League of United Latin American Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements

*734 I.BACKGROUND..........................................................739

A. Texas’ Method of Electing District Court Judges.....................739

B. Procedural History.................................................. 740

II. THE ACCEPTED FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING SECTION 2 VOTE DILUTION CLAIMS ................................................... 741

A. The Threshold Inquiry: The Gingles Factors......................... 742

1. Size and Geographical Compactness of the Minority Group.........743

2. Political Cohesiveness of the Minority Group.......................743

3. Legally Significant White Bloc Voting............................. 744

B. The Broader Inquiry: The Totality of the Circumstances............747

1. The Senate Report Factors........................................747

a. History of discrimination touching the rights of minorities to participate in the political process......................747

b. Extent of racially polarized voting........................... 747

c. Use of voting practices that enhance the opportunity for discrimination____1........................................749

d. Minority access to the slating process...................'.....750

e. Lingering socioeconomic effects of discrimination............750

f. Use of racial appeals in campaigns..........................750

g. Extent to which minority candidates have been elected to public office ...............................................750

h. Responsiveness of elected officials to particular needs of the minority group............................................752

i. Tenuousness of the policy underlying the challenged practice ........................................................752

2. Other Relevant Factors, Including Racial Animus in the Electorate----753

C. The Ultimate Inquiry: Unequal Opportunity to Participate on Account of Race or Color ...........................................754

III. THE PROPOSED BALANCING FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING SECTION 2 VOTE DILUTION CLAIMS....................................755

A. The Accepted Role of State Interests in Section 2 Analysis..........756

B. The Proposed Role for State Interests in Section 2 Analysis.........756

C. Problems with the Proposed Balancing Framework..................757

1. The Legal Problem...............................................757

a. Congressional intent......................................... 757

b. Federalism principles........................................758

c. The: Supreme Court’s decision in Houston Lawyers’ Associa tion........................................................760

2. The Practical Problem............................................ 763

3. Summation....................................................... 764

D. Applying the Proposed Balancing Framework in this Case: Evaluating Texas’ Asserted Interests......................................764

1. Identifying the Threatened State Interests.........................764

2. Scrutinizing the Threatened State Interests........................ 765

a. Texas’ interest in preserving the administrative advantages of the current at-large system..............................' 766

b. Texas’ interest in allowing judges to specialize...............766

c. Texas’ linkage interest.......................................767

d. Texas’ interest in preserving the function of district court judges as sole decision-makers.....'.........................769

3. Assigning a Weight to the Threatened State Interests.............772

IV. REVIEW OF THE DISTRICT COURT’S SECTION 2 LIABILITY FINDINGS................................... 772

A. Standard of Appellate Review....................................... 773

B. Review of the District Court’s Vote Dilution Findings Under the Accepted Section 2 Framework....................................774

*735 1. Statistical Methodology....................................... 774

2. Review of District Court's Vote Dilution Findings ............. 776

a. Bexar County............................................ 777

(i) Gingles factors....................................... 777

(ii) Totality of circumstances factors..................... 778

(iii) Ultimate vote dilution finding....................... 780

b. Dallas County............................................ 780

(i) Gingles factors....................................... 780

(ii) Totality of circumstances factors..................... 781

(iii) Ultimate vote dilution finding ....................... 785

c. Ector County............................................. 785

(i) Gingles factors....................................... 786

(ii) Totality of circumstances factors..................... 786

(iii) Ultimate vote dilution finding....................... 788

d. Harris County............................................ 788

(i) Gingles factors....................................... 788

(ii) Totality of circumstances factors..................... 789

(iii) Ultimate vote dilution finding ....................... 791

e. Jefferson County......................................... 792

(i) Gingles factors....................................... 792

(ii) Totality of circumstances factors..................... 793

(iii) Ultimate vote dilution finding....................... 794

f. Lubbock County.......................................... 794

(i) Gingles factors....................................... 794

(ii) Totality of circumstances factors..................... 795

(iii) Ultimate vote dilution finding....................... 796

g. Midland County.......................................... 797

(i) Gingles factors....................................... 797

(ii) Totality of circumstances factors..................... 798

(iii) Ultimate vote dilution finding....................... 799

h. Tarrant County........................................... 799

(i) Gingles factors....................................... 799

(ii) Totality of circumstances factors..................... 800

(iii) Ultimate vote dilution finding....................... 801

i. Travis County............................................ 801

3. Effect of District Court’s Refusal to Consider Partisan Voting Evidence................................................... 803

a. The Partisanship Evidence................................ 803

(i) History of partisan politics in Texas................. 803

(ii) How partisan politics operate in Texas district court elections ............................................. 803

(iii) The limitations of the partisanship evidence.......... 805

(iv) Summation of partisanship evidence................. 805

b. The District Court’s Treatment of the Evidence............ 806

c. The District Court’s Error................................ 807

d. The Effect of the Error; Whitcomb Considered............ 807

4. Summation................................................... 813

C. Review of the District Court’s Vote Dilution Findings Under the Proposed Balancing Framework............................... 813

V. REMEDY............................................................ 814

VI. CONCLUSION....................................................... 815

DISSENT OF PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge 819

APPENDIX A TO JUDGE HIGGINBOTHAM’S DISSENT ... 842

*736 Before KING, JOHNSON and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.

KING, Circuit Judge:

This case is before us on remand from the Supreme Court's decision in Houston Lawyers' Association v. Attorney General of Texas, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 2376 , 115 L.Ed.2d 379 (1991), in which the Court held that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 , applies to all Texas judicial elections. We must now address a question that is undoubtedly easier to frame than to answer. In particular, we must decide whether the district court erred in concluding that the method by which Texas elects district court judges — as that method operates in nine counties — violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. After a careful review of the record, we hold (1) that the district court correctly concluded, in eight of the counties at issue, that Texas' method of electing district court judges violates Section 2, but (2) that the district court erred in finding a Section 2 violation in Travis County. We therefore affirm the district court's decision in part, reverse the decision in part, and remand the case to the district court for consideration and imposition of an appropriate remedy.

In view of the length of this opinion, 1 a summary of the pertinent facts and major legal conclusions may be helpful to the reader:

As with all cases under the Voting Rights Act, this one is driven by the facts. In this case, certain key facts are best summarized by the following table which sets forth, with respect to each of the nine Texas counties at issue, the population of the relevant minority group, the total number of district court judges elected in the county, the number of judges who are members of the relevant minority group and the percentage of the total number of district judges who are members of the relevant minority group.

[[Image here]]

*737 The table portrays graphically what is inescapable from the record in this case— that in Texas district court elections, minority voters have less opportunity than white voters to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The powerlessness of Texas minority voters in state district court elections stands in marked contrast to the increasing ability of those voters to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice in the context of federal and state legislative elections and in local city council and school board elections. The strides that minority voters have made in the latter elections are due in no small part to the Voting Rights Act. In the years following the passage of the Act, minority plaintiffs throughout the state mounted successful challenges under Section 2 to at-large election schemes for the federal and state legislative branches and for local city councils and school boards. Thus, the face of this state’s legislative branch and of local government more and more reflects the face of this state’s people. By contrast, the face of the judicial branch in Texas continues to be—as it has always been—overwhelmingly white.

The state of Texas and the other defendants argue that the Voting Rights Act, so helpful to minorities in these other contexts, affords minorities no relief in the context of the election of state district judges. This is so, we are told, because the state has a compelling interest in the maintenance of the present electoral system— an interest which outweighs the interest of minorities in having an opportunity equal to that of the state’s white citizens to elect district judges of their choice. Specifically, we are told by the state that electing district judges from an area no smaller than a county is necessary to ensure that district judges are independent or accountable to all litigants equally and that no particular group will have undue influence over the decisions that must be made alone by the district judge. We are told further that the mechanism by which that interest is implemented is the state’s venue rules which operate to ensure the accountability of a state district judge to all the citizens of the county in which he is elected. Upon close inspection, we find, not surprisingly, that the venue rules in Texas, like the venue rules in the federal courts and in the courts of other states, are predicated on considerations of convenience for the litigants and the witnesses; in general, they afford a defendant some protection from being forced to defend an action in a district court remote from his residence in this vast state, or remote from the place where the events underlying the controversy occurred and the place where evidence is most likely available. In short, here as elsewhere, the venue rules were not designed to ensure judicial accountability.

What does ensure that state district judges are independent and accountable to all litigants equally and that no particular group will have undue influence over the decisions that must be made are—first, the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct and second, the integrity of the individual judges. The Texas Code of Judicial Conduct charges judges with applying the law and states that an honorable judiciary separated from the influence of others is “indispensable to justice in our society.” The Code also stresses that “[a] judge should be unswayed by partisan interest, public clamor, or fear of criticism.” There is no evidence in this record that judges elected with the support of minorities will be any less obedient to the commands of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct than are state district judges who are currently elected with the support of many other interest groups, *738 such as the personal injury bar and the defense bar. Nor is there any support in this record for the proposition that persons elected with the support of minorities would somehow be lacking in the same high level of integrity that has in the past characterized the Texas bench.

In summary, the compelling interest proffered by the state and the other defendants for the maintenance of the current system is, at best, little more than tenuous. Arrayed against it is the Texas Constitution, which was amended by the Texas legislature and by the voters of this state in 1985 to permit the election of state district judges from areas smaller than a county. The voters of this state have made provision for one of the remedies available to the district court in this case—namely, the remedy of subdistricting. Surely, the legitimate state interests in this case can permissibly be defined, in part, by this provision of its Constitution.

We turn finally to a brief summary of certain other important legal issues involved in the decision of this case. In particular, we have been asked by the state of Texas and several state district judges to decide what Congress meant in the Voting Rights Act when it prohibited voting practices that result in a denial or abridgement of the right to vote “on account of race or color.”

With respect to the significance of Congress' use of the phrase "on account of race" in Section 2, our holdings may be summarized as follows: First, we hold that, under the plain language of Section 2, minority plaintiffs must demonstrate that the challenged election practice, under the totality of the circumstances, results in the denial or abridgement of the right to vote "on account of," or based on, race or color. See Chisom v. Roemer, — U.S. —, —, 111 S.Ct. 2354, 2363 , 115 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991). The phrase "on account of race or color" has been broadly defined by the Supreme Court and by Congress. Specifically, the totality of circumstances factors listed by Congress as relevant to a determination of Section 2 liability, as well as the threshold factors for proving vote dilution set forth in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 , 106 S.Ct. 2752 , 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986), point to minority voters' unequal opportunity to participate in the political process on the basis of race or color. Thus, minority plaintiffs seeking to satisfy the "on account of race or color" requirement — which is indisputably their burden — may present evidence of the existence of racially polarized voting, racial campaign appeals, a history of official discrimination, the lingering socioeconomic effects of discrimination, and other features of the current or past racial climate of the community in question. Proof of some or all of these factors raises an inference that racial discrimination is responsible for minority plaintiffs' unequal opportunity to participate in the political process.

Therefore, we reject the argument that “on account of race or color” is a narrowly-defined phrase. In particular, we reject the contention that Congress has defined the phrase “on account of race or color” to require minority plaintiffs to present proof that their unequal opportunity to participate in the electoral process and elect representatives of their choice is “caused by racial animus in the electorate.” We also reject the related argument that, to prove legally significant white bloc voting in the context of partisan elections, as well as racially polarized voting in such elections, minority plaintiffs must prove that such voting patterns are caused by racial animus in the electorate. While proof of the presence of racial animus in the electorate would be a significant factor indicating that race or color is in some way responsible for minority plaintiffs’ unequal opportunity to participate in the electoral process, the absence of proof of racial animus in the electorate simply will not, by itself, preclude a finding that minority plaintiffs have an unequal opportunity to participate in the electoral process on account of race or color.

We have also been asked to decide whether evidence of a strong statistical correlation between the electoral success and the party affiliation of a candidate can override or negate other factors which Congress has indicated point towards vote dilution. With respect to the evidence in sever *739 al of the counties at issue showing a strong statistical correlation between a candidate’s electoral success and his or her party affiliation, we hold that the district court erred in refusing to consider the evidence. The evidence is unquestionably relevant as an important feature of the political landscape. And, to the extent the evidence purported to demonstrate the absence of current racial animus in the electorate, it was also relevant to the question of whether race or color is responsible for the minority plaintiffs’ unequal opportunity to participate in the political process.

We further hold, however, that the district court’s failure to consider the particular evidence adduced in this case amounts to harmless error. The so-called “partisanship evidence” in this case was offered to demonstrate only that voters in elections in large Texas counties, not knowing the race or names of district court candidates, vote without specific racial animus toward those candidates. The evidence did not purport to explain why voters voted the way they did, but simply purported to rule out specific racial animus towards candidates. Moreover, to the extent that minority candidates find it harder, because of their lack of financial resources, to mount a county-wide campaign on a scale necessary to gain name recognition, the partisanship evidence of straight-ticket voting reinforces rather than negates minorities’ unequal opportunity to participate in the political process. Accordingly, we hold that, although it should not have been excluded from consideration as legally irrelevant, the partisanship evidence adduced here does not undercut the district court’s ultimate conclusion that minorities have an unequal opportunity to participate in the political process, an unequal opportunity that is tied to race or color.

I. BACKGROUND

This lawsuit, which is before this panel for a second time, encompasses nine different voting rights cases. It concerns the method by which Texas elects its district court judges in Bexar, Dallas, Ector, Harris, Jefferson, Lubbock, Midland, Tarrant, and Travis counties (“target counties”). Before we recount the procedural history of this lawsuit, it will be helpful to outline Texas’ method of electing district court judges and to describe how this method operates in the larger counties of the state.

A. Texas’ Method of Electing District Court Judges

Texas elects its 386 state district judges in partisan elections, which are conducted at the same time and in a substantially similar fashion as other state partisan races. Political parties nominate judicial candidates in general primaries and runoffs, and a candidate must receive a majority of the vote to qualify as the party’s nominee. See Tex.Elec.Code Ann. § 172.-003 (Vernon 1986). At the general election, judicial candidates must run for a specifically numbered district court, and their party affiliation is indicated on the ballot. To win the general election, a judicial candidate needs only a plurality of votes. Id. § 2.001.

One feature of Texas’ method of electing state district judges is unique—the size of the various judicial districts from which such judges are elected. Since 1985, the Texas Constitution has provided that judicial districts may not be smaller than a county unless a majority of the voters of the county authorizes smaller districts, see Tex. Const. art. V, § 7a(i), and to date, no district smaller than one county has been authorized by voters from any Texas county. 2 In addition, although the Texas Constitution permits the creation of more than one judgeship per judicial district, see Tex. Const. art. V, § 7, the legislature has seldom invoked this provision. Consequently, as a general rule only one district judge is elected per judicial district, and the judicial districts, although no smaller than a county, vary in size from one county to six counties and in population from approximately 13,000 to 2.5 million. See generally The American Bench 2138-54 (6th ed. 1991) (breaking down judicial districts in Texas according to the counties they cover).

