explaining that because the New York Times test “protects the paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning public officials, their servants . . . , anything which might touch on an official’s fitness for office is relevant. Few personal attributes are more germane to fitness for office than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motivation, even though these 43 characteristics may also affect the official’s private character”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that because the New York Times test “protects the paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning public officials, their servants . . . , anything which might touch on an official’s fitness for office is relevant. Few personal attributes are more germane to fitness for office than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motivation, even though these 43 characteristics may also affect the official’s private character”
- holding that reporter's negligence in failing to investigate a source's background and in writing the article could not establish actual malice
- concluding, in criminal libel context, that criminal libel prosecutions are permissible so long as the malice standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964) — a civil libel case — is met
- holding that otherwise unprotected speech sometimes must be insulated from liability where the target is a public official “if the freedoms of expression are to have the breathing space that they need to survive”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled on other grounds by Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) — not on the Supreme Court's list
379 U.S. 64 (1964), overruled on other grounds by Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130
Supreme Court of the United StatesOct 9, 19674 citing opinionsother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead it
The opinion
Mr. Justice Goldberg,
concurring.
I agree with the Court that there is “no difficulty in bringing the appellant’s statement within the purview of criticism of the official conduct of public officials . . . .” Ante, at 76. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 297 , I expressed my conviction “that the Constitution accords citizens and press an unconditional freedom to criticize official conduct.” Id., at 305 . New York Times was a civil libel case; this is a criminal libel prosecution. In my view, “ [i] f the rule that libel on government has.no place in our Constitution is to have real meaning, then libel [criminal or civil] on the official conduct of the governors likewise can have no place in our Constitution.” Id., at 299 .