finding that plaintiff’s injury, permanent nerve damage as a result of a defective tourniquet applied in a veteran’s hospital while on active duty, exempt from the Feres Doctrine because the injury itself occurred after discharge when the individual was on civilian status
How later courts described this case
- finding that plaintiff’s injury, permanent nerve damage as a result of a defective tourniquet applied in a veteran’s hospital while on active duty, exempt from the Feres Doctrine because the injury itself occurred after discharge when the individual was on civilian status
- holding that Feres barred claim even though serviceman had been denied veteran's benefits
- observing “that Congress had given no indication that it made the right to compensation the veteran’s exclusive remedy, [and] that the receipt of disability payments under the Veterans Act was not an election of remedies and did not preclude recovery under the Tort Claims Act but only reduced the amount of any judgment under the latter Act.”
- finding Feres not to bar a serviceman’s claim for severe nerve damage resulting from the Veterans Administration’s application of a defective tourniquet during a post-service surgery for an injury received while in active-duty service
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Maddick v. United States, 978 F.3d 614 (1992)
In United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112-13, 75 S.Ct. 141, 143-44, 99 L.Ed. 139 (1954), the Supreme Court held that Feres was inapplicable to torts that arose after the completion of an individual’s military service.
Distinguished by Nora Faye Johnson v. United States, 631 F.2d 34 (1980)
348 U.S. 110, 75 S.Ct. 141, 99 L.Ed. 139 (1954), the second case cited by the appellant, is inapposite because there the injury occurred after the termination of the plaintiff’s military service.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Black,
with whom Mr. Justice Reed and Mr. Justice Minton join,
dissenting.
In Brooks v. United States, 337 U. S. 49 , we held that actions for damages could be brought against the Govern *114 ment for injuries to one soldier and the death of another due to negligent operation of an army truck. But we pointed out that the accident there had nothing to do with the “army careers” of the soldiers and was neither caused by nor incident to their military service. When injured the two soldiers were off duty and were riding along a state highway in their own car on their own business which bore no relationship of any kind to any past, present or future connection with the army. Thus, the two soldiers would have been injured had they never worn a uniform at all. In this case, however, the injury is inseparably related to military service and the Brooks case should not be held controlling. But for his army service this veteran could not have been injured in the veterans hospital as he was eligible and admitted for treatment there solely because of war service which gave him veteran status. Moreover, he was actually being treated for an army service injury.
For a hospital injury a veteran is entitled to precisely the same disability benefits as if the injury had been inflicted while he was a soldier. * We have previously held, I think correctly, that a soldier injured in a hospital cannot also sue for damages under the Tort Claims Act. Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135 . But the Court now holds that a veteran can. To permit a veteran to recover damages from the Government in circumstances under which a soldier on active duty cannot recover seems like an unjustifiable discrimination which the Act does not require.
“Where any veteran suffers ... an injury, or an aggravation of any existing injury, as the result of hospitalization or medical or surgical treatment . . . benefits . . . shall be awarded in the same manner as if such disability, aggravation, or death were service connected . . . .” 48 Stat. 526 , 38 U. S. C. § 501a.