Opinion

In re Trial Courts of the Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases

  • 431 So. 2d 594
  • 1981 Fla. LEXIS 2937
Court
Supreme Court of Florida
Filed
Apr 16, 1981
Status
Published
Author
Sundberg
On the bench
Adkins, Alderman, Also, Boyd, Change, Doubt, Elimination, England, Except, Instruction, McDonald, Overton, Sundberg, Trial, Whim
Cited by
127 cases
Authority
More cited than 26.0%

Modified by In re Trial Courts of the Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 1981 Fla. LEXIS 2938 (1981)

observing that "[t]he elimination of the current standard instruction on circumstantial evidence does not totally prohibit such an instruction if a trial judge, in his or her discretion, feels that such is necessary under the peculiar facts of a specific case," but that "the giving of proposed instructions on reasonable doubt and burden of proof ... renders an instruction on circumstantial evidence unnecessary"

How later courts described this case

  • observing that "[t]he elimination of the current standard instruction on circumstantial evidence does not totally prohibit such an instruction if a trial judge, in his or her discretion, feels that such is necessary under the peculiar facts of a specific case," but that "the giving of proposed instructions on reasonable doubt and burden of proof ... renders an instruction on circumstantial evidence unnecessary"
  • recognizing there could be improvement in the manner in which a case is presented to the jury on alternate theories of felony murder and premeditated murder and suggesting use of special verdict forms as a solution
  • rejecting the special standard for evaluating circumstantial evidence as “confusing and incorrect”
  • giving of reasonable doubt instruction renders instruction on circumstantial evidence unnecessary

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

SUNDBERG, Chief Justice,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur in all parts of the majority opinion except that part which approves reduction of lesser included offenses from four to two categories. Such a practice, I believe, will result in taking “a most critical eviden-tiary matter from the proper province of the jury and vesting] it improperly as a matter of law with the trial judge.” Hand v. State, 199 So.2d 100, 102 (Fla.1967); see Lomax v. State, 345 So.2d 719 (Fla.1977). To distinguish between “ample evidence to support a guilty verdict on the higher offense” on the one hand and a “total lack of evidence of the lesser offense” on the other simply is not meaningful to me. Hence, I dissent to the proposed change in rules 3.510 and 3.490, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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