finding 533 S.W.3d 572 (Ark. 2017) was issued in response to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas’s certification of two questions: first, “[a]re the rulings in DePriest v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals, L.P, 351 S.W.3d 168 [(Ark. 2009
How later courts described this case
- finding 533 S.W.3d 572 (Ark. 2017) was issued in response to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas’s certification of two questions: first, “[a]re the rulings in DePriest v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals, L.P, 351 S.W.3d 168 [(Ark. 2009
- "[W]hen a diversion of tax revenues occurs from a specific purpose that has been authorized to an unauthorized purpose . . . an illegal exaction occurs."
- "When a tax is enacted by the General Assembly or approved by a vote of the people without the statement of a purpose, the resulting revenues may be used for general purposes."
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled implicitly by Anderson v. State, 357 Ark. 180 (2004)
Nooner replies to the State’s citation to Hill with the argument that Anderson, 357 Ark. 180, 163 S.W.3d 333, implicitly overruled Hill, 331 Ark. 312, 962 S.W.2d 762. Citing Oldner v. Villines, 328 Ark. 296, 943 S.W.2d 574 (1997), Nooner argues that an earlier decision that has not been expressly overruled is implicitly overruled by subsequent decisions to the contrary.
The opinion
David Newbern, Justice, concurring. The first portion of the majority opinion concludes that Michael A. Oldner, the plaintiff in the Trial Court, did not state facts upon which relief could be granted because he did not attack a “law imposing a tax.” I thoroughly agree with that conclusion. Obviously, the failure to state the object of a tax on a ballot does not violate Ark. Const, art. 16, § 11. The majority opinion should end with that statement. Instead, it unnecessarily goes forward into a tortured interpretation of the Constitution with which I thoroughly disagree.
Article 16, § 11, states:
No tax shall be levied except in pursuance of law, and every law imposing a tax shall state distinctly the object of the same; and no moneys arising from a tax levied for one purpose shall be used for any other purpose.
The majority opinion allows that the only evil addressed by that section is the one stated in the phrase prohibiting the use of moneys arising from a tax levied for one purpose for another purpose. The ultimate conclusion is that the first phrase of § 11 is meaningless. That conclusion is reached despite the majority’s correct statement, supported by proper citations, that “Oldner is correct in urging that when the language of the constitution is plain and unambiguous, each word must be given its'plain, obvious, and common meaning.” To me, it is apparent that there are two distinct thoughts expressed in § 11. They are even separated by a semicolon and a conjunction. I am unwilling to ignore either of them.
When we go far beyond that which is necessary to decide litigation, even overruling precedent in the process, we encounter the danger of saying way too much and being sorry later. We will regret this decision that effectively nullifies the requirement that the object of a tax be stated in the law imposing it.