*740 Thus, Texas’ method of electing district court judges operates as an at-large system in the larger counties—including the nine target counties—but not in the smaller counties. For example, in Harris County, which according to the 1980 Census has a population of some 2,409,544, there are fifty-nine (59) overlapping, single-judge, county-wide judicial districts. The persons running for those 59 positions may be voted on by all 1,685,024 registered voters in Harris County. By contrast, in Milam County, which according to the 1980 Census has a population of 22,732, there is only one judicial district. The registered voters in that county cast their ballots for only one district judge. See id.

B. Procedural History

On July 11, 1988, ten individuals, along with local and state chapters of the League of United Latin American Citizens (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), filed suit in federal district court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs asserted that Texas’ method of electing district court judges, as that method operates in larger counties, (1) dilutes minority voting strength in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and (2) violates the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The named defendants in the original lawsuit were: William P. Clements, the Governor of Texas; Jim Mattox, the Attorney General of Texas, who is charged with enforcing the laws of the state; George Bayoud, the Secretary of State of Texas, who is charged with administering the elections laws of the state; and members of the Judicial Districts Board of Texas, which is charged with reapportioning the districts from which Texas district court judges are elected (collectively, “State Defendants”).

Several months later, in March 1989, the district court permitted several parties to intervene in the lawsuit. The Houston Lawyers Association and the Texas Black Legislative Caucus intervened on behalf of Plaintiffs, as did certain individuals residing in Dallas County. Two Texas district court judges—Sharolyn Wood, 127th District Court in Harris County, and Harold Entz, 194th District Court in Dallas County—intervened in their personal capacities on behalf of the State Defendants.

Plaintiffs originally challenged Texas’ election method in forty-four counties. By the time of trial, however, they had narrowed their challenged to the nine target counties. Plaintiffs proceeded on behalf of Black voters in Harris, Dallas, Tarrant, and Jefferson counties, on behalf of Hispanic voters in Bexar and Travis counties, and on behalf of Black and Hispanic voters combined in Lubbock, Ector, and Midland counties.

The lawsuit was tried to the district court the week of September 18, 1989. After considering all the evidence, including much expert testimony, the district court rendered its liability decision and made findings of fact and conclusions of law. In its 94-page memorandum opinion of November 8, 1989, the district court rejected the Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims but found their statutory claim meritorious. The district court concluded that the Plaintiffs, on behalf of specified minority voters in each of the nine target counties, demonstrated a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The district court based its conclusion on its finding that Texas’ current method of electing district court judges in the nine target counties “interacts with social and historical conditions” to cause the minority voters in each of the nine counties to have less opportunity than white voters “to elect their preferred candidates.”

On appeal, a divided panel of this court held that the district court erred in concluding that Texas' method of electing district court judges violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in the nine target counties. See League of United Latin American *741 Citizens v. Clements, 902 F.2d 293 (5th Cir.), opinion on rehearing en banc, 914 F.2d 620 (1990), rev'd and remanded, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 2376 , 115 L.Ed.2d 379 (1991). We reasoned that, although Section 2 applies to some state judicial elections, it does not apply to elections of state district judges. Id. at 308. In reaching this decision, we focused specifically on the legislative history of the Voting Rights Act, as amended in 1982, and the nature of Texas district court judgeships. We noted that, unlike a judge of a multi-member body, "the district judge in Texas does his judging alone." Id. Because we concluded that "there can be no share of such a single member office," we held that county-wide elections of district judges "[do] not violate the Voting Rights Act." Id. Accordingly, we reversed the judgment of the district court.

On its own initiative, the members of this court decided to rehear the case en banc. Over Judge Johnson's dissent, a majority of this court concluded that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not apply to any judicial elections. See League of United Latin American Citizens, 914 F.2d 620 , 631 (5th Cir.1990) (en banc), rev'd and remanded, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 2376 , 115 L.Ed.2d 379 (1991). In reaching this conclusion, the majority relied primarily on Congress' use of the word "representative" in Section 2. It reasoned that Congress did not intend the term "representative" to include state judges. The majority stated: "Should Congress seek to install [the results] test for judicial elections, it must say so plainly. Instead, it has thus far plainly said the contrary." Id.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari for the limited purpose of considering the scope of Section 2's coverage. See Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney General of Texas, — U.S. —, —, 111 S.Ct. 2376, 2380 , 115 L.Ed.2d 379 (1991). Relying on its decision in Chisom v. Roemer, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 2354 , 115 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991), which was issued the same day, the Court concluded that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act applies to Texas' method of electing district court judges. Id. — U.S. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 2381. The Court specifically held that "[i]f a State decides to elect its trial judges, as Texas did in 1861, those elections must be conducted in compliance with the Voting Rights Act." Id. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 2380. Accordingly, the Court reversed this circuit's en banc decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

II. THE ACCEPTED FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING SECTION 2 VOTE DILUTION CLAIMS

When Congress amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in 1982, it sought “to clearly establish the standards ... for proving a violation of that section.” S.Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 178 [hereinafter S.Rep.]. 3 Congress specifically intended to “make clear that proof of discriminatory intent is not required to establish a violation of Section 2.” S.Rep. at 2, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 178. Congress also intended to restore “the legal standards under the results test by codifying” the vote dilution framework embraced in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 , 93 S.Ct. 2332 , 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973). Id. at 2, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 179.

As amended, Section 2 establishes the basic framework for analyzing vote dilution claims. It provides:

(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of *742 the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this section.

(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.

42 U.S.C. § 1973 . Subsection (a) makes clear that Congress intended to codify a results test, and subsection (b) provides guidance about how the results test is to be applied. See Chisom, — U.S. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 2364. Under this framework, then, a plaintiff can prevail “by showing that a challenged election law or procedure, in the context of the total circumstances of the local electoral process, ha[s] the result of denying a racial or language minority an equal chance to participate in the electoral process.” S.Rep. at 16, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 193.

The basic framework set forth in the language of Section 2, although it appears straightforward, has become increasingly complex. Both the Supreme Court and Congress have elaborated on this basic structure, and the product of their elaborations is a two-part framework for analyzing vote dilution claims brought by minority voters. Under the first part of this accepted Section 2 framework, a court must determine whether the minority voters have satisfied a threshold test enunciated by the Supreme Court. If minority voters satisfy the threshold test and demonstrate that their ability to elect representatives of their choice is being hindered by the challenged practice, a court must then ask whether the minority voters have demonstrated certain factors that Congress deemed relevant to the Section 2 inquiry—factors that raise an inference of vote dilution. Ultimately, a court must inquire whether minority voters have demonstrated an unequal opportunity to participate in the political process on account of race or color.

A. The Threshold Inquiry: The Gingles Factors

The Supreme Court first elaborated on the basic analytical framework established by Section 2 in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 , 106 S.Ct. 2752 , 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986), a case in which Black voters successfully challenged North Carolina's multimember legislative redistricting plan. Although the case produced a "complicated web of dissents, concurrences, and plurality opinions," 4 a majority of the Court agreed that at-large election procedures do not automatically violate Section 2. Id. at 46 , 106 S.Ct. at 2764 . A majority of the Court also agreed with the formulation of a three-part, threshold test for analyzing claims that an at-large election scheme dilutes minority voting strength. Under this threshold test, the minority group challenging an at-large election scheme must demonstrate that (1) it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single member district, (2) it is politically cohesive, and (3) the white major *743 ity votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it — in the absence of special circumstances — usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate. Id. at 48-51 , 106 S.Ct. at 2765-2767 . Failure to establish any one of the Gingles factors precludes a finding of vote dilution, because "[t]hese circumstances are necessary preconditions for multimember districts to operate to impair minority voters' ability to elect representatives of their choice...." Id. at 50 , 106 S.Ct. at 2766 ; see also Overton v. City of Austin, 871 F.2d 529, 538 (5th Cir.1989) (failure to establish any one of the Gingles factors is fatal to plaintiffs' vote dilution claim).

1. Size and Geographical Compactness of the Minority Group

As stated above, to pass the Gingles threshold inquiry, the minority group challenging an at-large election scheme must first demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district. To satisfy this first Gingles factor, the minority group must ordinarily be able to draw a single member district in which a majority of the voting age population is minority. See Westwego Citizens for Better Government v. City of Westwego, 946 F.2d 1109 , 1117 n. 7 (5th Cir.1991) (Westwego III); Overton, 871 F.2d at 536 ; see also Westwego Citizens for Better Gov't v. Westwego, 872 F.2d 1201 , 1205 n. 4 (5th Cir.1989) (Westwego I) (noting that evidence of size of "voting age" population is critical to a vote dilution claim); Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1426 (9th Cir.1989) ("eligible minority voter population, rather than total minority population, is the appropriate measure of geographical compactness"). This requirement, according to the majority in Gingles , ensures that, in the absence of the multimember district and at-large voting scheme, "minority voters possess the potential to elect representatives...." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 n. 17, 106 S.Ct. at 2767 n. 17 (emphasis in original). In other words, if the minority group is not sufficiently large and geographically compact, "the multimember form of the district cannot be responsible for [minority] voters' inability to elect [their] candidates." Id. at 50 , 106 S.Ct. at 2766 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).

2. Political Cohesiveness of the Minority Group

The minority group must also demonstrate that it is "politically cohesive" to pass the Gingles threshold inquiry. Id. at 51 , 106 S.Ct. at 2766 . One way of proving political cohesiveness, according to the Gingles majority, is to show "that a significant number of minority group members usually vote for the same candidates...." Id. at 56 , 106 S.Ct. at 2769 ; see also Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of Gretna, 834 F.2d 496, 501-02 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 905 , 109 S.Ct. 3213 , 106 L.Ed.2d 564 (1989). If the minority group is not politically cohesive, or does not engage in significant bloc voting, "it cannot be said that the selection of a multimember structure thwarts distinctive minority group interests." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51 , 106 S.Ct. at 2766 (citation omitted).

Although statistical evidence of racially polarized voting, see infra Part II.B.l.b., is frequently employed to demonstrate a minority group’s political cohesiveness, other evidence may also establish this second Gingles factor. We have on several occasions indicated that Gingles allows minority voters to prove their political cohesiveness even in the absence of statistical evidence of racial polarization. See Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1118 n. 12; Brewer v. Ham, 876 F.2d 448, 453 (5th Cir.1989). In particular, political cohesiveness also may be demonstrated by testimony from persons familiar with the community in question, provided that such testimony is reinforced with other evidence or is not otherwise *744 rebutted. See Brewer, 876 F.2d at 453-54 ; see also Overton, 871 F.2d at 536 .

Political cohesiveness is related to, but distinct from, the concept of racially polarized voting. The notion of political cohesiveness contemplates that a specified group of voters shares common beliefs, ideals, principles, agendas, concerns, and the like such that they generally unite behind or coalesce around particular candidates and issues. See Monroe v. City of Woodville, 881 F.2d 1327, 1331 (5th Cir. 1989), modified, 897 F.2d 763 , cert. denied, 498 U.S. 822 , 111 S.Ct. 71 , 112 L.Ed.2d 45 (1990). The term racially polarized voting, on the other hand, describes an electorate in which white voters favor and vote for certain candidates or propositions, and minority voters vote for other candidates or propositions. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 53 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. at 2768 n. 21. (racial polarization exists where there is a consistent relationship between the race of the voter and the way in which the voter votes or where minority voters and white voters vote differently). Thus, while a showing of racially polarized voting will frequently demonstrate that minority voters are politically cohesive, 5 a showing that minority voters are politically cohesive will not, by itself, establish racially polarized voting.

Finally, according to a majority of the Justices in Gingles , to satisfy the second threshold factor minority voters need not prove that the reason they vote for the same candidates is linked to race or color. Justice Brennan, writing for three other Justices, would have held that “the reasons [minority] and white voters vote differently have no relevance to the central inquiry of § 2.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 63 , 106 S.Ct. at 2773 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.). Although not entirely agreeing with Justice Brennan, Justice O’Connor, writing on behalf of three other Justices, agreed that defendants cannot rebut statistical evidence of a minority group’s political cohesiveness by “offering evidence that the divergent racial voting patterns may be explained in part by causes other than race.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 100 , 106 S.Ct. at 2792 (O’Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in the judgment). Justice O’Connor specifically stated that statistical evidence of divergent racial voting offered solely to establish the minority group’s political cohesiveness may not be rebutted by evidence indicating that there is “an underlying divergence in the interests of minority and white voters.” Id.

3. Legally Significant White Bloc Voting

Under the third Gingles factor, the minority group “must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it—in the absence of special circumstances, such as the minority candidate running unopposed—usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51 , 106 S.Ct. at 2766-2767 (internal references omitted). “In establishing this last circumstance, the minority group demonstrates that submergence in a white multimember district impedes its ability to elect its chosen representatives.” Id. As with demonstrating political cohesiveness, a minority group can demonstrate white bloc voting by introducing statistical evidence of racially polarized voting. See Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1118 . Moreover, where statistical evidence of racially polarized voting is used to establish white bloc voting, the elections that will usually be most probative are those in which the minority-preferred candidate is a member of the minority group. See Westwego I, 872 F.2d at 1208 n. 7.

The determinative question for this third Gingles factor “is not whether whites *745 generally vote as a bloc, but rather, whether such bloc voting is legally significant.” Monroe, 881 F.2d at 1332 . Legally significant white bloc voting means white bloc voting that usually defeats the minority group’s preferred candidate. Id. at 1333 . As the Court recognized in Gingles , “a white bloc vote that normally will defeat the combined strength of minority support plus white ‘crossover’ votes rises to the level of legally significant white bloc voting.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 56 , 106 S.Ct. at 2769 . It is “the usual predictability of the majority’s success,” the Court continued, that “distinguishes structural dilution from the mere loss of an occasional election.” Id. at 51 , 106 S.Ct. at 2767 .

The amount of white bloc voting that rises to the level of legal significance will vary from location to location. That is, in determining whether white voting strength can generally “minimize or cancel” minority voters’ ability to elect representatives of their choice, courts must look at a number of factors. Id. at 56 , 106 S.Ct. at 2769 (quoting S.Rep. at 28). Among the factors affecting the level of legally significant white bloc voting are: (1) the nature of the allegedly dilutive electoral mechanism; (2) the presence or absence of other potentially dilutive electoral devices, such as majority vote requirements, designated posts, and prohibitions against bullet voting; (3) the percentage of registered voters in the district who are members of the minority group; (4) the size of the district; and (5) in multimember districts, the number of seats open and the number of candidates in the field. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 56 , 106 S.Ct. at 2769 .

