explaining that because the New York Times test “protects the paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning public officials, their servants . . . , anything which might touch on an official’s fitness for office is relevant. Few personal attributes are more germane to fitness for office than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motivation, even though these 43 characteristics may also affect the official’s private character”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that because the New York Times test “protects the paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning public officials, their servants . . . , anything which might touch on an official’s fitness for office is relevant. Few personal attributes are more germane to fitness for office than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motivation, even though these 43 characteristics may also affect the official’s private character”
- holding that reporter's negligence in failing to investigate a source's background and in writing the article could not establish actual malice
- concluding, in criminal libel context, that criminal libel prosecutions are permissible so long as the malice standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964) — a civil libel case — is met
- holding that otherwise unprotected speech sometimes must be insulated from liability where the target is a public official “if the freedoms of expression are to have the breathing space that they need to survive”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled on other grounds by Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) — not on the Supreme Court's list
379 U.S. 64 (1964), overruled on other grounds by Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130
Supreme Court of the United StatesOct 9, 19674 citing opinionsother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead it
The opinion
Mr. Justice Black,
with whom Mr. Justice Douglas joins,
concurring.
For reasons stated at greater length in my opinions concurring in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 293 , and dissenting in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250, 267 , as well as in the opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in this case, infra, p.'80, I concur in reversing the conviction of appellant Garrison, based as it is purely on his public discussion and criticism of public officials. I believe that the First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth, protects every person from having a State or the Federal Government fine, imprison, or assess damages against him when he has been guilty of no conduct, see Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490, 498 , other than expressing an opinion, even though others may believe that his views are unwholesome, unpatriotic, stupid or dangerous. I believe that the Court is mistaken if it thinks that requiring proof that *80 statements were “malicious” or “defamatory” will really create any substantial hurdle to block public officials from punishing those who criticize the way they conduct their office. Indeed, “malicious,” “seditious,” and other such evil-sounding words often have been invoked to punish people for expressing their views on public affairs. Fining men or sending them to jail for criticizing public officials not only jeopardizes-the free, open public discussion which our Constitution guarantees, but can wholly stifle it. I would hold now and not wait to hold later, compare Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 , overruled in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 , that under our Constitution there is absolutely no place in this country for the old, discredited English Star Chamber law of seditious criminal libel.