holding that a privately owned restaurant's refusal to serve a black patron was state action for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the restaurant premises were leased from a state agency and were located in a public building maintained by the state, thereby making the state a joint participant in the discriminatory action
How later courts described this case
- holding that a privately owned restaurant's refusal to serve a black patron was state action for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the restaurant premises were leased from a state agency and were located in a public building maintained by the state, thereby making the state a joint participant in the discriminatory action
- holding that fourteenth amendment is implicated when state is “a joint participant in the challenged action,” and noting that “[ojnly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance”
- finding a symbiotic relationship and holding that a privately owned restaurant’s refusal to serve an African American patron constituted state action where the restaurant leased space in a garage that was financed by public funds and owned by a state agency
- holding that Temple is a private institution despite its designation as part of the Commonwealth system of higher education
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled — as noted by 2 later courts — not on the Supreme Court's list
(1) the Lugar trilogy overruled or, at a minimum, limited Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority to its facts, and therefore Braden, which relies on Burton, is no longer good law; and
2 citing opinionsunconfirmed confidenceReported overruled implicitly by Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) — not on the Supreme Court's list
Jackson implicitly overruled Burton,
Distinguished
Distinguished by Adams v. Vandemark, 855 F.2d 312 (1988)
We distinguish Burton.
Distinguished by Krynicky v. University of Pittsburgh, 742 F.2d 94 (1984)
As is apparent from the preceding discussion, the Supreme Court in the Lugar trilogy clearly treated the symbiotic relationship test as a viable framework of analysis, but concluded that Burton was inapposite to the factual scenarios of those cases.
Distinguished by Kiracofe v. Reid Memorial Hospital, 1984 Ind. App. LEXIS 2477 (1984)
The opinion held Burton was distinguishable because there was no evidence that the state sought to influence the hospital decisions or policies either through direct regulation or discriminatory application of its powers or its benefits.
Distinguished by George D. Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, a Partnership, 522 F.2d 1110 (1975)
As we have already discussed, Burton is distinguishable from the present case on other grounds.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Stewart,
concurring.
I agree that the judgment must be reversed, but I reach that conclusion by a route much more direct than the one traveled by the Court. In upholding Eagle’s right to deny service to the appellant solely because of his race, the Supreme Court of Delaware relied upon a statute of that State which permits the proprietor of a restaurant to refuse to serve “persons whose reception or entertainment by him would be offensive to the major part of his customers . . . .” * There is no suggestion in the record that the appellant as an individual was such a person. The highest court of Delaware has thus construed this *727 legislative enactment as authorizing discriminatory classification based exclusively on color. Such a law seems to me clearly violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. I think, therefore, that the appeal was properly taken, and that the statute, as authoritatively construed by the Supreme Court of Delaware, is constitutionally invalid.
24 Del. Code, § 1501. The complete text of the statute is set out in the Court opinion at note 1.