Contrary to the arguments advanced by the State Defendants, Judge Wood, and Judge Entz, a minority group is not required to demonstrate that racial animus is responsible for a white bloc voting pattern. A requirement of demonstrating racial animus would, in the words of the Senate Report, be “unnecessarily divisive because it [would] involve charges of racism on the part of ... entire communities.” S.Rep. at 36, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 214. And, one of the reasons Congress decided to amend Section 2 was to obviate the need for such charges of racism. Id. 6

In sum, a minority group can satisfy the third Gingles factor by showing that a substantial majority of white voters consistently vote against the candidates preferred by minority voters, such that the *746 candidates preferred by the minority group usually lose. It has never been the case, however, that for white bloc voting to be legally significant, it must be shown to be motivated by racial animus. See e.g., Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1118-20 (concluding, without inquiring as to the cause of voting patterns, that the record “unmistakably” demonstrated legally significant white bloc voting). We decline to hold so now.

*747 B. The Broader Inquiry: The Totality of the Circumstances

Satisfaction of the Gingles factors, at least in this circuit, does not by itself establish a violation of Section 2. See Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1116 . The minority group must further demonstrate that, under the totality of the circumstances, “its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (b). Unlike the Gingles threshold inquiry, the totality of circumstances inquiry is broad. It requires courts to make a “searching practical evaluation of the ‘past and present reality’ ” of the community and to take a “ ‘functional’ view of the political process.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45 , 106 S.Ct. at 2764 . Although courts typically should be guided by the factors mentioned in the Senate Report accompanying the 1982 amendments to Section 2, other factors may also be relevant. See Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1120 .

1. The Senate Report Factors

The Senate Report accompanying the 1982 amendments to Section 2 identifies seven "typical" factors and two "additional" factors that may be relevant to an analysis of the totality of the circumstances. These factors, which were derived from the analytical framework used by the Supreme Court in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 , 93 S.Ct. 2332 , 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973), as articulated by this court in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir.1973), aff'd sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 , 96 S.Ct. 1083 , 47 L.Ed.2d 296 (1976), are meant to aid a court in assessing whether "the challenged system or practice, in the context of all the circumstances in the jurisdiction in question, results in minorities being denied equal access to the political process." S.REP. at 27, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 205. According to the Senate Report, a court must "assess the impact of the challenged structure or practice on the basis of objective factors, rather than making a determination about the motivations which lay behind its adoption or maintenance." Id. at 27, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 205 (emphasis added).

a. History of discrimination touching the rights of minorities to participate in the political process. The first factor mentioned in the Senate Report is “the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process.” S.Rep. at 28, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 206. In listing this factor, Congress made clear that it “was concerned not only with present discrimination, but with the vestiges of discrimination which may interact with present political structures to perpetuate a historical lack of access to the political system.” Westwego I, 872 F.2d at 1211-12 . Evidence that is relevant under this factor includes the use of poll taxes and literacy tests, as well as the existence of racially segregated schools and public facilities. See White, 412 U.S. at 768 , 93 S.Ct. at 2340 ; Zimmer, 485 F.2d at 1306 ; see also Andrew P. Miller and Mark A. Packman, Amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: What is the Intent of the Results Test?, 36 Emory L.J. 1 , 28 (1987).

b. Extent of racially polarized voting. The second factor that Congress deemed relevant to an analysis of the totality of the circumstances is “the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized.” S.Rep. at 29, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 206. This factor is one of the two most important in the inquiry into the past and present reality of the challenged electoral structure. Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1120 . It is, we have stated, “the linchpin -of a § 2 vote dilution claim____” Gretna, 834 F.2d at 499 ; see also Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 Mich.L.Rev. 1833, 1848-49 (1990) (opin *748 ing that the inclusion of the racially polarized voting inquiry in the Senate Report marked “a major shift in voting rights law” and pointed to an “emerging doctrinal coherence for claims of minority vote dilution”).

As previously discussed, see supra Part II.A.2, racially polarized voting “exists where there is a ‘consistent relationship between [the] race of the voter and the way in which the voter votes,’ ... or to put it differently, where ‘[minority] voters and white voters vote differently.’ ” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 53 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. at 2768 n. 21. Racially polarized voting is not, as Judge Wood, Judge Entz, and the State Defendants suggest, racially motivated voting, or voting caused by racial animus. 7 See Collins v. City of Norfolk, 816 F.2d 932 , 935 (4th Cir.1987) (“The legal standard for the existence of racially polarized voting looks only to the difference between how majority votes and minority votes were cast; it does not ask why those votes were cast the way they were____”). Nor is racially polarized voting simply “the tendency of citizens to vote for candidates of their own race.” Miller & Packman, supra, at 16. Rather, racially polarized voting is an objective factor, which is established by evidence demonstrating that “voters vote along racial lines.” Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1122 .

To say that racial polarization does not simply measure the tendency of citizens to vote for candidates of their own race, however, does not mean that evidence of such tendencies are unimportant to the racial polarization inquiry. We recognized in Gretna that, in determining the existence of racial bloc voting, “the race of the candidate is in general of less significance than the race of the voter—but only within the context of an election that offers voters the choice of supporting a viable minority candidate.” 834 F.2d at 503 . Furthermore, we have noted that “the evidence most probative of racially polarized voting must be drawn from elections including both [minority] and white candidates.” Westwego I, 872 F.2d at 1208 n. 7. 8 Accordingly, in ascertaining whether a community’s elections are characterized by racially polarized voting, a court may properly give more weight to elections in which the minority-preferred candidate is a member of the minority group.

The Senate Report recognizes that racially polarized voting is a relative concept by instructing courts to assess not *749 only the existence of racially polarized voting, but the extent of such voting. Indeed, the existence of racially polarized voting will frequently, if not always, be established by satisfying of the second and third Gingles factors. See supra Parts H.A.2., II.A.3; see also Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1423 (9th Cir.1989) (suggesting that the second and third Gingles factors, political cohesiveness and white bloc voting, are the “component parts” of racially polarized voting). Under the totality of circumstances inquiry, the focus is on the degree of racially polarized voting. When the pattern of racially polarized voting is severe—that is, when minority and white voters rarely engage in cross-over voting—an at-large election scheme is more likely to dilute minority voting strength in violation of Section 2. Conversely, when the pattern of racially polarized voting is slight, and there is substantial cross-over voting between minority and with voters, an at-large election scheme is less likely to dilute minority voting strength in violation of Section 2.

c. Use of voting practices that enhance the opportunity for discrimination. The Senate Report also directs courts to consider other voting practices that may interact with the challenged election scheme to dilute minority voting strength. In particular, courts are to consider “the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group.” S.Rep. at 29, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 206. Courts may also consider, at least in the context of at-large elections, whether the state or political subdivision employs what amounts to a numbered-post system and whether the system lacks a district residency requirement. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766 , 93 S.Ct. 2332, 2339 , 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973) (discussing Texas’ “place” rule). The potential of such features to dilute minority voting strength is well-documented. See generally Chandler Davidson, Overview, in Minority Vote Dilution 5-8 (Chandler Davidson ed. 1984).

Unusually large election districts may enhance vote dilution in a least two ways: First, such districts may make it more difficult for minorities to successfully campaign for office. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 627 , 102 S.Ct. 3272, 3280 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1982); see also Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 143 , 91 S.Ct. 1858, 1869 , 29 L.Ed.2d 363 (1971) (recognizing that, when large, multimember districts have an enhanced tendency to minimize or cancel out minority voting strength). Such districts may also create the problem of overly long ballots, making “an intelligent choice among candidates ... quite difficult.” Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 731 , 84 S.Ct. 1459, 1471 , 12 L.Ed.2d 632 (1964).

The other features discussed above similarly enhance the possibility of vote dilution. Majority vote requirements can obstruct the election of minority candidates by giving white voting majorities a "second shot" at minority candidates who have only mustered a plurality of the votes in the first election. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 491 (1975) (testimony of Dr. Charles Cotrell); see also Jones v. City of Lubbock, 727 F.2d 364, 383 (5th Cir. 1984); Major v. Treen, 574 F.Supp. 325 , 351 n. 32 (E.D.La.1983) (three-judge court). Anti-single shot provisions prohibit voters from casting fewer than all of their votes and effectively force minority voters to cast votes for white candidates who may not be favored by minority voters. Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1113 n. 3. Under a numbered post system, candidates are required to run for a designated seat. See White, 412 U.S. at 766 , 93 S.Ct. at 2339 . This requirement, the Supreme Court has recognized, "enhances [the minority group's] lack of access because it prevents a cohesive political group from concentrating on a single candidate." Rogers, 458 U.S. at 627 , 102 S.Ct. at 3280 . Finally, where there is no requirement that candidates reside in subdistricts of a multimember district, "all candidates may be selected from outside [a minority group's] residential *750 area." White, 412 U.S. at 766 n. 10, 93 S.Ct. at 2340 n. 10.

d. Minority access to the slating process. The fourth totality factor listed in the Senate Report is “whether members of the minority group have been denied- access” to any candidate slating process. S.Rep. at 29, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 206. Slating has been defined as “the creation of a package or slate of candidates, before filing for office, by an organization with sufficient strength to make the election merely a stamp of approval of the preordained candidate group.” Overton, 871 F.2d at 534 . The core inquiry as to slating, we have stated, “is the ability of [minorities] to get on the ballot.” Hendrix v. Joseph, 559 F.2d 1265, 1268 (5th Cir.1977).

Where a slating organization exists, "the ability of minorities to participate in that slating organization and to receive its endorsement may be of paramount importance." United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1569 (11th Cir.) (Wisdom, J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 976 , 105 S.Ct. 375 , 83 L.Ed.2d 311 (1984). We have indicated, however, that a slating organization's endorsement of a few minority candidates will not preclude a finding that the minority group lacks access to the slating process, at least where those candidates are not preferred by the minority group. See Velasquez v. City of Abilene, 725 F.2d 1017 , 1022 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1984) (referring to the Senate Report). Moreover, we have recognized that the absence of a slating organization will not mitigate evidence of an unequal opportunity to participate in the political process. See McMillan v. Escambia County, 638 F.2d 1239, 1245 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 453 U.S. 946 , 102 S.Ct. 17 , 69 L.Ed.2d 1033 (1981).

e. Lingering socioeconomic effects of discrimination. Congress also has directed courts to consider “the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health____” S.Rep. at 29, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 206. In doing so, Congress recognized that the lingering socioeconomic effects of discrimination may hinder a minority group’s “ability to participate effectively in the political process.” Id. Where the minority group presents evidence that its members are socioeconomically disadvantaged and that their level of participation in politics is depressed, the group “need not prove any further causal nexus between [its members’] disparate socioeconomic status and the depressed level of political participation.” Id. at 29 n. 114, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207 n. 114.

f.Use of racial appeals in campaigns. The Senate Report further directs courts, when looking at the present reality of the community’s political process, to consider “whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals.” S.Rep. at 29, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 206. The presence of this factor, Congress undoubtedly recognized, could provide evidence that racial politics dominate the political process. See id. at 33, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 210-211. The absence of racial appeals, however, is not fatal to a minority group’s vote dilution claim under Section 2. As Judge Wisdom recognized in Marengo County, overt political racism has decreased over time. 731 F.2d at 1571 . Therefore, while “[e]vidence of racism can be very significant if it is present[,]____its absence should not weigh heavily against a plaintiff proceeding under the results test of [S]ection 2.” Id.

g. Extent to which minority candidates have been elected to public office. The “extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction,” S.Rep. at 29, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207, along with the extent of racially polarized voting, are the two most important factors that the district court must consider its analysis of the totality of the circumstances. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48 n. 15, 106 S.Ct. at 2767 n. 15; Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1120 . Indeed, minority candidate success is the only factor that is mentioned in the language of Section 2 itself. 9 Subsection (b), *751 which sets forth the totality of the circumstances standard, expressly provides: “The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (b).

In the Senate Report, Congress indicated that the analysis of minority candidate success should be a cautious, relative inquiry. On the one hand, Congress recognized that, where “no members of a minority group have been elected to office over an extended period of time,” the lack of success “is probative.” S.Rep. at 29 n. 115, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207 n. 115. Congress cautioned, however, against giving too much weight to the isolated instances of minority candidate success. Citing our decision in Zimmer , Congress noted that “the election of a few minority candidates does not ‘necessarily foreclose the possibility of dilution of the [minority] vote’ in violation of this section.” S.Rep. at 29 n. 115, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207 n. 115. If such isolated successes were allowed to foreclose a Section 2 claim, Congress continued, “the possibility exists that the majority citizens might evade the section[, for example,] by manipulating the election of a ‘safe’ minority candidate.” Id. 10

*752 Congress did not, however, clearly establish a reference point for measuring the success of minority candidates. One possibility is to measure the success of minority candidates by reference to the proportion of minorities in the local population. Another way in which to measure the success of minority candidates is to focus on their success rate by comparing the number of minority candidates who have won with the number of minority candidates who have lost. And finally, as a third way of gauging minority success, a court could compare the number of minorities elected with the “qualified applicant pool,” as is currently done with employment discrimination claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

In our view, both of the first two methods discussed above are relevant to the inquiry of minority candidate success. Measuring the success of minority candidates by referring to the proportion of minorities in the local population is supported by the language of Section 2. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (b). The method was also embraced by a majority of the Justices in Gingles. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 77 , 106 S.Ct. at 2780 (Brennan J., joined by White, J.) (finding that “persistent proportional representation” of minority voters in a multimember district precluded their vote dilution claim); id. at 104-05 , 106 S.Ct. at 2794 (O’Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in the judgment) (stating that “consistent and virtually proportional minority electoral success” is entitled to great weight in totality of circumstances analysis). The Senate Report provides support for relying on the success rate of minority candidates in determining the extent to which minorities have been elected. It specifically notes the probative value of “[t]he fact that no members of a minority group have been elected to office over an extended period of time____” S.Rep. at 29 n. 115, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207 n. 115 (emphasis added).

