Opinion

United States v. Harris

  • 498 F.2d 1164
Court
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Filed
May 30, 1974
Status
Published
On the bench
Aldisert, Biggs, Gibbons, Rosenn, Seitz, Weis
Cited by
59 cases
Authority
More cited than 18.7%

rejecting proposition that "the prosecutor must play the role of defense counsel, and ferret out ambiguities in his witness' responses on cross-examination"

How later courts described this case

  • rejecting proposition that "the prosecutor must play the role of defense counsel, and ferret out ambiguities in his witness' responses on cross-examination"
  • prosecutor admitted that he had promised the cooperating witness that the Government would do “whatever [it] could” to get her state sentence reduced
  • the prosecutor’s obligation to correct arises “where the Government knows that the witness is intentionally committing perjury” or “when it should be obvious to the Government that the witness’ answer ... is untrue”
  • "We do not believe ... that the prosecution’s duty to disclose false testimony by one of its witnesses is to be narrowly and technically limited to those situations where the prosecutor knows that the witness is guilty of the crime of perjury.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

OPINION SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING

The dissent sur denial of the petition for rehearing would reverse on the ground that the prosecution must inform the fact finder as well as the court and defense counsel of the truth. This requirement appears to have been met in the instant case, however, by the prosecutor’s proffered stipulation during the Government’s case in chief as to the facts he admitted to the court and to counsel. This stipulation could also have been submitted to the jury if defense counsel so desired.

The dissent views the trial judge’s statement that he would deny a defense motion as effectively foreclosing the defendants from any significant means of relief. The trial judge, however, was apparently referring to a motion for mistrial. As we have indicated in our original opinion, he was not precluding the defense from other remedies which were readily available to them.

For an example of measures by defense counsel to reduce prejudice resulting from the prosecution’s belated disclosure of a bargain with a key witness, see United States v. Johnson, 487 F.2d 1318, 1322-1324 (5th Cir. 1974), petition for certiorari filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3542 (U.S. March 26, 1974) (No. 73-1418).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.