holding that a privately owned restaurant's refusal to serve a black patron was state action for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the restaurant premises were leased from a state agency and were located in a public building maintained by the state, thereby making the state a joint participant in the discriminatory action
How later courts described this case
- holding that a privately owned restaurant's refusal to serve a black patron was state action for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the restaurant premises were leased from a state agency and were located in a public building maintained by the state, thereby making the state a joint participant in the discriminatory action
- holding that fourteenth amendment is implicated when state is “a joint participant in the challenged action,” and noting that “[ojnly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance”
- finding a symbiotic relationship and holding that a privately owned restaurant’s refusal to serve an African American patron constituted state action where the restaurant leased space in a garage that was financed by public funds and owned by a state agency
- holding that Temple is a private institution despite its designation as part of the Commonwealth system of higher education
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled — as noted by 2 later courts — not on the Supreme Court's list
(1) the Lugar trilogy overruled or, at a minimum, limited Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority to its facts, and therefore Braden, which relies on Burton, is no longer good law; and
2 citing opinionsunconfirmed confidenceReported overruled implicitly by Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) — not on the Supreme Court's list
Jackson implicitly overruled Burton,
Distinguished
Distinguished by Adams v. Vandemark, 855 F.2d 312 (1988)
We distinguish Burton.
Distinguished by Krynicky v. University of Pittsburgh, 742 F.2d 94 (1984)
As is apparent from the preceding discussion, the Supreme Court in the Lugar trilogy clearly treated the symbiotic relationship test as a viable framework of analysis, but concluded that Burton was inapposite to the factual scenarios of those cases.
Distinguished by Kiracofe v. Reid Memorial Hospital, 1984 Ind. App. LEXIS 2477 (1984)
The opinion held Burton was distinguishable because there was no evidence that the state sought to influence the hospital decisions or policies either through direct regulation or discriminatory application of its powers or its benefits.
Distinguished by George D. Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, a Partnership, 522 F.2d 1110 (1975)
As we have already discussed, Burton is distinguishable from the present case on other grounds.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Harlan,
whom Mr. Justice Whittaker joins,
dissenting.
The Court’s opinion, by a process of first undiscrimi-natingly throwing together various factual bits and pieces and then undermining the resulting structure by an equally vague disclaimer, seems to me to leave completely at sea just what it is in this record that satisfies the requirement of “state action.”
*729 I find it unnecessary, however, to inquire into the matter at this stage, for it seems to me apparent that before passing on the far-reaching constitutional questions that may; or may not, be lurking in this judgment, the case should first be sent back to the state court for clarification as to the precise basis of its decision. In deciding this case the Delaware Supreme Court, among other things, said:
“It [Eagle] acts as a restaurant keeper and, as such, is not required to serve any and all persons entering its place of business, any more than the operator of a bookstore, barber shop, or other retail business is required to sell its product to every one. This is the common law, and the law of Delaware as restated in 24 Del. C. § 1501 with respect to restaurant keepers. 10 Am. Jur., Civil Rights, §§ 21,22; 52 Am. Jur., Theatres, § 9; Williams v. Howard Johnson’s Restaurant, 4 cir., 268 F. 2d 845 . We, accordingly, hold that the operation of its restaurant by Eagle does not fall within the scope of the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment.” * - Del. -, -, 157 A. 2d 894 , 902.
If in the context of this record this means, as my Brother Stewart suggests, that the Delaware court construed this state statute “as authorizing discriminatory classification based exclusively on color,” I would certainly agree, without more, that the enactment is offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment. It would then be quite *730 unnecessary to reach the much broader questions dealt with in the Court’s opinion. If, on the other hand, the state court meant no more than that under the statute, as at common law, Eagle was free to serve only those whom it pleased, then, and only then, would the question of “state action” be presented in full-blown form.
I think that sound principles of constitutional adjudication dictate that we should first ascertain the exact basis of this state judgment, and for that purpose I would either remand the case to the Delaware Supreme Court, see Musser v. Utah, 333 U. S. 95 ; cf. Harrison v.N. A. A. C. P., 360 U. S. 167 , or hold the case pending application to the state court for clarification. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117 . It seems to me both unnecessary and unwise to reach issues of such broad constitutional significance as those now decided by the Court, before the necessity for deciding them has become apparent.
24 Del. Code, § 1501, reads as follows:
“No keeper of an inn, tavern, hotel, or restaurant, or other place of public entertainment .or refreshment of travelers, guests, or customers shall be obliged, by law, to furnish entertainment or refresh-' ment to persons whose reception or entertainment by him would be offensive to the major part of his customers, and would injure his business.”-