We have serious reservations about the relevance of the third, “qualified applicant pool” approach. Such an approach seems inconsistent with our “refusal to preclude vote dilution claims where few or no [minority] candidates have sought offices in the challenged electoral system.” Westwego I, 872 F.2d at 1209 n. 9. It would, in our view, “allow voting rights cases to be defeated at the outset by the very barriers to political participation that Congress has sought to remove.” Id. Indeed, it seems perverse to measure the success of minority candidates by referring to the pool of qualified minority candidates, when the paucity of qualified minority candidates “is a likely result of a racially discriminatory system.” McMillan v. Escambia County, 748 F.2d 1037, 1045 (11th Cir.1984). But see Southern Christian Leadership Conference of Alabama v. Evans, 785 F.Supp. 1469, 1476-77 (M.D.Ala.1992) (measuring success of minority candidates under “qualified applicant pool” standard).

h. Responsiveness of elected officials to particular needs of the minority group. An “additional factor” that in some cases has probative value in the totality of circumstances inquiry is “whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group.” S.Rep. at 29, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207. The Senate Report makes clear, however, that “[u]nresponsiveness is not an essential part” of a vote dilution claim. Id. at 29 n. 116, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207 n. 116. “Therefore, defendants’ proof of some responsiveness [does] not negate [a minority group’s] showing by other, more objective factors ... that minority voters nevertheless [are] shut out of equal access to the political process.” Id.; see Campos v. City of Bay-town, 840 F.2d 1240, 1250 (5th Cir.1988).

i. Tenuousness of the policy underlying the challenged practice. A second “additional factor” that is sometimes relevant to totality of circumstances analysis is “whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision’s use of [the challenged] voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or *753 procedure is tenuous. S.Rep. at 29, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207. The tenuousness of the policy underlying the challenged practice, although less important under the “results test” embodied in Section 2, is nonetheless relevant. See Marengo County, 731 F.2d at 1571 . Evidence of a tenuous underlying state policy, which is circumstantial evidence that the practice or procedure was motivated by an intent to discriminate, may also indicate that the practice or procedure produces a discriminatory result. See id. Moreover, “the tenuousness of the justification for a state policy may indicate that the policy is unfair.” Id. (citation omitted); see also S.Rep. at 29 n. 117, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207 n. 117 (“If the [challenged] procedure markedly departs from past practice or from practice elsewhere in the jurisdiction, that bears on the fairness of its impact.”). The existence of a legitimate state policy underlying the challenged practice or procedure does not, however, preclude a finding of vote dilution. As noted in the Senate Report: “[E]ven a consistently applied practice premised on a racially neutral policy [does] not negate a plaintiff’s showing through other factors that the challenged practice denies minorities fair access to the process.” S.Rep. at 29 n. 117, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207 n. 117.

2. Other Relevant Factors, Including Racial Animus in the Electorate

The list of relevant factors in the Senate Report is not exclusive. The Senate Report specifically states that, while the nine “enumerated factors will often be the most relevant ones, in some cases other factors will be indicative of the alleged dilution.” S.Rep. at 29, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207. The report also instructs courts to consider “the challenged election law or procedure, in the context of the total circumstances of the local electoral process.” See id. at 16, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 193 (emphasis added). As we stated in Westwego III, “other factors may be relevant” under the totality of circumstances inquiry. 946 F.2d at 1120 .

In determining whether a factor not expressly mentioned in the Senate Report is relevant for purposes of the totality of circumstances inquiry, courts should be mindful of Justice O’Connor’s admonition in Gingles to avoid arbitrary rules that prevent “consideration of all evidence concerning voting preferences other than statistical evidence of racial voting patterns.” 478 U.S. at 101 , 106 S.Ct. at 2792 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Courts should also remember that the totality of circumstances inquiry is expansive and requires a “searching practical evaluation of the ‘past and present reality.’ ” S.Rep. at 30, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 208 (quoting White v. Reges ter ) (emphasis added). Finally, courts should determine whether the particular factor being advanced as relevant under the totality of circumstances inquiry is probative of the ultimate vote dilution inquiry. See infra Part II.C.

The State Defendants, Judge Wood, and Judge Entz argue that, under these principles, the presence or absence of racial animus in the electorate must be relevant to the totality of circumstances inquiry. We agree and accordingly hold that racial animus in the electorate is an “other factor” that is relevant to the totality of circumstances inquiry. After all, as Justice O’Connor recognized in her Gingles concurrence, the Senate Report accompanying the amendment to Section 2 repeatedly emphasizes the- relevance of “racial politics” and “racial political considerations” to the vote dilution inquiry. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 101 , 106 S.Ct. at 2792 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing S.Rep. at 33-34, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 210-212). Moreover, by listing the presence of racial campaign appeals as a relevant factor in the totality of circumstances inquiry, Congress has already instructed courts to consider, at least in a limited fashion, whether racial politics are a part of the local political landscape.

The presence of racial animus in the electorate may be a signal of vote dilution. Indeed, like the presence of racial campaign appeals, racial animus in the electorate “can be very significant if it is present.” Marengo, 731 F.2d at 1571 . Where white voters are motivated by racial animus, minority voters are not only likely to be prevented from electing representatives *754 of their choice, but they are also likely to be unable to influence the representatives who are elected. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 100-01 , 106 S.Ct. at 2792 (O’Connor, J., concurring). In addition, the presence of racial animus in the electorate makes it substantially more likely that an election practice with the potential to dilute minority voting strength is in fact operating to dilute minority voting strength.

The absence of racial animus in the electorate, however, like the absence of racial campaign appeals, “should not weigh heavily against a plaintiff proceeding under the results test of [S]ection 2.” Marengo, 731 F.2d at 1571 . The limited relevance of the absence of racial animus is mandated by two considerations. The first is the nature of racial animus as a subjective rather than an objective factor pointing toward vote dilution. In the Senate Report accompanying the amended Section 2, Congress expressed a preference for objective rather than subjective indicators of vote dilution. See, e.g., S.Rep. at 27, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 204. Placing great weight on the absence of racial animus in the electorate would, in our view, be contrary to congressional intent. The second consideration mandating that little weight be accorded to the absence of this factor is the problem of proving the existence of racial animus in the electorate. As Judge Wisdom has recognized, because overt political racism has decreased over time, racial animus in the electorate may be difficult, if not impossible, to detect. See Marengo, 731 F.2d at 1571 . Anecdotal testimony to the effect that voters are pure of heart, by its very nature, will not bear much weight. Moreover, as the experts in this case admitted, see infra Part IV.B.3.a.(iii), there are inordinate difficulties in using statistical analyses to explain why voters vote for or against certain candidates. One expert, on whom the State Defendants placed heavy reliance, testified that it would be impossible to use a multivariate analysis to account for the various factors that might influence voters’ decisions. See id.

Thus, racial animus in the electorate, like other factors in the totality of circumstances inquiry, is neither necessary nor dispositive. We reiterate that a plaintiff proceeding under Section 2 need not establish racial animus in the electorate to demonstrate minority political cohesiveness, legally significant white bloc voting, or racially polarized voting. Moreover, because racial animus in the electorate is not an essential element of a vote dilution claim, evidence suggesting the absence of racial animus cannot, by itself, defeat a vote dilution claim. 11

C. The Ultimate Inquiry: Unequal Opportunity to Participate on Account of Race or Color

In the end, the Gingles threshold inquiry and the expansive, totality of circumstances inquiry provide only guidance for answering the ultimate Section 2 inquiry: whether it has been shown “that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a [racial or language minority] in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (b). As the Senate Report accompanying the amended Section 2 cautions, courts should not become bogged down in “mechanical ‘point counting.’ ” S.Rep. at 29 n. 118, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207 n. 118. No one of the factors is dispositive, and the minority group need not prove a majority of the factors mentioned in the Senate Report. Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1120 . Rather, based on “the totality of circumstances and guided by those relevant factors in the particular case,” a court is required to make an overall judgment of “whether the voting strength of minority voters is ... ‘minimized or can *755 celed out.’ ” S.Rep. at 29 n. 118, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207 n. 118; see also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47 , 106 S.Ct. at 2764 (“The essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by [minority] and white voters to elect their preferred representatives.”).

The focus of the ultimate Section 2 inquiry is on minority voters’ unequal opportunity to participate in the electoral process on account of race or color. The factors that must be considered in both the Gingles and the totality of circumstances inquiries point to minority voters’ unequal opportunity to participate in the political process. Those factors also point to an unequal opportunity to participate on the basis of race or color. That is, to prevail under Section 2, a minority group has the burden to demonstrate (1) that, because of the challenged scheme or practice, its members are unable to fully participate in the political process and (2) that their inability to participate is tied to race or color. The framework set forth by the Supreme Court in Gingles and by Congress in the Senate Report is the only means through which a minority group meets this burden.

By framing the ultimate vote dilution inquiry in terms of whether the minority group has demonstrated an unequal opportunity to participate in the political process that is tied to race or color, we give effect to Congress' intent in amending Section 2. The language of Section 2, as well as the Senate Report accompanying the amendment of that section, indicate that Congress was concerned with minority groups having an unequal opportunity to participate in the political process. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (b) (violation established if minority group has "less opportunity" to participate in the political process under the totality of circumstances); S.REP. at 27, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 205 (violation established if minority group demonstrates under totality of circumstances that, because of the challenged practice, its members are being "denied equal access to the political process"); S.REP. at 30, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207 (ultimate question is whether the political processes are "equally open" to minority candidates). The language of Section 2 also indicates that Congress was concerned with voting practices resulting in an unequal opportunity to participate that is linked to race or color. By prohibiting only election procedures that result "in a denial or abridgment of the right ... to vote on account of race or color...." 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (a) (emphasis added), Congress expressed its intent that the minority group's unequal opportunity be tied to race or color. See also Chisom v. Roemer, — U.S. —, —, 111 S.Ct. 2354, 2363 , 115 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991) ("Now plaintiffs can prevail under § 2 by demonstrating that a challenged election practice has resulted in the denial or abridgement of the right to vote based on color or race.") (emphasis added).

To show that an at-large election scheme results in an unequal opportunity to participate in the political process on account of race or color, however, a minority group need not demonstrate current racial animus in the electorate. See S.Rep. at 28 n. 109, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 205 n. 109 (“[I]t is patently clear that Congress has used the words ‘on account of race or color’ in the Act to mean ‘with respect to’ race or color, and not to connote any required purpose of racial discrimination.”). Rather, the minority group may, by demonstrating some mix of factors under the totality of the circumstances—such as the existence of racially polarized voting, racial campaign appeals, a history of official discrimination, the lingering socioeconomic effects of discrimination, and other features of the current or past racial climate—raise an inference that their unequal opportunity to participate is linked to race or color. In short, members of a minority group seeking relief may satisfy the ultimate vote dilution inquiry by offering circumstantial evidence that racial discrimination is responsible for their unequal opportunity to participate in the political process.

III. THE PROPOSED BALANCING FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING SECTION 2 VOTE DILUTION CLAIMS

The State Defendants, as well as Judge Wood and Judge Entz, argue that the ana *756 lytical framework set forth in Part II of this opinion is incomplete. Specifically, they argue that the Gingles inquiry, the totality of circumstances inquiry, and the ultimate vote dilution inquiry fail to adequately take into account Texas’ asserted interests in maintaining its current method of electing district court judges. Thus, they propose a balancing framework for analyzing Section 2 vote dilution claims—a framework in which a court would be required to weigh the extent of proven vote dilution, as established by the factors set forth in Part II of this opinion, against the magnitude of the state’s asserted interests in the election scheme or practice.

A. The Accepted Role of State Interests in Section 2 Analysis

All parties concede that the state interests underlying an allegedly dilutive election practice are relevant to Section 2 analysis in two ways. First, as discussed above, see supra Part II.B.1.i., a state's interests in the challenged election practice may be relevant in the totality of circumstances inquiry. The district court may consider as an "additional factor" whether the state policies underlying the challenged practice are tenuous. See S.REP. at 29, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 206. Second, a state's interests in the challenged practice must be taken into account during the remedial phase of a vote dilution lawsuit. In Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 160-61 , 91 S.Ct. 1858, 1878 , 29 L.Ed.2d 363 (1971), the Supreme Court held that the district court may not "broadly brush[] aside state apportionment policy" when remedying an allegedly dilutive electoral mechanism. Instead, when choosing among remedial plans or fashioning one of its own, the district court must honor state policies and intrude on those policies only to the extent necessary. See Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 40-42 , 102 S.Ct. 1518, 1520-1521 , 71 L.Ed.2d 725 (1982); White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795 , 93 S.Ct. 2348, 2355 , 37 L.Ed.2d 335 (1973); see also United States v. Dallas County Comm'n, 850 F.2d 1430 , 1432 (11th Cir.1988) ("[W]hen devising election plans, federal courts should defer to state legislative policy and modify the state's plan only to the extent necessary to cure statutory or constitutional defects."), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1030 , 109 S.Ct. 1768 , 104 L.Ed.2d 203 (1989).

B. The Proposed Role for State Interests in Section 2 Analysis

The State Defendants, Judge Wood, and Judge Entz propose a new role for state interests in Section 2 analysis. Although the details for their proposals are different, all the proposals have one thing in common. Under each of the proposals, state interests in an underlying election scheme would have to be weighed against proven vote dilution before a Section 2 violation could be found.

Judge Wood proposes a three-step balancing framework. Under her framework a court would first be required, “[i]n each vote dilution case, [to] separately determine the existence and severity of vote dilution.” Judge Wood’s Brief on Remand at 29. The court would then be required to separately “assess the state interests that would be affected.” Id. Finally, the court would have to “balance the severity of the dilution against the intrusion on state interests necessary to cure it to determine if a remediable violation of § 2 exists under the totality of the circumstances.” Id. If the state interests outweighed the severity of the dilution, then there would be no violation of Section 2.

The balancing framework proposed by Judge Entz is somewhat more complex. Under his proposed framework, the minority group would first have to satisfy the Gingles threshold inquiry. Once the minority group did so, the court would then have to consider whether the state interests are legally compelling—that is, (1) whether they relate to a central aspect of state sovereignty, and (2) whether tampering with them would result in undue federal entanglement with the operations of state government. If the state interests were compelling, they would “prevent a section 2 violation.” Judge Entz’s Brief on Remand at 9. If the state interests were not legally compelling, the district court would still be required to weigh the state *757 interests in the challenged practice, “along with all other factors ... to determine whether the [minority group] proved dilution by clear and convincing evidence.” Id.

Although similar to the framework proposed by Judge Entz, the framework proposed by the State Defendants is yet a third version of the balancing framework. Under this proposal, the district court would first, before inquiring into any alleged vote dilution, ascertain whether the challenged election procedure is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. If this Fourteenth Amendment strict scrutiny standard were satisfied, the State Defendants argue, the state interest would be “sufficiently strong to outweigh as a matter of law the other elements in the totality of the circumstances____” State Defendants’ Brief on Remand at 21. If the strict scrutiny standard were not satisfied, then, under the State Defendants’ proposal, the district court would still be required to engage in some kind of weighing: The plaintiffs would have to set forth facts to satisfy the Gingles inquiry. The burden would then “shift to the state to produce evidence of its interests in the maintenance of the system and the non-discriminatory reasons for retaining the system.” Id. at 24. And finally, if the state met its shifting burden, the plaintiffs would have to prove their vote dilution case by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 24-25.

