holding that tribes’ suit for breach of fiduciary duty based on the United 70 227-329 VOL_25_PROOF.pdf 80 10/22/12 11:10 AM Investment of Federal Trust Funds for Cheyenne River and Lower Brule Sioux States’ breach of its duties as trustee to tribes would be determined by reference to the statutory scheme governing Indian trust funds deposited in the Treasury
How later courts described this case
- holding that tribes’ suit for breach of fiduciary duty based on the United 70 227-329 VOL_25_PROOF.pdf 80 10/22/12 11:10 AM Investment of Federal Trust Funds for Cheyenne River and Lower Brule Sioux States’ breach of its duties as trustee to tribes would be determined by reference to the statutory scheme governing Indian trust funds deposited in the Treasury
- holding that the government was obligated to pay interest when it mismanaged funds that were part of the same IMPL accounts at issue in this case
- “It is clear from past actions of this *647 court and from the Supreme Court, and from the actions of both Congress and the Executive Branch, that funds appropriated to Indians to satisfy judgments of the Indian Claims Commission or of this court ... are, when kept in the Treasury, held in trust for the Indians.”
- defendant’s proposed three-day grace period “included an allowance for mailing the deposit to Muskogee and the deposit there of the funds”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Nichols, Judge,
concurring:
I concur in Judge Davis’ opinion. I would like, however, to stress, even more strongly than he does, the utter inappropriateness of invoking our summary judgment procedure in this case at this juncture, with the hope that no one will copy plaintiffs’ measures in future cases.
In my opinion, the procedure in Trans Ocean Van Service v. United States, 192 Ct. Cl. 75 , 426 F. 2d 329 (1970), after Rule 131(c) proceedings 200 Ct. Cl. 122 , 470 F. 2d 604 (1972) shows how, within the present Bules, a multiplicity of separate claims can be handled even though they involve a complex cross entangling of numerous legal and factual issues, as I think these claims do.
I went to the oral argument in this case, after spending much time with the briefs and record, in a state of utter *354 perplexity as to what useful action we could possibly be expected to take. I asked plaintiffs for a draft order in hopes of getting light as to this. With his greater wisdom, Judge Davis has managed to salvage something of value out of an exercise I expected to be a total loss.
In general, a judgment is a pronouncement by the court as to the legal consequences of established facts. A roving pronouncement of the law supposedly applicable to a case, independent of the facts, is not a judgment of itself, and a motion for summary judgment is not an appropriate means of eliciting such a pronouncement, supposing it is appropriate for the court to make it. A motion for summary judgment under Eule 101(a) is not an appropriate means to use in good faith for eliciting a partially dispositive order under Rule 101(e) even though, as here, such an order may sometimes be the result. The filing of a motion for summary judgment suspends the jurisdiction of the trial judge per Rule 14(b) (2), whereas this case is, of all others, one where the services of a trial judge are most needed. At present, our clerk has no option to do anything with cross motions for summary judgment except to calendar them for argument before a panel of judges. And finally, our trial division has many important functions besides conducting trials. For one thing, a pre-trial conference under Rule 111 may be an appropriate means of settling on further procedural steps, and perhaps even avoiding a trial. Parties should consider the operational effect of the moves they make.