tracing “the development of the congressional policy against an exemption for organizations that attempt to promote or defeat legislation” (emphasis added)
How later courts described this case
- tracing “the development of the congressional policy against an exemption for organizations that attempt to promote or defeat legislation” (emphasis added)
- “The limitations in sections 501(c)(3) and 170(c)(2) of the 1954 Code stem from the policy that the United States Treasury should be neutral in political affairs and that substantial activities directed to attempts to influence legislation should not be subsidized.”
- “Tax exemptions are matters of 8 Case: 23-60608 Document: 58-1 Page: 9 Date Filed: 10/28/2024 No. 23-60608 legislative grace and taxpayers have the burden of establishing their entitlement to exemptions.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Nichols, Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the result. The trial judge holds that National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP) the donee of plaintiff’s contributions, was disqualified because not operated exclusively for the purposes required by IRC of 1954, § 170(c) (2) (B) and (emphasis supplied) a substantial part of its activities involved attempts to influence legislation per § 170(c) (2) (D). I deem the former holding clearly correct. Slee v. Commissioner, 42 F. 2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930). An organization like NARP has a choice of seeking its ends by advocating or opposing legislation in Congress or by “public interest” litigation in the courts. NARP did both. The former is the most direct possible form of petitioning for redress of grievances under Amendment I of the Constitution. To hold that an organization that has qualified under subsec. *451 (B) loses its status because it petitions even though in the most correct and lawful fashion, but not if it litigates, however unethically, or foments litigation, is to create a discrimination that raises constitutional difficulties for me that neither the trial judge nor the authorities he cites wholly resolve. Cases should be decided if possible without raising or dealing with Constitutional difficulties and this can be done here by resting the decision on subsec. (B) and not going on to subsec. (D) on the hypothesis, contrary to fact, that the organization qualifies so far as (B) is concerned.
CONCLUSION OF LAAV
Upon the foregoing opinion and the findings of fact, which are adopted by the court and made a part of the judgment herein, the court concludes as a matter of law that plaintiff is not entitled to recover, and the petition is dismissed.