Opinion

Arkansas Department of Human Services v. Harris

  • 322 Ark. 465
  • 910 S.W.2d 221
  • 1995 Ark. LEXIS 688
Court
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Filed
Nov 20, 1995
Status
Published
Author
Dudley
On the bench
Brown, Dudley, Glaze
Cited by
3 cases
Authority
More cited than 62.5%

The opinion

Robert H. Dudley, Justice. Deborah Harris had a baby on November 26, 1970, and subsequently married appellee Robert Harris. Appellee then adopted the child. On August 6, 1981, the Harrises were divorced in Missouri. The decree awarded child custody to the mother and ordered appellee to pay $128.00 per month child support beginning September 1, 1981, and to con-dime until the child reached majority. The child reached majority on November 26, 1988. In the meantime, appellee moved to Crittenden County and, at least in part, failed to pay the child support. The Missouri Department of Social Services referred the matter to appellant Arkansas Department of Human Services, and on March 19, 1993, in Crittenden County, appellant Department of Human Services filed this action for past due child support. The chancellor ruled that the applicable statute of limitations barred claims for arrearage that accrued more than five years before the complaint was filed and found that appellee Harris owed $1,152.00 Appellant Department appeals. We affirm the ruling.

On appeal, appellant Department of Human Services contends that the statute of limitations barred claims for arrearage that accrued more than five years from the effective date of Act 870 of 1991, or March 29, 1986, rather than the five years before the complaint was filed, or March 19, 1989. Act 870 of 1991, now codified as Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-236 (Repl. 1993), expanded the limitations period for child support actions.

We do not reach the issue. Appellant’s abstract does not contain a summary of the petition or complaint; nor does it contain a synopsis of the proof, if any; nor does it contain a condensation of arguments made below, if any; nor does it contain a summary of briefs submitted to the chancellor, if any. In short, appellant’s abstract does not reflect that it made the argument to the chancellor that it now makes on appeal.

We only reverse a trial court for some prejudicial error committed, or not corrected, by the trial court, with some exceptions not applicable to this case. Silvey Cos. v. Riley, 318 Ark. 788 , 888 S.W.2d 636 (1994). It is incumbent upon appellant to file an abstract that reflects that an issue was raised in the trial court, and the trial court either erred or refused to correct an error. We will not reach an issue where the abstract does not show that it was raised in the trial court. Johnson v. Lilly, 308 Ark. 201 , 823 S.W.2d 883 (1992).

Affirmed.

Glaze, J., concurs and Brown, J., dissents.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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