Read it
  • Distinguished by Scatena v. Brierley, 310 F. Supp. 406 (1970)

    The eases of Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L. Ed.2d 600 (1966), and Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965), are distinguishable from and inapplicable to the instant facts and circumstances.
    District Court, W.D. PennsylvaniaMar 23, 1970Read it

The opinion

Mr. Justice White,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins, dissenting.

I agree with Mr. Justice Stewart that a finding of constitutional prejudice on this record entails erecting a flat ban on the use of cameras in the courtroom and believe that it is premature to promulgate such a broad constitutional principle at the present time. This is the first case in this Court dealing with the subject of television *630 coverage of criminal trials; our cases dealing with analogous subjects are not really controlling, cf. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723 ; and there is, on the whole, a very limited amount of experience in this country with television coverage of trials. In my view, the currently available materials assessing the effect of cameras in the courtroom are too sparse and fragmentary to constitute the basis for a constitutional judgment permanently barring any and all forms of television coverage. As was said in another context, “we know too little of the actual impact ... to reach a conclusion on the bare bones of the . . . evidence before us.” White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U. S. 253, 261 . It may well be, however, that as further experience and informed judgment do become available, the use of cameras in the courtroom, as in this trial, will prove to pose such a serious hazard to a defendant’s rights that a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment will be found without a showing on the record of specific demonstrable prejudice to the defendant. Compare Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 , with Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 ; Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 , with Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 ; Stein v. New York, 346 U. S. 156 , with Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368, 389-390 .

The opinion of the Court in effect precludes further opportunity for intelligent assessment of the probable hazards imposed by the use of cameras at criminal trials. Serious threats to constitutional rights in some instances justify a prophylactic rule dispensing with the necessity of showing specific prejudice in a particular case. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723, 727 ; Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368, 389 . But these are instances in which there has been ample experience on which to base an informed judgment. Here, although our experience is inadequate and our judgment correspondingly infirm, the Court discourages further meaningful study of the use of television at criminal trials. Accordingly, I dissent.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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