holding that, under a similar driver's license disciplinary statute, Ala. Code 1975, § 32-5A-195(q), a judicial-review proceeding "is a de novo hearing, i.e., the trial court is empowered to have a hearing, to take testimony, to receive evidence, and to make a finding on its own," and "the [d]irector [of the disciplining agency] ha[s] the burden of proof"
How later courts described this case
- holding that, under a similar driver's license disciplinary statute, Ala. Code 1975, § 32-5A-195(q), a judicial-review proceeding "is a de novo hearing, i.e., the trial court is empowered to have a hearing, to take testimony, to receive evidence, and to make a finding on its own," and "the [d]irector [of the disciplining agency] ha[s] the burden of proof"
- holding that, under a similar driver's license disciplinary statute, Ala. Code 1975, § 32-5A-195(q
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ROBERTSON, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
While the majority opinion quotes Madison for the proposition that this is a civil proceeding, I disagree. The Madison case involved a question of automobile liability insurance and the sixth amendment right to counsel, and this court held that the sixth amendment extends only to criminal or quasi-criminal cases and that Madison was a civil proceeding.
The license suspension in this case is based on a charge of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquors in the State of Georgia where Irvine entered a “nolo contendere” plea. It is my opinion that this proceeding is quasi-criminal in nature, and, as such, the trial court did not err in refusing to allow the Director to call Irvine as an adverse witness. If it was error, after a review of the record, I would find it to be harmless error in this case.