holding that Georgia Supreme Court’s decision was not contrary to clearly established federal law because neither the petitioner nor the federal court found any Supreme Court precedent to support the petitioner’s assertion
How later courts described this case
- holding that Georgia Supreme Court’s decision was not contrary to clearly established federal law because neither the petitioner nor the federal court found any Supreme Court precedent to support the petitioner’s assertion
- finding the protections of Edwards do not apply "to a defendant in Isaacs' position one who has already been tried and convicted of the crime for which he was taken into custody and with respect to which he asserted a right to counsel"
- discussing the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “good cause” under Rule 6 as ‘“where specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is . . . entitled to relief, it is the duty of the court to provide the necessary facilities and procedures for an adequate inquiry.”’ (ellipses in original) (quoting Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 908-09 (1997))
- observing that the petitioner did not explain why the discovery he now seeks is any different from the discovery that was available to him in state courts and that, under such circumstances, the district court properly denied the petitioner’s request to conduct additional discovery because he did not show good cause as required by Rule 6(a)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Shatzer v. State, 405 Md. 585 (2008)
Isaacs and Arrington are factually distinguishable from the case at bar in that they involve the invocation of the right to counsel on the original charge, followed by a conviction and sentencing on that charge, and then subsequent interrogation on a new crime while incarcerated on the first charge.
The opinion
EDMONDSON, Chief Judge,
concurring in the judgment:
I agree that AEDPA applies. As I understand the law, deciding this case accurately is no complicated or laborious task. I easily accept that the pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court of Georgia were not contrary to and did not involve unreasonable applications of clearly established federal law.