C. Problems with the Proposed Balancing Framework

In evaluating the appropriateness of balancing state interests against proven vote dilution under Section 2 analysis, we discover two problems. The first problem is that the proposed balancing framework may not be grounded in law. The second is that the proposed balancing framework appears to unnecessarily complicate an already complex analysis. Although both of these problems call into question the appropriateness of the proposed balancing framework, we ultimately need not decide whether such a framework is required in this case.

1. The Legal Problem

The proposed balancing framework may be grounded in law in one of several ways. First, in amending Section 2 and providing for a totality of circumstances analysis, Congress may have expressly intended for courts to balance the “total circumstances” pointing toward vote dilution against the state’s asserted interests in the challenged election practice. Second, even if Congress did not expressly intend to provide for a balancing framework, constitutionally-rooted federalism principles may nonetheless require such a framework. Or finally, the Supreme Court may have erected a balancing framework when it remanded this case to us in Houston Lawyers’ Association v. Attorney General of Texas, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 2376 , 115 L.Ed.2d 379 (1991).

a. Congressional intent. Before addressing any constitutional concerns, we first ask whether Congress demonstrably intended for state interests to be balanced against proven vote dilution before finding a violation of Section 2. If Congress expressed an intent that courts should use a balancing framework in analyzing vote dilution claims, we are undoubtedly bound by that intent. Of course, in discerning congressional intent, we apply the traditional tools of statutory construction, looking first to the language of Section 2 and then to the legislative history if the language of the statute is ambiguous. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 , 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1548 , 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984).

Our inquiry necessarily begins with the language of Section 2. On its face, Section 2 does not allow a state to defeat proof of vote dilution by showing that it has a good reason for maintaining the challenged electoral practice. It provides, in absolute terms, that a violation is established if, “based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members [of a racial or language minority]____” 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (b). It makes no exceptions.

The Senate Report accompanying the amendment of Section 2 speaks in similarly *758 absolute terms. The report states: “If as a result of the challenged practice or structure plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity to participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of their choice, there is a violation cf. this section.” S.Rep. at 28, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 206 (emphasis added). It does not make an exception for election practices or structures that are justified by strong or compelling state interests. And, although the Senate Report allows courts to consider whether the state interests underlying the challenged procedure are tenuous, this consideration is qualitatively different from balancing state interests against proven vote dilution. Moreover, Congress emphasized that “even a consistently applied practice premised on a racially neutral policy would not negate a plaintiff’s showing through other factors that the challenged practice denies minorities fair access to the process.” Id. at 29 n. 117, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207 n. 117. Thus, the Senate Report, like the language of Section 2 itself, appears inconsistent with the balancing framework proposed in this case.

b. Federalism principles. The State Defendants, Judge Wood, and Judge Entz argue that, even if Congress did not expressly intend for courts to employ a balancing framework under Section 2, federalism principles nonetheless require us to construe Section 2 to allow for such an approach. Relying primarily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Gregory v. Ashcroft, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 2395 , 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991), they argue that we should employ a plain statement rule of statutory construction. In particular, they argue that we should construe Section 2 to require a balancing framework unless Congress has unmistakably indicated its intent to upset the usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers.

In Gregory , the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the mandatory retirement provision for state judges in the Missouri Constitution violated the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 . See — U.S. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 2398. The ADEA prohibits any employer, including state employers, from discharging an employee who is at least 40 years old because of such individual’s age. 29 U.S.C. § 630 (b)(2). The definition of “employee” under the ADEA, however, excludes all elected and most high-ranking government officials. See 29 U.S.C. § 630 (f). The crucial question in Gregory thus became whether state judges, who are appointed by. the Governor of Missouri and thereafter subject to retention elections, were “employees” within the meaning of the ADEA. — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. at 2403.

In order to avoid potential constitutional problems, the Court in Gregory applied a “plain statement” rule of statutory construction, requiring Congress to unmistakably express its intention to alter the usual constitutional balance between the states and the federal government. Because Congress did not plainly express its intent to include appointed state judges within the terms of the ADEA, the Court held that such judges were not covered. — U.S. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 2404. The Court reasoned that it “would not read the ADEA to cover state judges unless Congress has made it clear that judges are included.” Id. (emphasis in original).

The Court’s application of the plain statement rule in Gregory rested on two concerns. The first was the nature of the state interest involved. The Court emphasized that the Missouri constitutional provision was not just “an area traditionally regulated by the States, [but] a decision of the most fundamental sort for a sovereign entity.” — U.S. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 2400. According to the Court, “the authority of the people of the States to determine the qualifications of their most important government officials ... lies at ‘the heart of representative government.’ ” Id. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 2402. The second concern was the nature of the power being exercised by Congress under the ADEA. Although there was some argument that Congress acted pursuant to its enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment in passing the ADEA, the Court in Gregory ultimately concluded that Congress had acted only pursuant to its Commerce Clause pow *759 ers. See id. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 2404-06. The Court thus expressed its rationale for applying the plain statement rule when it said: “As against Congress’ powers ‘[t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several States,’ U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, the authority of the people of the States to determine the qualifications of their government may be inviolate.” Id. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 2402-03.

The concerns underlying the Court’s application of the plain statement rule in Gregory do not, in our view, exist in this case. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not impinge on the authority of the states to set qualifications for their elected officials. Rather, by its terms, Section 2 only impinges on the authority of states to employ certain election practices—namely, those which result in a denial or abridgment of the right to vote on account of race. Furthermore, it is clear that, when Congress amended Section 2, it was acting pursuant to its enforcement powers under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Congress specifically concluded that, “to enforce fully the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, it is necessary that Section 2 ban election procedures and practices that result in a denial or abridgment of the right to vote.” S.Rep. at 40, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 218 (emphasis added).

Moreover, even if we were to apply the plain statement rule in determining whether Section 2 provides for the balancing of state interests against proven vote dilution, we would be inclined to hold that Congress plainly intended that no such balancing should occur. 12 After all, as previously discussed, Congress has indicated in the Senate Report accompanying the amended Section 2 that even if the challenged election procedure is consistently applied and premised on a racially neutral policy, such proof does “not negate a plaintiff’s showing through other factors that the challenged practice denies minorities fair access to the [political] process.” S.Rep. at 29 n. 117, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207 n. 117. Along the same lines, the Senate Report further notes that the failure to prove that the state’s interests are tenuous “is not rebuttal evidence of non-dilution.” Id. at 29 n. 118, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207 n. 118. Finally, after carefully considering Congress’ primary purpose in amending Section 2, we believe that examining a state’s motives beyond the limited inquiry into tenuousness would be inconsistent with that purpose. Congress has indicated that, when a plaintiff proceeds under the “results test” of Section 2, the court should “assess the impact of the challenged structure or practice on the basis of objective factors, rather than making a determination about the motivations which lay behind its adoption or maintenance.” S.Rep. at 27, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 205.

Nor are we prepared to hold, as Judge Entz would have us do, that Congress' failure to provide for a balancing of state interests against proven vote dilution ren *760 ders Section 2 unconstitutional. 13 In Mississippi Republican Executive Committee v. Brooks, 469 U.S. 1002 , 105 S.Ct. 416 , 83 L.Ed.2d 343 (1984), the Supreme Court summarily rejected the argument that Section 2, "if construed to prohibit anything other than intentional discrimination on the basis of race in registration and voting, exceeds the power vested in Congress by the Fifteenth Amendment." Id. at 1003 , 105 S.Ct. at 416 . We have similarly rejected a broad challenge to Congress' power to amend Section 2 and prohibit election practices that produce discriminatory results. In Jones v. City of Lubbock, 727 F.2d 364, 373 (5th Cir.1984), we stated that "Congressional power to adopt prophylactic measures to vindicate the purposes of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments is unquestioned." We noted that Congress did not lightly interfere with state and municipal self-governance. Id. at 374 n. 5. Instead, we found that, in light of the legislative fact-finding accompanying the amendment and the limited nature of the intrusion into state and municipal self-determination, Congress had not offended any other provision of the Constitution. Id.; see also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173-75 , 100 S.Ct. 1548, 1559-1560 , 64 L.Ed.2d 119 (1980); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 , 86 S.Ct. 803, 822 , 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966). But see Chisom v. Roemer, — U.S. —, —, 111 S.Ct. 2354, 2376 , 115 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (clarifying that the Court was not addressing the constitutional validity of Section 2).

We recognize that in Gregory the Court indicated that "the Fourteenth Amendment does not override all principles of federalism." — U.S. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 2405. The Court noted, however, "that the principles of federalism that constrain Congress' exercise of its Commerce Clause powers are attenuated when Congress acts pursuant to its powers to enforce the Civil War Amendments." Id. The reason federalism principles are attenuated in this context, the Court explained, "is because those `Amendments were specifically designed as an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state sovereignty.'" Id. (quoting City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 179 , 100 S.Ct. at 1563 ). Thus, although Congress may not act to enforce the Civil Rights Amendments "in complete disregard of" the powers retained by the states, Gregory , — U.S. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 2405, concerns of federalism must not be allowed to emasculate Congress' power to adopt prophylactic measures to vindicate the purposes of those Amendments.

c. The Supreme Court’s decision in Houston Lawyers’ Association. Were it not for isolated passages in the Supreme Court’s decision in this case, we would likely conclude that the proposed balancing framework is not grounded in law. However, when the Supreme Court held that Section 2 applies to the election of state district court judges in Houston Lawyers’ Association , it also used language suggesting that state interests might have to be balanced against proven vote dilution. Relying on the Court’s suggestions, the State Defendants, Judge Wood, and Judge Entz argue that state interests must be balanced against proven vote dilution.

There are two passages in the Court’s opinion in Houston Lawyers’ Association that provide support for the proposed balancing framework. The first one reads as follows:

Even if we assume, arguendo, that the State’s interest in electing judges on a district-wide basis may preclude a remedy that involves redrawing boundaries or subdividing districts, or may even pre *761 elude a finding that vote dilution has occurred under the “totality of the circumstances” in a particular case, that interest does not justify excluding elections for single-member offices from the coverage of the § 2 results test. Rather, such a state interest is a factor to be considered by the court in evaluating whether the evidence in a particular case supports a finding of a vote dilution violation in an election for a single-member office.

— U.S. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 2380-81 (emphasis added). In the second such passage, which follows the Court’s rejection of the argument that “the ‘single-member office’ theory automatically exempts certain elections from the coverage of § 2,” the Court states:

Rather, we believe that the State's interest in maintaining an electoral system — in this case, Texas' interest in maintaining the link between a district judge's jurisdiction and the area of residency of his or her voters — is a legitimate factor to be considered by courts among the totality of circumstances in determining whether a § 2 violation has occurred. A State's justification for its electoral system is a proper factor for the courts to assess in a racial vote dilution inquiry, and the Fifth Circuit has expressly approved the use of this particular factor in the balance of considerations. See Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (CA5 1973), aff'd sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 , 96 S.Ct. 1083 , 47 L.Ed.2d 296 (1976). Because the State's interest in maintaining an at-large, district-wide electoral scheme for single-member offices is merely one factor to be considered in evaluation the totality of the circumstances, that interest does not automatically, and in every case, outweigh proof of racial vote dilution.

Id. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 2381 (emphasis in original and emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). In both of these passages, the underscored language suggests that courts should balance state interests against proven vote dilution.

Other parts of the Court’s opinion in Houston Lawyers’ Association suggest that the Court was not substituting a new balancing framework for the one set forth in Section 2. Initially, the Court stated that it granted certiorari “for the limited purpose of considering the scope of the coverage of § 2.” — U.S. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 2380. The Court focused specifically on whether judicial elections are subject to Section 2, and its narrow holding was: “If a State decides to elect its trial judges, as Texas did in 1861, those elections must be conducted in compliance with the Voting Rights Act.” Id. In addition, before the Court made any statement suggesting that balancing of state interests might be required, it stated that it was “deliberately avoidpng] any evaluation” of the state interest arguments made by Judge Higginbotham in his concurrence below. Id. Such matters, the Court continued, “are relevant either to an analysis of the totality of the circumstances that must be considered in an application of the results test embodied in § 2, as amended, or to a consideration of possible remedies in the event a violation is proved, but not to the threshold question of the Act’s coverage.” Id. (emphasis added).

Further, in the second passage (quoted above) relied on to support a balancing framework, the Court begins by recognizing that the state interest in maintaining an electoral system is “a legitimate factor to be considered by courts among the ‘totality of circumstances’ in determining whether a § 2 violation has occurred.” Id. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 2381 (emphasis added). The Court then notes that this court “has expressly approved the use of this particular factor in the balance of consideration^]” and cites our opinion in Zimmer, 485 F.2d at 1305 , which formed the basis for the treatment of state interests in the Senate Report. The inquiry into state interests in the Senate Report is limited to an inquiry into whether the state interest is tenuous, and if so, it is a factor supporting a finding of dilution. This reference to Zimmer , in our view, suggests that the Court did not *762 intend to substitute a balancing framework. 14

That the Court in Houston Lawyers’ Association did not mean to substitute a balancing framework is further supported by what is absent from the Court’s opinion. The Court’s decision does not mention, much less discuss, either the Senate Report or Thornburg v. Gingles. We question whether the Court would alter the Section 2 framework without reference to either of these authorities. Nor does the Court’s decision indicate why such a balancing framework would be required. There is no discussion in Houston Lawyers’ Association of congressional intent or of federalism principles. The absence of such a discussion, in our view, suggests that the Court did not mean to require courts to balance state interests against proven vote dilution.

Also, in Chisom v. Roemer, decided the same day as Houston Lawyers’ Association , the Court expressly disavowed any intention to alter or amend the elements of a vote dilution claim. The Court stated that it was not addressing “any question concerning the elements that must be proved to establish a violation of the [Voting Rights] Act or the remedy that might be appropriate to redress a violation if proved.” Id. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 2361. It is difficult to believe that the Supreme Court would issue one opinion expressly disavowing any intention to alter the elements of a Section 2 claim, and on the same day issue another opinion which, sub silentio, recasts the elements of such a claim.

Finally, prior to Houston Lawyers' Association , the Supreme Court has on several occasions rejected the argument that state interests may preclude relief from an election scheme violating federal law. In Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 , 93 S.Ct. 979 , 35 L.Ed.2d 320 , modified, 411 U.S. 922 , 93 S.Ct. 1475 , 36 L.Ed.2d 316 (1973), which involved a challenge to the apportionment plan for the Virginia legislature, the Court rejected the state's argument that its interest in drawing legislative districts to conform to county and city boundaries justified some population deviation between districts. Then-Justice Rehnquist wrote for *763 the Court that "a State's policy urged in justification of disparity in district population, however rational, cannot constitutionally be permitted to emasculate the goal of substantial equality." Id. 410 U.S. at 326 , 93 S.Ct. at 986. The Court rejected a similar argument in White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 , 93 S.Ct. 2348 , 37 L.Ed.2d 335 (1973). In White, the State of Texas defended its congressional reapportionment plan on the ground that it had an interest in preserving the relationships between incumbent legislators and their constituents. Id. at 791, 93 S.Ct. at 2352. While the Court did not "disparage this interest," it held that district courts should defer to state policy "only where that policy is consistent with constitutional norms and is not itself vulnerable to legal challenge." Id. at 791, 797, 93 S.Ct. at 2353, 2355.

