explaining that, under RSA 630:3, I, II, the culpability requirement of negligent homicide may be satisfied either by showing that a person caused the death of another negligently or by establishing that the person caused the death in the course of driving while under the influence
How later courts described this case
- explaining that, under RSA 630:3, I, II, the culpability requirement of negligent homicide may be satisfied either by showing that a person caused the death of another negligently or by establishing that the person caused the death in the course of driving while under the influence
- holding drunken driving in violation of statute is not merely malum prohibitum, but is malum in se
- rejecting overbreadth argument where, “[i]n prohibiting a person from causing death as a consequence of driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, [the statute] does not infringe a protected freedom”
- rejecting overbreadth argument where, “[i]n prohibiting a person from causing *436 death as a consequence of driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, [the statute] does not infringe a protected freedom”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Douglas, J.,
concurring specially: I concur in the portion of part III, A, wherein the majority holds that the due process clause did not mandate that defendant Grindle be provided an additional breath sample for independent analysis, while reaffirming my special concurrence in State v. Cornelius, 122 N.H. 925, 928-29 , 452 A.2d 464, 465-66 (1982). It is significant that the facts in the instant *633 case occurred prior to February 1, 1983. Had they occurred after that date, a second breath test sample or its functional equivalent would have been required by the due process clause of the New Hampshire Constitution. N.H. CONST, pt. I, art. 15.