observing that "[t]he elimination of the current standard instruction on circumstantial evidence does not totally prohibit such an instruction if a trial judge, in his or her discretion, feels that such is necessary under the peculiar facts of a specific case," but that "the giving of proposed instructions on reasonable doubt and burden of proof ... renders an instruction on circumstantial evidence unnecessary"
How later courts described this case
- observing that "[t]he elimination of the current standard instruction on circumstantial evidence does not totally prohibit such an instruction if a trial judge, in his or her discretion, feels that such is necessary under the peculiar facts of a specific case," but that "the giving of proposed instructions on reasonable doubt and burden of proof ... renders an instruction on circumstantial evidence unnecessary"
- recognizing there could be improvement in the manner in which a case is presented to the jury on alternate theories of felony murder and premeditated murder and suggesting use of special verdict forms as a solution
- rejecting the special standard for evaluating circumstantial evidence as “confusing and incorrect”
- giving of reasonable doubt instruction renders instruction on circumstantial evidence unnecessary
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ADKINS, Justice,
concurs:
Also, I dissent to the proposed change in the instruction on reasonable doubt and the elimination of the instruction on circumstantial evidence except at the whim of the trial judge.