Accordingly, we conclude that Houston Lawyers’ Association is, at best, ambiguous about the proper role of evidence regarding state interests in Section 2 analysis. The passages relied on by the State Defendants, Judge Wood, and Judge Entz suggest that state interests may be relevant in determining whether there is a violation of Section 2. And, in at least one of those passages, the Court uses language suggesting that state interests might have to be balanced against proven vote dilution. In the same breath, however, the Court (1) emphasizes the limited scope of its holding, (2) refuses to address Judge Higginbotham’s concurring opinion regarding the importance of state interests, and (3) notes that it is appropriate to consider state interests when imposing a remedy for a Section 2 violation. Given this ambiguity, we cannot say that the proposed balancing framework is wholly unsupported by the law.

2. The Practical Problem

Section 2 demands a great deal from district courts. They must “consider the totality of the circumstances and ... determine, based upon a searching practical evaluation of the past and present reality, whether the political process is equally open to minority voters.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 79 , 106 S.Ct. at 2781 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “This determination is peculiarly dependent on the facts of each case, and requires an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of the contested electoral mechanisms.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, because Section 2 cases require, close analysis of “extraordinarily fact-oriented issuesf,]” we have held that, under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court is “required to discuss all the substantial evidence contrary to its opinion.” Velasquez v. City of Abilene, 725 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir.1984).

The balancing framework possibly suggested in Houston Lawyers’ Association would further complicate this already complex undertaking. Because the state interests would not be a signal of dilution like the other Section 2 factors (including the tenuousness of the state interests), a court analyzing a Section 2 claim under the proposed balancing framework would no longer ask only whether, under the totality of the circumstances, there is an unequal opportunity to participate in the political process. The court would also ask whether, in light of the state interests, the unequal opportunity to participate is sufficiently unequal to support a finding of liability under Section 2. In other words, the state interests would have to be weighed against proven vote dilution. See Houston Lawyers’ Association, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. at 2381. The problem with such a framework, from a district court’s perspective, is the lack of standards for such an approach. Neither the Supreme Court’s decision in Houston Lawyers’ Association nor Section 2 provides any guidance for determining whether the state interests are substantial enough—or whether the proof of vote dilution is insubstantial enough—to excuse the state from Section 2 liability.

The proposed balancing framework becomes even more complicated when we consider the number of state interests and the possible remedies that might be implicated in any case. Although state election schemes generally embody several state policy choices, see, e.g., infra Part III.D.l., *764 the only state interests threatened in a Section 2 case are those that would be trammeled by a proposed remedy. Thus, the only way to identify the threatened state interests would be to identify a remedy. This difficulty in identifying the threatened state interests is not present in the non-balancing framework described in Part II, where a court must only ask whether the state interest is tenuous. The proposed balancing framework, on the other hand, would apparently require a district court to assess the potential damage to each of the various state interests during the liability phase of a Section 2 case, before the need for a remedy has been absolutely determined. In short, a district court would have to weigh, against a showing of minority vote dilution, each of the state interests, as that interest is affected by each of the possible remedies. Such a complicated balancing act would be required, because it is the only way to fairly assess the strength of the asserted state interests.

3. Summation

In sum, although there are legal and practical problems with the proposed balancing framework, we need not decide whether such a framework is required in this case. After a careful review of the state interests asserted in this case, see infra Part III.D., we conclude that even if Houston Lawyers’ Association were read to require courts to balance state interests against proven vote dilution, the Plaintiffs in this case would still prevail in the eight counties in which they have demonstrated vote dilution under Section 2, see infra Part IV. Their evidence establishes substantial vote dilution in each of the eight counties, and as discussed below, the interests asserted by the state are little more than tenuous. Moreover, there are several potential remedies that could cure the proven vote dilution while simultaneously protecting the asserted state interests.

D. Applying the Proposed Balancing Framework in this Case: Evaluating Texas’ Asserted Interests

Before we can weigh the asserted state interests against proven vote dilution, see infra Part IV.C., we must evaluate Texas’ asserted interests. Our evaluation proceeds in three steps. First, we identify the threatened state interests. Second, we scrutinize those threatened state interests. And finally, we assign a weight to the threatened state interests.

1. Identifying the Threatened State Interests

In evaluating the state interests in a challenged election scheme, a court must first, as a matter of law, identify those interests that would be threatened by possible remedies. To identify state interests in an election scheme or practice, a court may -look to state statutes and constitutions. See White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795 , 93 S.Ct. 2348, 2355 , 37 L.Ed.2d 335 (1973) (in the context of legislative reapportionment, a federal court “should follow the policies and preferences of the State, as expressed in statutory and constitutional provisions or in the reapportionment plans proposed by the state legislature,” to the extent possible under federal law) (emphasis added). A court may also look to evidence introduced at trial. To identify the subset of state interests that are threatened by a finding of vote dilution, however, a court must consider all possible remedies. As discussed above, only the interests that are threatened by a proposed remedy need be considered under the proposed balancing framework.

Texas has various interests in the current method of electing district court judges. Among those expressed in the state statutes and constitution are the following: an interest in an elected judiciary; 15 an interest in partisan judicial elections; 16 an interest in a qualified judicia *765 ry; 17 an interest in having district judges reside in the district in which they serve; 18 and an interest in requiring judicial candidates to refrain from certain kinds of political activity. 19 Based on testimony and evidence at trial, the district court identified other state interests in Texas’ current scheme of electing district judges. These include: an interest in an electorate informed about the qualifications of candidates for district court judgeships; an interest in preserving the administrative advantages of at-large elections; an interest in allowing judges to specialize in areas like family law; a “linkage” interest in electing district judges from the area over which they have “primary jurisdiction”; and finally, an interest in preserving the function of the district court judge as a sole decision-maker. 20

Most of the interests listed above are not threatened by any of the possible remedies in this case. Neither subdistricting, cumulative voting, nor limited voting would threaten Texas’ asserted interests in having an elected and qualified judiciary or in having partisan judicial elections. Moreover, none of the possible remedies would threaten Texas’ interests in requiring that judges reside in the district in which they serve and refrain from certain forms of political activity. Finally, the state interest in an informed electorate would be enhanced by at least some of the proposed remedies and threatened by none of them.

Four of the interests listed above, however, appear to be threatened to some extent by some or all of the proposed remedies. Texas’ interest in preserving the administrative advantages of the current at-large election system is threatened to some extent by all of the possible remedies. Texas’ interest in allowing judges to specialize may also be threatened to a minimal degree, but only by a strict subdistricting remedial scheme. Texas’ linkage interest may also be threatened by a subdistricting remedy. Finally, we are told that Texas’ interest in preserving the fact and appearance of independence in district court judges—that is, in preserving the function of district court judges as sole decision-makers—is threatened by a subdistricting remedy.

2. Scrutinizing the Threatened State Interests

Having identified the interests asserted by Texas that would arguably be threatened by possible remedies, we now proceed to scrutinize those interests. It is not enough to evaluate the state interests as a matter of legal or political theory. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45 , 106 S.Ct. at 2764 (in Section 2 case, court must ground its analysis in "a searching practical evaluation of the past and present reality" of the community and its politics, and must take a "functional view of the political process") (quoting S.REP. at 30 & n. 120, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207 & n. 120). A court must also examine the practical realities of *766 the challenged election scheme to determine the strength of the asserted interest. See White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. at 796, 93 S.Ct. at 2355 (in deciding whether district court erred in choosing one of two apportionment plan options, an appellate court considers the impact of each plan on state apportionment policy); see also Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1123 (concluding, after scrutinizing district court's finding that at-large system was justified by concerns of administrative efficiency, that such a finding was no longer supported by the evidence because of a change in underlying state law). In addition, a court must determine whether the challenged election scheme "does in fact advance" the asserted state interests. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 329 , 93 S.Ct. 979, 987 , 35 L.Ed.2d 320 (emphasis added), modified, 411 U.S. 922 , 93 S.Ct. 1475 , 36 L.Ed.2d 316 (1973); see also id. 410 U.S. at 326 , 93 S.Ct. at 986 ("The inquiry ... [is] whether it can reasonably be said that the state policy urged ... is, indeed, furthered by the plan adopted by the legislature...."). Finally, in scrutinizing the asserted state interests, a court must determine whether any of the proposed remedies will serve the asserted state interests as well as the challenged election scheme. See White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. at 791-92, 93 S.Ct. at 2353 (refusing to decide whether state interest was sufficient to justify legislative apportionment plan, where another proposed plan served the state interest just as well).

The first two state interests that are threatened in this case—namely, Texas’ interests in preserving the administrative advantages of the current system and allowing judges to specialize—have received little attention in the parties’ briefs. This is because the third and fourth threatened state interests—Texas’ interest in “linking the jurisdictional base of district judges directly to the electoral base” and Texas’ interest in preserving the function of district court judges—have threatened to assume a larger than life role in this lawsuit. We scrutinize each of these interests in turn.

a. Texas’interest in preserving the administrative advantages of the current at-large system. As a practical matter, we can agree that any of the proposed remedies will result in Texas losing some administrative advantages of its current method of electing judges. We can also agree that maintenance of the current method of electing Texas district court judges does to a considerable extent further the state’s administrative interest. We note, however, that elevating Texas’ administrative interest in the liability phase of a Section 2 case to a dispositive position would be contrary to our decision in Westwego I, where we held that the district court should not consider the potential disruption of reorganizing an administrative structure in determining whether an at-large electoral system violates Section 2. 872 F.2d at 1211 . More importantly, however, it must be acknowledged that, in passing the 1985 constitutional amendment permitting the creation of judicial districts smaller than a county, see Tex. Const. art. V, § 7a(i), the Texas legislature and the voters considered the potential loss of administrative advantages and concluded that the advantages in such smaller districts outweighed any loss of administrative advantages under the current system. The voters have spoken to this issue.

b. Texas’ interest in allowing judges to specialize. Our scrutiny of Texas’ interest in allowing judges to specialize reveals one major weakness in this interest: Several of the proposed remedies would advance the interest just as well as the current election scheme. Under a cumulative voting scheme, for example, judges could still specialize. Voters would not be required to cast a vote for specialized judges, but would nonetheless have the opportunity to cast one or more of their votes for such judges. Moreover, a subdistricting remedy could also protect the interest in allowing judges to specialize. Under a flexible subdistricting remedy, specialized judges would not necessarily have to be elected from districts the same size as district court judges who do not specialize. And, if a subdistricting election scheme for a specialized judge could not be devised—e.g., if there were only one family law judge per *767 county—that judge could still be elected on a county-wide basis.

c. Texas’ linkage interest. As we have previously noted, the so-called “linkage interest”—Texas’ interest in linking the elective base of district judges to the area in which they exercise “primary jurisdiction”—has threatened to take on a life of its own in this litigation. The genesis of this interest, it appears, is the testimony of Chief Justice Thomas Phillips of the Texas Supreme Court. At trial, in response to a question asking him whether “it is a good idea to require at least county-wide elections” for district court races, Chief Justice Phillips testified that, in his view, such a requirement was a good idea. In explaining his answer, Chief Justice Phillips stated:

In my opinion, the district judge should not be responsible to the voters over an area that is smaller than that area in which the district judge exercises primary jurisdiction. If we wanted to go to a system where the judge had primary venue responsibility over an area smaller than the county, I don’t know that I would have any objection to electing judges from [an area] smaller than a county. And our Justices of the Peace do ordinarily have jurisdiction primarily over a portion of the county, but as long as we are going to elect judges, as long as judges are going to be responsible for all the cases in the county and are going to exercise that kind of power and authority over persons[’] lives and as long as they are going to be responsible to the voters, I believe they should be responsible to all the voters of the county, or a multi-county district.

In this somewhat conflicting testimony, the so-called linkage interest was born.

Although Chief Justice Phillips first uses the phrase "primary jurisdiction," 21 it becomes clear that what he was attempting to describe was two-fold: first, a judge's elective base, and second, a judge's "primary venue responsibility." Thus, although the State Defendants repeatedly speak of the state's interest in terms of "linking the jurisdictional base of district judges directly to the electoral base," it is really only the district court's venue that has any link to its electoral base. The terms "jurisdiction" and "venue" are not synonymous under Texas law. See State v. Pounds, 525 S.W.2d 547, 550 (Tex.Civ. App. — Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Jurisdiction "is the power of the court to decide a controversy between parties and to render and enforce a judgment with respect thereto...." Id. In Texas, district courts have general, statewide jurisdiction — that is, they have the power to hear any case that may be filed in the state of Texas. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8 (district courts have jurisdiction of all actions and proceedings except where jurisdiction is conferred on another court or tribunal by the Texas Constitution or by statute). Moreover, a district court's order is effective throughout the state. Venue, on the other hand, "is the proper place where [a court's] power [to decide a specific controversy] is exercised." Pounds, 525 S.W.2d at 550 . It concerns the propriety of "prosecuting a suit involving a given subject matter and specific parties in a particular county." Jeter-Millar Co. v. Kasch Bros. Inc., 466 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex.Civ.App. — Eastland 1971, no writ). Thus, because all but one of the district judges in this case are elected from county-wide judicial districts, their elective base can only be linked — if it is linked at all — with venue, not jurisdiction. 22

Moreover, whatever link may have existed between a district judge’s elective base and venue disappeared in 1985. In that year, as we have seen, the state amended its constitutional provision tying a district judge to the county in which he or she was elected. Specifically, the Texas Constitu *768 tion now permits district judges to be elected from areas smaller than a county when a majority of the voters in such a county approve of such an election scheme. See Tex. Const. art. V, §§ 7, 7a(i). 23

The Texas legislature has also weakened the ties between district court judges and the counties which elect them by establishing a mechanism by which district judges can be compelled to periodically sit in other counties. The state of Texas is divided into nine administrative judicial regions, the smallest of which consists of eleven counties. See Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. § 74.042 (Vernon 1988). The presiding judge of each region may assign judges within the region “to hold special or regular terms of court in any county of the administrative region to try cases and dispose of accumulated business.” Id. § 74.056(a). The presiding judge of an administrative region may further “request the presiding judge of another administrative region to furnish judges” to aid in the disposition of litigation. Id. § 74.056(b). A judge assigned to sit in another county under these provisions “has all the powers of the judge of the court to which he is assigned.” Id. § 74.059(a). Texas also makes widespread use of retired judges, who are assigned across administrative region lines. See id. § 75.002. In view of these provisions, it is simply not possible to conclude that Texas insists on tying its district judges to the counties in which they are elected. 24

Texas' interest in linking district judges' elective base to the respective areas in which they have venue is further weakened by the operation of the state's venue rules. The Texas venue rules have not been drafted to insure that parties appear before judges for whom they have had an opportunity to vote. Instead, the venue rules for lawsuits involving living persons — including the general venue rule, 25 the mandatory venue exceptions, 26 and the permissive venue exceptions 27 — "were, in the main, manifestly adopted to prevent serious inconveniences and probable injury to defendants ...." Snyder v. Pitts, 150 Tex. 407 , 241 S.W.2d 136, 142 (1951). Nor do the Texas venue rules operate evenly. When someone who fears being hailed into court as a defendant files an action under Texas' Declaratory Judgment Act, the action will *769 be "subject to the general venue rule and its ... exceptions." Bracewell v. Fair, 638 S.W.2d 612, 613 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ). There is no mechanism under Texas' venue rules, it appears, for piercing the form of the lawsuit. See Charles T. Frazier, Jr., Note, Venue Procedure in Texas: An Analysis of the 1983 Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure Governing Venue Practice Under the New Venue Statute, 36 BAYLOR L.Rev. 241, 260 (1984) (recognizing that, under the current Texas venue rules, a party who anticipates being sued may "capture" venue by filing suit first).

