holding that COGSA’s one-year limitations period is inapplicable “[wjhere the relationship or contract between the party seeking indemnity and the one from whom indemnity is sought is not governed by an agreement subject to COGSA”
How later courts described this case
- holding that COGSA’s one-year limitations period is inapplicable “[wjhere the relationship or contract between the party seeking indemnity and the one from whom indemnity is sought is not governed by an agreement subject to COGSA”
- holding that a claim for indemnity arises only after the party seeking indemnity is held liable and that a statute of limitation provision cannot commence to run until the claim arises
- explaining that the limitations period for maritime claims is “generally determined by the equitable doctrine of laches”
- finding circumstantial evidence was sufficient to find a meeting of the minds to carry out a conspiracy
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
REAVLEY, Circuit Judge, with whom CHARLES CLARK, RONEY, GEE, ALVIN B. RUBIN and R. LANIER ANDERSON, III,
join concurring:
The court states that “there was no contractual limitation period as between Escambia and Detco covering loss or damage to the barge (not cargo).” It follows that the court is not holding that statutory or contractual limitations, stated to begin to run upon delivery, begin to run against an indemnity claim only after payment or judgment. See ITT Rayonier v. Southeastern Maritime Co., 620 F.2d 512 at 515 (Tate, J., concurring); Francosteel Corp. v. S.S. Tien Cheung, 375 F.Supp. 794 at 796 . The only change made in the law of the circuit by the writing on the indemnity claim is to repudiate the rationale of Grace (this being that since cargo Royal was time-barred against owner Grace, charterer Central’s indemnity claim was therefore likewise time-barred against owner Grace). Grace Lines v. Central Steamship Corp., 416 F.2d 977 at 979 . For this reason I concur.