stating, “[sjince Nierotko remained an employee under the definition of the Labor Act, although his employer had attempted to terminate the relationship, he had ‘employment’ under that Act” sufficient to satisfy the broad language of the statute defining wages
How later courts described this case
- stating, “[sjince Nierotko remained an employee under the definition of the Labor Act, although his employer had attempted to terminate the relationship, he had ‘employment’ under that Act” sufficient to satisfy the broad language of the statute defining wages
- stating, "[s]ince Nierotko remained an employee under the definition of the Labor Act, although his employer had attempted to terminate the relationship, he had 'employment' under that Act" sufficient to satisfy the broad language of the statute defining wages
- holding that the term “service” as used in the Social Security Act’s definition of “employment” means not only work actually done, but also “the entire employer-employee relationship for which compensation is paid to the employee by the employer”
- holding that, even though the employer attempted to fire the plaintiff-respondent, he remained an employee under the definition of the Labor Act from which his award stemmed, such that he had “employment” under that act
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by BNSF Ry. Co. v. Loos, 139 S. Ct. 893 (2019)
Nierotko , the dissent urges, is distinguishable because it involved "a different factual context.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
concurring.
The decisions of this Court leave no doubt that a man’s time may, as a matter of law, be in the service of another *371 though he be inactive. E. g., Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U. S. 126 . This is, practically speaking, the ordinary situation of employment in a “stand-by” capacity. United States v. Local 807, 315 U. S. 521, 535 . The basis of a back-pay order under the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 , 29 U. S. C. § 151 , is precisely that. When the employer is liable for back pay, he is so liable because under the circumstances, though he has illegally discharged the employee, he still absorbs his time. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U. S. 177 . In short, an employer must pay wages although, in violation of law, he has subjected his employee to enforced idleness. Since such compensation is in fact paid as wages, it is a plain disregard of the law for the.Social Security Board not to include such payments among the employees’ wages. Neither the terms of the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 620 , 53 Stat. 1360 , 42 U. S. C. § 301 , nor the implications of policy, comparable to some aspects of the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 , 48 Stat. 926 , 48 Stat. 1185 , 49 Stat. 1921 , 54 Stat. 785 , 45 U. S. C. § 151 , give the Board judicially unreviewable authority to exclude from wages what as a matter of law are wages. And so I concur in the decision of the Court.