ruling plaintiffs prevailing parties where they not only achieved favorable statement of law, but also obtained declaratory relief, partial vacation of remedial order, and revision of that order in district court
How later courts described this case
- ruling plaintiffs prevailing parties where they not only achieved favorable statement of law, but also obtained declaratory relief, partial vacation of remedial order, and revision of that order in district court
- noting that the party moving for attorneys’ fees is “charged with the burden of showing the reasonableness of the hours they bill, and, accordingly, are charged with proving that they exercised billing judgment”
- plaintiffs received “judicial relief” entitling them to prevailing party status because, “[a]lthough the permanent injunction sought by the [plaintiffs] was never granted,” the appellate court ruled “as a matter of law, that the remedial order was unconstitutional for precisely the reasons argued by the [plaintiffs]”
- holding defendant’s good *233 faith conduct does not establish special circumstances
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
HUDSPETH, District Judge,
dissenting:
Because I believe that the distinguished district judge did not abuse his discretion in finding that the Appellants were not “prevailing parties” entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under § 1988,1 respectfully dissent..
From the very beginning of their involvement in this litigation until now, the real objective of the Homeowners has been to prevent the Dallas Housing Authority from constructing new public housing units on land adjacent to the their neighborhoods. They have not achieved that objective. When this Court decided the previous appeal in 1999, it did stay construction at the sites adjacent to the Homeowners’ neighborhoods pending further proceedings in the district court. Walker v. City of Mesquite, Texas, 169 F.3d at 988. However, that stay has long since expired, and neither the district court nor this Court has enjoined construction of public housing units on those specific sites. Indeed, the Dallas Housing Authority is still considering building new public housing units on those sites, basing the decision to build there upon criteria which the Authority asserts are race-neutral. In my view, this is an example of what the Supreme Court meant when it stated that “Of itself, ‘the moral satisfaction [that] results from any favorable statement of law cannot bestow *253 prevailing party status.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. at 112, 113 S.Ct. 566 ; Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. at 762, 107 S.Ct. 2672 . In this case, the Homeowners have not “prevailed”, i.e., attained their litigation objectives, in any material or realistic way. Therefore, I would hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Homeowners’ application for attorney’s fees, and would affirm the decision below.