The operation of Texas’ venue rules suggests that these rules have not been developed to promote the accountability of judges to the litigants appearing before them. Put differently, Texas’ venue rules, like the venue rules in the federal courts and in the courts of other states, are not designed to foster judicial accountability. The most that can be said for the so-called “linkage interest” is that there may be some rough correlation—a loose link indeed—between a district court’s elective base and venue. Perhaps it simply comes down, as Justice Phillips candidly put it, to a “good idea.” 28

Finally, Texas’ asserted linkage interest is weakened by the availability of several remedies that could cure the dilution caused by the use of at-large elections while simultaneously protecting Texas’ linkage interest. For instance, a system of limited voting, in which each voter casts fewer votes than the total number of places to be filled, would allow Texas to continue to select its district judges through county-wide elections—and thereby preserve the “linkage interest”—while also giving minority voters a meaningful opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. See Sen. Gene Green, The Future of Judicial Selection in Texas: Election Methods, 55 Tex.B.J. 294, 295 (1992); Daniel R. Ortiz, Note, Alternative Voting Systems as Remedies for Unlawful At-Large Systems, 92 Yale L.J. 144 , 148-50 (1982). A system of cumulative voting, in which each voter is entitled to cast as'many votes as seats to be filled and to give her preferred candidate more than one voté, would also protect Texas’ “linkage interest.” See Green, supra, at 295; Note, supra, at 153-60.

In sum, our scrutiny of Texas’ asserted linkage interest reveals several substantial weaknesses in the interest. The first is Texas’ refusal to insist that judges in fact be elected from districts no smaller than a county. The second is Texas’ willingness to direct judges elected from one county to preside periodically over lawsuits filed in other counties. The third weakness arises from the uneven operation .of Texas’ venue rules, which do not ensure, even as a general matter, that parties will appear before a judge for whom they have had the opportunity to vote. And fourth, the strength of Texas’ linkage interest is weakened by the availability of remedies that will protect it.

d. Texas’ interest in preserving the function of district court judges as sole decision-makers. Texas maintains that, even if it does not consistently link a district court’s elective base with venue, it nonetheless has a distinct, compelling state interest in the function of the district court *770 judge as a sole decision-maker. The argument is essentially as follows: Although in any one county there may be more than one district judge with county-wide, overlapping jurisdiction, each district judge acts alone in wielding power. That is, “[bjefore any suits are filed, before any cases are assigned, there is a group of judges with concurrent jurisdiction----” League of United Latin Am. Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620 , 649 (5th Cir.1990) (en banc) (Higginbotham, J., concurring) (LULAC II). Once a case is assigned, however, “It is decided by only one judge. The other judges have absolutely no say over the disposition of that case, and no influence over the deciding judge.” Id. Thus, the district court judge in Texas is not a member of a multi-member body like a city council or even an appellate court that engages in collegial decision-making. Rather, the district court judge in Texas is charged with making his or her decision alone and with exercising exclusively the full authority of the office.

The current method of electing judges, we are told, is necessary to preserve the function of the district court as a sole decision-maker. Electing district judges from an area no smaller than a county ensures that district judges are responsive to all litigants equally and that no particular group will have undue influence over the decisions that must be made alone by the judge. Moreover, under the current method of electing district court judges, minorities can participate in all judicial elections in each county. This opportunity to participate, the argument continues, gives minority voters the opportunity to influence all elections.

A subdistricting remedy, it is argued, poses two threats to Texas’ interest in preserving the function of the district court judge as sole decision-maker. First, such a remedy would destroy the appearance if not the fact of independence and responsiveness to all. Said another way: if elected from a subdistrict, a district judge would be prevented from acting alone, or making his or her decisions independently, because the judge would be beholden to the particular racial group who elected him or her. Second, a subdistricting remedy—perversely—would disenfranchise minority voters, because they would no longer be able to influence the outcome of every district court election, but only a few. Such a remedy, the argument goes, makes it probable that a minority litigant would appear “before a judge who has little direct political interest in being responsive to minority concerns.” LULAC II, 914 F.2d at 650. We address each of these contentions in turn.

Certain parties have suggested on remand that; if minorities are given greater voting strength in district court elections, the function of district court judges as sole decision-makers will be destroyed. Judge Wood argues that the subdistricting remedy sought by the Plaintiffs runs “directly counter to the historical preference of the citizens of Texas for an elected judiciary in which each judge is accountable to each voter and independent from special interest groups.” Judge Wood’s Brief on Remand at 31. Judge Wood further suggests that increasing minority voters’ ability to sponsor and elect district court candidates of their choice from single member districts would serve no “purpose other than to provide [minority] role models,” role models who would apparently serve “specialized interests different from those served by Texas’ majority judges.” Id. at 29. Judge Entz makes similar suggestions. He argues that, under a subdistricting remedy, a trial judge would still be required to exercise his or her authority alone, but the authority, which would necessarily be “derived from voters representing only a fraction of the judge’s [current] electoral base,” would somehow be tainted. Judge Entz’s Brief on Remand at 16.

The argument that any proposed subdistricting remedy would destroy the district judge’s ability to act alone or independently is premised on two flawed assumptions. The first flawed assumption is that district judges elected from smaller election districts will not abide by their oaths. The Texas Code of Judicial Conduct charges judges with applying the law and states that an honorable judiciary separated from *771 the influence of others is “indispensable to justice in our society.” Tex.Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 1. The Code also stresses that “[a] judge should be unswayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism.” Id. Canon 3, pt. A(l). These directives, by which we must assume judges will abide, effectively negate any concern about a judge’s ability, even one elected from a subdistrict, to continue making his or her decisions alone. 29 The second flawed assumption is a more disturbing one. Underlying the argument that a subdistricting remedy would destroy a district judge’s ability to act independently is the following assumption: while district judges who are currently elected by white majorities in each of the counties at issue are responsive to the needs of all voters in the county—including minority voters—a judge who would be elected by minorities in a single-member district would be unresponsive to the current white majority. The flaw in this assumption being clear, we will not address it further.

More important, this argument has been implicitly rejected by the Texas legislature and Texas voters in 1985. By amending the Texas Constitution to allow for the election of district judges from an area smaller than a county, see Tex. Const. art. V, § 7a(i), the Texas legislature and Texas voters must have concluded that district judges who are elected from an area smaller than a county could continue to make their decisions alone and independently. In short, the voters have spoken to this concern.

The second contention raised by the parties in connection with the single-member office theory is that, because there is no share of district court judgeships, creating safe minority district court positions would disenfranchise minorities. Judge Entz argues that, under the current method of electing district court judges, voters of all races are permitted to influence every judicial election in the county. Judge Entz’s Brief on Remand at 17. An alternative system would, in Judge Entz’s view, “fix geographical and racial power and influence over judicial elections for all time— and actually limit the numbers of judicial benches possible for a growing minority population.” Id. According to Judge Wood, the subdistricting remedy sought by the Plaintiffs in this case would disenfranchise all the voters in each of the counties at issue, “thereby greatly decreasing minority voting power.” Judge Wood’s Brief on Remand at 31.

Again, the argument about the disastrous results of subdistricting is flawed. The argument that in subdistricting judicial positions, “[minority] voters will ... be sacrificing [an] extremely valuable political right—the right to vote for all of the judges who will be serving as judges in the [county] wherein they live,” see Southern Christian Leadership Conference of Alabama, 785 F.Supp. at 1478—smacks of paternalism. . It essentially tells minority voters in each of the target counties in this case that they must somehow be saved from themselves. In our view, it is not difficult to understand why minority voters would willingly “sacrifice” their ability to vote for all judges and elect none for the ability to vote for and elect a few judges. Indeed, Congress amended Section 2, at least in part, to allow minority voters to make such a sacrifice.

In sum, after scrutinizing Texas’ interest in preserving the function of district court judges as sole decision-makers, we con- *772 elude that this interest is not actually-threatened by any of the proposed remedies—including subdistricting. There is no evidence in this record suggesting that judges elected from smaller districts, or judges elected from districts in which minority voters constitute a majority, would be any less independent in deciding cases. Nor is there any evidence suggesting that judges elected from such districts would be any less sensitive to the diverse interests of the litigants than the judges who are currently elected from larger districts.

3. Assigning a Weight to the Threatened State Interests

Assuming that courts are required to apply a new balancing framework to Section 2 claims, we think that the weight assigned to any state interests is probably a question of law. 30 We note that, to a limited extent, the inquiry into the weight of the state interests is not novel. That is, from the beginning, vote dilution cases have focused on the tenuousness of the state interests. See, e.g., Cross v. Baxter, 604 F.2d 875, 878, 884 (5th Cir.1979); Zimmer, 485 F.2d at 1305, 1307 . District courts deciding these cases have assigned tenuous or non-tenuous weights to the various interests asserted by the affected jurisdictions. See, e.g., Canton Branch, NAACP v. City of Canton, 472 F.Supp. 859, 876 (S.D.Miss.1978). Appellate courts appear to have looked at the weight of the state interests afresh without deference to the district courts’ decisions. See, e.g., Zimmer, 485 F.2d at 1307 . In all cases, courts addressing the tenuous or non-tenuousness of the state interests have done so without explaining whether the decision is a question of law or fact. Given the legal sources that underlie the determination, we think that the strength of the state interests may be a legal question. But, in candor, we are not certain that it has made any difference what kind of a question it is. It is important, however, that the inquiry about the weight of a state interest, at least to the extent of determining whether it is tenuous, is a familiar question.

Even though the weight of Texas’ threatened interests may be a legal question which we could determine de novo, we find ourselves in agreement with much of what the district court had to say about Texas’ asserted interests. In particular, we agree with the district court that, while the threatened state interests underlying Texas’ current method of electing district judges are not tenuous, they are not compelling either. On the basis of our scrutiny of those interests, we conclude that Texas’ interests in (1) preserving the administrative advantages of the current at-large system, (2) allowing judges to specialize, (3) linking the elective base of district court judges with venue, and (4) preserving the function of district court judges are at best “legitimate state interests.” They are not, based on our review of Texas law and the practical realities of the Texas judicial system, compelling or substantial state interests. Accordingly, in any proposed balancing framework, they would be entitled to little weight.

IY. REVIEW OF THE DISTRICT COURT’S SECTION 2 LIABILITY FINDINGS

Having set forth the analytical framework (or frameworks) for analyzing Section *773 2 claims, we now proceed to the question framed at outset of this opinion: Did the district court err in concluding that the method by which Texas elects district court judges—as that method operates in the nine target counties—violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act? Because of the uncertainty about the relevance of state interests in Section 2 analysis, we think it prudent, in answering this question, to evaluate the district court’s findings under both the accepted analytical framework and the proposed balancing framework. Before reviewing the district court’s findings under the two frameworks, however, we explain the standard of appellate review.

A. Standard of Appellate Review

The standard of appellate review for findings made in a Section 2 case is the clearly erroneous standard set forth in Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court made this clear in Gingles by "reaffirm[ing]" that the ultimate Section 2 liability or vote dilution finding is reviewed for clear error. See 478 U.S. at 79 , 106 S.Ct. at 2779 . We have also recognized that the district court's subsidiary findings under the Gingles threshold inquiry and the totality of circumstances inquiry — with the possible exception of the tenuousness of the state interests, see supra Part III.D.3 — are also reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. See Westwego I, 872 F.2d at 1203 ; Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1243 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 905 , 109 S.Ct. 3213 , 106 L.Ed.2d 564 (1989).

The reason we apply such a standard of review is due to the nature of the vote dilution inquiry. As the Supreme Court in Gingles recognized, the vote dilution determination under Section 2 is “peculiarly dependent upon the facts of each case” and requires “an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of the contested electoral mechanisms.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 79 , 106 S.Ct. at 2779 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Moreover, “the application of the clearly-erroneous standard to ultimate findings of vote dilution preserves the benefit of the trial court’s particular familiarity with the indigenous political reality without endangering the rule of law.” Id.

Even under the clearly erroneous standard set forth in Rule 52(a), a district court’s factual findings may be set aside if they rest on an erroneous view of the law. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 , 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1789 , 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982). As we stated in Armco, Inc. v. Armco Burglar Alarm Co., 693 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir.1982): “When a finding of fact is based on a misapprehension of governing legal standards, it loses the insulation of the ‘clearly erroneous’ rule.” Id. at 1162 . Once a district court’s finding loses the insulation of the clearly erroneous rule, however, “a remand is the proper course unless the record permits only one resolution of the factual issue.” Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 292 , 102 S.Ct. at 1792 (emphasis added). A remand is generally proper, according to the Supreme Court, because it is the district court, and not the court of appeals, who is “charged with the task of factfinding in the first instance.” Id. at 293 , 102 S.Ct. at 1792.

If the district court applies the appropriate legal standards in making a finding of fact, under Rule 52(a) we will not set aside that finding unless, based upon the entire record, we are "left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 , 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511 , 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 , 68 S.Ct. 525, 542 , 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)). "If the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety," we will not reverse it — even if convinced that had we "been sitting as the trier of fact, [we] would have weighed the evidence differently." Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573-74 , 105 S.Ct. at 1511 . Moreover, we give "due regard ... to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses." FED.R.CIV.P. 52(a). This reluctance to reverse a district court's findings under the clearly erroneous standard *774 persists "even when the district court's findings do not rest on credibility determinations, but are based instead on physical or documentary evidence or inferences from other facts." Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574 , 105 S.Ct. at 1511-1512 .

