holding that parole board members performing a quasi-judicial function are immune from damages liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .
How later courts described this case
- holding that parole board members performing a quasi-judicial function are immune from damages liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .
- deciding pre-Butz that members of parole board were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity even though prisoners did not have rights to call or cross-examine witnesses at parole hearings
- defining the minimum due process requirements that parole proceedings must satisfy
- finding inmates have a limited liberty interest in parole entitling them to a statement of reasons for denial of parole
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WIDENER, Circuit Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
While I concur in the result and in nearly all of the opinion of the majority, I think we “anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.” Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 [ 56 S.Ct. 466, 483 , 80 L.Ed. 688 ] (1936) (Mr. Justice Brandéis concurring). Since the Board already does everything that may be constitutionally required, including giving the reasons for a denial of parole, I think an approach preferable to the dictum would be to assume that if there were a constitutional requirement, it has been lived up to, thus avoiding a question “of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.” Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 [ 25 S.Ct. 243, 245 , 49 L.Ed. 482 ] (1905).