explaining that, under RSA 630:3, I, II, the culpability requirement of negligent homicide may be satisfied either by showing that a person caused the death of another negligently or by establishing that the person caused the death in the course of driving while under the influence
How later courts described this case
- explaining that, under RSA 630:3, I, II, the culpability requirement of negligent homicide may be satisfied either by showing that a person caused the death of another negligently or by establishing that the person caused the death in the course of driving while under the influence
- holding drunken driving in violation of statute is not merely malum prohibitum, but is malum in se
- rejecting overbreadth argument where, “[i]n prohibiting a person from causing death as a consequence of driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, [the statute] does not infringe a protected freedom”
- rejecting overbreadth argument where, “[i]n prohibiting a person from causing *436 death as a consequence of driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, [the statute] does not infringe a protected freedom”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
King, C.J.,
with whom Batchelder, J., joins, dissenting in Grindle: While I agree with the majority’s analysis of section II of the negligent homicide statute, RSA 630:3, II, and the disposition of Grindle’s sufficiency claim, I am unable to join in the court’s reaffirmation of State v. Cornelius, 122 N.H. 925 , 452 A.2d 464 (1982), in part III, A of the opinion. For the reasons set forth in Justice Batchelder’s dissent in State v. Cornelius, supra, at 929-31 , 452 A.2d at 467-68 , in which I concurred, I continue to believe that when a breath test is administered at the direction of a law enforcement officer, the defendant has a due process right under part I, article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution to have a second sample preserved for independent analysis. Accordingly, the results of a breathalyzer test should be inadmissible unless the State preserves a second breath sample or its functional equivalent for independent testing by the defendant. I would therefore vacate the judgment of the superior court in Grindle and remand for further proceedings.