B. Review of the District Court’s Vote Dilution Findings Under the Accepted Section 2 Framework

Our review of the district court's vote dilution findings under the accepted Section 2 framework proceeds in three parts. In the first part, we discuss the methodology used by the Plaintiffs and accepted by the district court, and address the general attacks on that methodology by the State Defendants, Judge Wood, and Judge Entz. In the second part, we review the district court’s subsidiary fact findings under the Gingles threshold inquiry and the totality of circumstances inquiry, as well as the district court’s ultimate vote dilution finding in each of the nine counties. Finally, in the third part we consider the impact of the evidence of partisan voting patterns on the district court’s ultimate vote dilution findings.

1. Statistical Methodology

At trial, the Plaintiffs relied heavily on statistics to establish that Texas’ method of electing judges results in vote dilution in each of the nine target counties. To establish the first Gingles factor—the size and geographical compactness of the minority group—the Plaintiffs used voting age population data from the 1980 Census. To establish the second and third Gingles factors—the political cohesiveness of the minority group and legally significant white bloc voting—as well as the existence of racially polarized voting, the Plaintiffs performed certain statistical analyses on results from various elections. Finally, the Plaintiffs relied on statistics to establish certain factors that are relevant to the totality of circumstances inquiry—namely, the lingering socioeconomic effects of discrimination and the extent to which minorities have been elected to public office.

Because of the position of the second and third Gingles factors and racially polarized voting in Section 2 analysis, it is important to outline the Plaintiffs’ statistical methodology with regard to these factors. There are three aspects to this methodology: (1) the subset of elections that the Plaintiffs chose to analyze; (2) the manner in which the Plaintiffs isolated the race of the voters in the nine target counties; and (3) the types of analyses the Plaintiffs chose to perform on the particular election results.

With regard to the elections that were analyzed, the Plaintiffs’ experts, Dr. Engstrom and Dr. Brischetto, were guided by several principles. They only studied elections in which a minority candidate opposed a white candidate. Also, they preferred to analyze general elections as opposed to primary elections; however, they analyzed primary elections when no minority candidate made it past that stage of the electoral process. Finally, they preferred to analyze state district court elections. If, however, there were no district court elections or primaries in which a minority candidate opposed a white candidate, the Plaintiffs’ experts looked, in the following order of preference, to county court elections, justice of the peace elections, and statewide judicial races.

In isolating the independent variable for their statistical analyses, the racial composition of election precincts, the Plaintiffs’ experts took various approaches, depending on the availability of data. In counties where the Plaintiffs were proceeding only on behalf of Hispanics, they relied on Spanish surname counts done by the Texas Secretary of State to determine the percentage of Hispanic registered voters in any given precinct. In other instances—for example, in Harris and Dallas counties—the Plaintiffs’ experts used updated counts of Black and Hispanic total or voting age population in each precinct of the county. If such counts were not available, then the Plaintiffs’ experts relied on data from the 1980 Census. When relying on census data, the Plaintiffs’ experts calculated the number of non-minorities within precincts by subtracting the number of Hispanics and Blacks *775 from the total number of persons within the precinct.

The Plaintiffs’ experts performed two types of analyses on the data sets that were obtained: ecological regression analysis and extreme case or homogeneous precinct analysis. 31 “Ecological regression analysis” shows the relationship between the ethnic composition of voting precincts and voting behavior—or, to put it differently, which candidate receives how many votes from each race or ethnic group. See Overton v. City of Austin, 871 F.2d 529, 539 (5th Cir.1989). “Extreme case or homogeneous precinct analysis” focuses on precincts in which almost all of the voting age population belong to one ethnic group. Under this type of analysis, if the race or ethnicity of a voter predicts voting behavior, then election results in predominately minority precincts should differ from results in predominately white precincts.

The State Defendants, Judge Wood, and Judge Entz raise various, across-the-board challenges to the methodology used by the Plaintiffs and accepted by the district court. They first attack the Plaintiff’s reliance on 1980 Census figures to establish thé Cingles factors. They also challenge the Plaintiffs’ selection of elections. Finally, they complain about the Plaintiffs’ use of bivariate regression analysis in establishing racially polarized voting.

With regard to the Plaintiffs’ use of population statistics from the 1980 Census, the complaint is that the statistics are dated. Quoting this court’s decision in Houston v. Haley, 859 F.2d 341, 345 (5th Cir.1988), vacated on other grounds, 869 F.2d 807 (5th Cir.1989), Judge Entz argues that “[wjhatever the voting age population composition was [in 1980], given mobility, mortality, and coming of age, we cannot tell with any certainty what it is today.” Thus, Judge Entz concludes that the Plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of proof with regard to the Cingles factors, and that, therefore, the district court erred in relying on their statistical analyses. We disagree.

After examining the record and Fifth Circuit law on this issue, we conclude that the complaint about the Plaintiffs’ use of outdated statistical data is without merit. In Overton , we recognized that “absolute perfection of the base statistical data is not to be expected.” 871 F.2d at 539 . It is difficult for us to fault the Plaintiffs—and the district court—for relying on the most recent census figures in this case. Moreover, we note that in Dallas and Harris counties, the Plaintiffs relied on updated census figures. Judge Entz would apparently require minority groups seeking relief under Section 2 to either bring their lawsuits within the first few years after census figures are released or engage in a costly re-estimation of population figures. Although we cautioned in Overton that “a trial court should not ignore the imperfections of the data used nor the limitations of the statistical analysis,” id., we do not think the trial court ignored the imperfections in the data set relied on by the Plaintiffs in Dallas County. Instead, the district court, after carefully considering those imperfections, accepted the data sets used by the Plaintiffs as being reliable. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in relying on the 1980 Census population data or on the analyses by the Plaintiffs’ experts who also relied on this data.

The State Defendants, Judge Wood, and Judge Entz also complain about the principles by which the Plaintiffs’ experts chose the relevant elections to be analyzed. They argue specifically that the Plaintiffs’ experts should have considered more elections—elections pairing white candidates against white candidates, elections pairing white candidates against other minority candidates, primary elections, and non-judicial elections. Because the Plaintiffs’ experts did not consider all of these types of elections, they conclude that the district court erred in relying on the Plaintiffs’ analyses. Again, we disagree.

*776 The State Defendants, Judge Wood, and Judge Entz essentially complain that, in the battle of the experts, their expert—Dr. Taebel—lost. Dr. Taebel analyzed the various types of elections described above, and the district court considered his analyses in each of the counties at issue. We cannot fault the district court for giving more weight to the elections analyzed by the Plaintiffs’ experts, especially given our recognition .that “the evidence most probative of racially polarized voting must be drawn from elections including both [minority] and white candidates.” Westwego I, 872 F.2d at 1208 n. 7. Accordingly, we reject the complaint that, as a matter of law, the elections the Plaintiffs chose to analyze are insufficient to establish the second and third Gingles factors as well as the existence of racially polarized voting.

Finally, Judge Wood argues that, to establish racially polarized voting, the Plaintiffs were required to conduct a multivariate analysis on the election results—an analysis that would consider variables other than the race of the voter, such as partisan affiliation of the candidate, whether the candidate was endorsed by the local bar poll, and campaign expenditures. We reject this argument. As we have already explained, see supra Part II.B.l.b. and note 7, to establish racially polarized voting, a Section 2 plaintiff need only demonstrate that whites and minorities vote differently. Thus, bivariate analyses such as the ones used by the Plaintiffs are sufficient.

In sum, we conclude that the statistical methods used by the Plaintiffs, although not perfect, are sufficient for purposes of establishing the Gingles factors and racially polarized voting. The Plaintiffs and the district court could reasonably rely on 1980 Census statistics. It was also reasonable for the district court to give more weight to the elections analyzed by the Plaintiffs. And finally, the Plaintiffs’ were not required to use a multivariate analysis to demonstrate the existence of racially polarized voting.

2. Review of District Court’s Vote Dilution Findings

In Gingles , the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he inquiry into the existence of vote dilution caused by submergence in a multimember district is district specific.” 478 U.S. at 59 n. 28, 106 S.Ct. at 2771 n. 28. In a case like this, where a number of vote dilution claims are raised in one case, the district court must rely on data “specific to each individual district” in making the appropriate findings under the Gingles threshold inquiry and the totality of circumstances inquiry. See id. The district court may not, according to the Court in Gingles , rely on data aggregated from all the challenged districts. Id.; see also id. at 101, 106 S.Ct. at 2793 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (voting statistics from one district are ordinarily irrelevant in assessing the totality of circumstances in another).

Because the Plaintiffs challenge Texas method of electing judges, as that method operates in nine target counties, we review the district court’s findings on a county-by-county basis. That is, with regard to each of the nine target counties—Bexar County, Dallas County, Ector County, Harris County, Jefferson County, Lubbock County, Midland County, Tarrant County, and Travis County—we review the district court’s specific findings under the Gingles inquiry, the totality of circumstances inquiry 32 and the ultimate vote dilution inquiry 33 for clear error.

*777 a. Bexar County

In Bexar County, where nineteen (19) state district court judges are elected in county-wide elections, Plaintiffs proceed only on behalf of Hispanic voters. At trial, the district court found that Plaintiffs had introduced evidence sufficient to establish all three Gingles factors and five of the factors listed as relevant in the totality of circumstances inquiry. Based on this evidence, the district court found that Texas’ method of electing district judges dilutes Hispanic voting strength in Bexar. For the following reasons, we conclude that none of the district court’s findings with regard to Bexar County is clearly erroneous. 34

(i) Gingles factors. With regard to the first Gingles factor, the district court found that, as a group, Hispanic voters in Bexar County are sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single member district. In making this finding, the district court relied on evidence introduced by the Plaintiffs indicating that (a) Hispanics constitute 41.1% of the voting age population in Bexar County, (b) Hispanics primarily reside in the central and south central sections of Bexar County, and (c) it would be possible to create eight single-member districts in which voting-age Hispanics constitute majorities. Because the district court correctly based its determination on the voting age population in Bexar County, see supra Part H.A.I., and because its determination is plausible in light of the record, we conclude that its finding with regard to the first Gingles factor is not clearly erroneous.

The district court also found, under the legal standards required to establish the second Gingles factor, see supra Part II. A.2., that Hispanic voters in Bexar County are politically cohesive. In reaching this finding, the district court primarily relied on Dr. Brischetto’s statistical analysis of six district court elections in which Hispanic candidates opposed white candidates. This analysis indicated that, in Bexar County, Hispanic voters gave 73% to 93% of their votes to the same candidate. The district court also relied on a bivariate regression analysis performed by Dr. Brischetto, an analysis that demonstrated a “strong relationship between race and voting patterns in Bexar County.” In view of this evidence, we are not “left with a definite and firm conviction” that the district court was mistaken in finding that Hispanic voters in Bexar County are politically cohesive. Thus, this finding may not be set aside as clearly erroneous.

As for the third Gingles factor, the district court determined, after considering all the testimony offered by the Plaintiffs and the State Defendants, that there is legally significant white bloc voting in Bexar County. The district court first considered Dr. Brischetto’s statistical analysis of the six general elections in which Hispanic district court candidates opposed white candidates. This data indicated that the preferred candidate of Hispanic voters won only once and that the non-Hispanic support for the Hispanic-preferred candidate ranged from 18% to 35% in those six elections. 35 The district court also considered *778 statistical evidence offered by Dr. Taebel, the State Defendants’ expert, who analyzed twelve general elections, only one of which was a district court election, and eighteen primary elections. Dr. Taebel found that the Hispanic-preferred candidate won three of twelve general elections and six of eighteen primary elections. Finally, the district court considered testimony from Hispanic judicial candidates who attributed their losses to the lack of adequate support from white voters. Given the evidence presented to the district court, we cannot say that it clearly erred in finding persuasive Dr. Brischetto’s conclusion that the white bloc vote in Bexar county is sufficiently strong to usually defeat the Hispanic community’s preferred candidate.

(ii) Totality of circumstances factors. Inquiring into the totality of the circumstances in Bexar County, the district court found: that Hispanics had been subject to a history of discrimination in voting, that elections in Bexar County were characterized by racially polarized voting, that several aspects Texas’ method of electing district judges enhance the opportunity for discrimination in Bexar County, that Hispanics in Bexar County continue to bear the socioeconomic effects of past discrimination, and that Hispanics in Bexar County have not been successful in district court elections. The district court found, however, no evidence of a slating process and no use of racial appeals in Bexar County elections. None of these findings is clearly erroneous.

The district court effectively took judicial notice of the history of official discrimination against Hispanics and Blacks in Texas, finding that this history was “either well chronicled or undisputed.” This history of official discrimination, the district court continued, “touched many aspects of the lives of minorities in [the nine target counties,] including their access to and participation in the democratic system governing this State____” (emphasis added). Neither the State Defendants nor the intervenors challenge this finding on appeal. Indeed, the State Defendants acknowledge the “long, shameful history of racial discrimination in Texas.” Given this admission, we cannot conclude that the district court clearly erred in finding a history of discrimination touching the rights of Hispanics to participate in the Bexar County political process. See also Graves v. Barnes, 343 F.Supp. 704, 728 (W.D.Tex.) (three-judge court) (noting that “the Mexican-American population of Texas ... has historically suffered from, and continues to suffer from, the results and effects of invidious discrimination and treatment in the fields of education, employment, economics, health, politics, and others”), aff’d sub nom. Archer v. Smith, 409 U.S. 808 , 93 S.Ct. 62 , 34 L.Ed.2d 68 (1972), aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 , 93 S.Ct. 2332 , 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973) (Graves I).

The district court also found strong evidence of racially polarized voting in Bexar County. Dr. Brischetto’s statistical analysis of six district court elections from 1980 to 1988 revealed that, in all but one of the races, as the percentage of Hispanic voters in a precinct increased, support for the Hispanic preferred candidate also increased. According to Dr. Brischetto’s statistical analysis, race explains 64% to 77% of the variance in voting in these six elections. The district court further observed that, in twenty-eight of the twenty-nine judicial elections involving Hispanic candidates in Bexar County, whites and Hispanics voted differently. Because the record supports the district court’s finding of a strong relationship between race and voting patterns in Bexar County, we will not set that finding aside as being clearly erroneous.

Surveying the other factors relevant to the political landscape in Bexar County, the district court found that certain features of Texas’ scheme of electing district court judges interact with the at-large nature of that election scheme to further enhance the opportuni

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.